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From:   Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To:     Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
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Cc:     Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
        Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
        Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
        Lee Smith <Lee.Smith@arm.com>,
        Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
        Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@arm.com>,
        Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@arm.com>,
        Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 3/7] arm64: untag user addresses in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr
Date:   Wed, 20 Jun 2018 17:24:22 +0200
Message-Id: <69573b1f821c5068be21fdff556cef11f03a09b4.1529507994.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1529507994.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
References: <cover.1529507994.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data
from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can
provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user,
we need to correctly handle such pointers.

Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr,
before performing access validity checks.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2d6451cbaa86..fa7318d3d7d5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si
 #define untagged_addr(addr)		\
 	((__typeof__(addr))sign_extend64((__u64)(addr), 55))
 
-#define access_ok(type, addr, size)	__range_ok(addr, size)
+#define access_ok(type, addr, size)	\
+	__range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size)
 #define user_addr_max			get_fs
 
 #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to)						\
@@ -237,7 +238,8 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void)
 
 /*
  * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the
- * current addr_limit.
+ * current addr_limit. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set),
+ * untag the pointer before checking.
  */
 #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr)
 static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
@@ -245,10 +247,11 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
 	void __user *safe_ptr;
 
 	asm volatile(
-	"	bics	xzr, %1, %2\n"
+	"	bics	xzr, %3, %2\n"
 	"	csel	%0, %1, xzr, eq\n"
 	: "=&r" (safe_ptr)
-	: "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit)
+	: "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit),
+	  "r" (untagged_addr(ptr))
 	: "cc");
 
 	csdb();
-- 
2.18.0.rc1.244.gcf134e6275-goog