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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 21 Jun 2018 16:59:56 -0400 Received: from b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.109]) by b01cxnp22035.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w5LKxtp511010634 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Thu, 21 Jun 2018 20:59:55 GMT Received: from b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44C55112061; Thu, 21 Jun 2018 16:59:52 -0400 (EDT) Received: from b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 305B1112064; Thu, 21 Jun 2018 16:59:52 -0400 (EDT) Received: from sbct-3.pok.ibm.com (unknown [9.47.158.153]) by b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 21 Jun 2018 16:59:52 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] ima: Use tpm_chip_find() and access TPM functions using it To: Mimi Zohar , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Cc: jgg@ziepe.ca, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20180620204236.1572523-1-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20180620204236.1572523-4-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1529614425.23843.20.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> From: Stefan Berger Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2018 16:59:55 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1529614425.23843.20.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-MW X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18062120-0052-0000-0000-000003025882 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00009235; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000265; SDB=6.01050355; UDB=6.00538278; IPR=6.00829326; MB=3.00021792; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-06-21 20:59:58 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18062120-0053-0000-0000-00005D1872B8 Message-Id: X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-06-21_09:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1805220000 definitions=main-1806210226 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 06/21/2018 04:53 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Wed, 2018-06-20 at 16:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: >> Rather than accessing the TPM functions using a NULL pointer, which >> causes a lookup for a suitable chip every time, get a hold of a tpm_chip >> and access the TPM functions using this chip. We call the tpm_chip >> ima_tpm_chip and protect it, once initialization is done, using a >> rw_semaphore called ima_tpm_chip_lock. >> >> Use ima_shutdown to release the tpm_chip. >> >> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger >> --- >> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +++ >> security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 12 ++++++++++-- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 7 +++++-- >> 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> index 354bb5716ce3..53a88d578ca5 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ >> #include >> #include >> #include >> +#include >> #include >> >> #include "../integrity.h" >> @@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ extern int ima_policy_flag; >> extern int ima_used_chip; >> extern int ima_hash_algo; >> extern int ima_appraise; >> +extern struct rw_semaphore ima_tpm_chip_lock; >> +extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; > > ima_add_templatE_entry() synchronizes appending a measurement to the > measurement list and extending the TPM by taking a lock.  Do we really > need to introduce another lock? This lock protects the ima_tpm_chip from going from != NULL to NULL in the ima_shutdown function. Basically, a global pointer accessed by concurrent threads should be protected if its value can change. However, in this case ima_shutdown would be called so late that there shouldn't be concurrency anymore. Though, I found it better to protect it. Maybe someone else has an opinion?     Stefan > > Mimi > >> /* IMA event related data */ >> struct ima_event_data { >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c >> index 4e085a17124f..da7715240476 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c >> @@ -631,10 +631,18 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len, >> >> static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) >> { >> + int result = 0; >> + >> + down_read(&ima_tpm_chip_lock); >> + >> if (!ima_used_chip) >> - return; >> + goto out; >> + >> + result = tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, pcr); >> +out: >> + up_read(&ima_tpm_chip_lock); >> >> - if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0) >> + if (result != 0) >> pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); >> } >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c >> index 8a5258eb32b6..24db06c4f463 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c >> @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ >> /* name for boot aggregate entry */ >> static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate"; >> int ima_used_chip; >> +struct rw_semaphore ima_tpm_chip_lock = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(ima_tpm_chip_lock); >> +struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; >> >> /* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend >> * the PCR register. >> @@ -108,6 +110,13 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void) >> static int ima_shutdown(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long action, >> void *data) >> { >> + down_write(&ima_tpm_chip_lock); >> + if (ima_tpm_chip) { >> + tpm_chip_put(ima_tpm_chip); >> + ima_tpm_chip = NULL; >> + ima_used_chip = 0; >> + } >> + up_write(&ima_tpm_chip_lock); >> return NOTIFY_DONE; >> } >> >> @@ -118,19 +127,15 @@ static struct notifier_block ima_reboot_notifier = { >> >> int __init ima_init(void) >> { >> - u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> int rc; >> >> register_reboot_notifier(&ima_reboot_notifier); >> >> - ima_used_chip = 0; >> - rc = tpm_pcr_read(NULL, 0, pcr_i); >> - if (rc == 0) >> - ima_used_chip = 1; >> + ima_tpm_chip = tpm_chip_find(); >> >> + ima_used_chip = (ima_tpm_chip != NULL); >> if (!ima_used_chip) >> - pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=%d)\n", >> - rc); >> + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); >> >> rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); >> if (rc) >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c >> index 418f35e38015..6c9427939a28 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c >> @@ -142,10 +142,13 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr) >> { >> int result = 0; >> >> + down_read(&ima_tpm_chip_lock); >> if (!ima_used_chip) >> - return result; >> + goto out; >> >> - result = tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcr, hash); >> + result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, hash); >> +out: >> + up_read(&ima_tpm_chip_lock); >> if (result != 0) >> pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); >> return result;