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Biederman" , Amir Goldstein , linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com Subject: [PATCH v3] overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2018 08:20:46 -0700 Message-Id: <20180622152056.16877-1-salyzyn@android.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.18.0.rc2.346.g013aa6912e-goog Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials. If the principals of least privilege are applied, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credential of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector. We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options, all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. This option default is set in the CONFIG OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS or in the module option override_creds. The module bool parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature" by checking existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds. This will allow user space to determine if the option can be supplied successfully to the mount(2) operation. Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn Cc: Miklos Szeredi Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Vivek Goyal Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Amir Goldstein Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@android.com --- v2: - Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error. - altered commit message. v3: - Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the boolean override_creds. - Changed from creator to mounter credentials. - Updated and fortified the documentation. - Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt | 17 +++++++++++++++++ fs/overlayfs/Kconfig | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 9 +++++---- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 16 ++++++++-------- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 6 +++--- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 4 ++-- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ fs/overlayfs/util.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 11 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt index 72615a2c0752..5c646f993a4b 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt @@ -106,6 +106,23 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged. Other content such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper directory only. These attributes of the lower directory are hidden. +credentials +----------- + +By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the +recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are +checked against the caller's credentials. + +If the principals of least privilege are applied, the mounter's +credentials might not overlap the credential of the caller's when +accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower +DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally +higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector. One +option is to turn off override_creds in the mount options, all +subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the +caller's credentials. This option default is set in the CONFIG +OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS or in the module option override_creds. + whiteouts and opaque directories -------------------------------- diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig b/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig index 9384164253ac..1ecb910f0300 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig @@ -103,3 +103,24 @@ config OVERLAY_FS_XINO_AUTO For more information, see Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt If unsure, say N. + +config OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS + bool "Overlay filesystem override credentials" + depends on OVERLAY_FS + default y + help + If set, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the + recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are + checked against the caller's credentials. The check of both access + credentials. + + If the principals of least privilege are applied, the mounter's + credentials might not overlap the credential of the caller's when + accessing the overlayfs filesystem. The mount option override_creds=n + drops the mounter's credential check, so that all subsequent + operations, after mount, on the filesystem will only be the + caller's credentials. This option sets the default for the module + option override_creds, and thus the default for all mounts that + do not specify this option. + + For more information see Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c index ddaddb4ce4c3..7a841718ff2e 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c @@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags) dput(parent); dput(next); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return err; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c index f480b1a2cd2e..a9f10cd38e32 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c @@ -561,7 +561,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid; if (!attr->hardlink) { err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry, - attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred, + attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, + old_cred ? old_cred : current_cred(), override_cred); if (err) { put_cred(override_cred); @@ -577,7 +578,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr); } out_revert_creds: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return err; } @@ -824,7 +825,7 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir) err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list); else err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); if (!err) { if (is_dir) clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode); @@ -1150,7 +1151,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old, out_unlock: unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir); out_revert_creds: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); ovl_nlink_end(new, locked); out_drop_write: ovl_drop_write(old); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c index ed16a898caeb..afb0af1a24e9 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode); old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); if (!err) ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode); inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode); @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink; out: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return err; } @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) mask |= MAY_READ; } err = inode_permission(realinode, mask); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return err; } @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return p; } @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE); err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); out_drop_write: ovl_drop_write(dentry); @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return res; } @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); if (res <= 0 || size == 0) return res; @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); acl = get_acl(realinode, type); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return acl; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c index c993dd8db739..c53e0b127332 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c @@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, OVL_I(inode)->redirect = upperredirect; } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); dput(index); kfree(stack); kfree(d.redirect); @@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, kfree(upperredirect); out: kfree(d.redirect); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) dput(this); } } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return positive; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h index 7538b9b56237..81968e574264 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry); void ovl_drop_write(struct dentry *dentry); struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry); const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb); +void ovl_revert_creds(const struct cred *oldcred); struct super_block *ovl_same_sb(struct super_block *sb); int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb); struct dentry *ovl_indexdir(struct super_block *sb); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h index 41655a7d6894..ee4cc3802147 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct ovl_config { bool index; bool nfs_export; int xino; + bool override_creds; }; struct ovl_sb { diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c index ef1fe42ff7bb..150c7ee2f7f7 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd) } inode_unlock(dir->d_inode); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return err; } @@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); if (err) return err; diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index 704b37311467..9f1e0cc85d27 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -56,6 +56,12 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_xino_auto_def, "Auto enable xino feature"); +static bool __read_mostly ovl_default_override_creds = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS); +module_param_named(override_creds, ovl_default_override_creds, bool, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_default_override_creds, + "Use mounter's credentials for accesses"); + static void ovl_entry_stack_free(struct ovl_entry *oe) { unsigned int i; @@ -376,6 +382,8 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry) "on" : "off"); if (ofs->config.xino != ovl_xino_def()) seq_printf(m, ",xino=%s", ovl_xino_str[ofs->config.xino]); + seq_show_option(m, "override_creds", + ofs->config.override_creds ? "on" : "off"); return 0; } @@ -413,6 +421,8 @@ enum { OPT_XINO_ON, OPT_XINO_OFF, OPT_XINO_AUTO, + OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON, + OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF, OPT_ERR, }; @@ -429,6 +439,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = { {OPT_XINO_ON, "xino=on"}, {OPT_XINO_OFF, "xino=off"}, {OPT_XINO_AUTO, "xino=auto"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON, "override_creds=on"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF, "override_creds=off"}, {OPT_ERR, NULL} }; @@ -485,6 +497,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->redirect_mode = kstrdup(ovl_redirect_mode_def(), GFP_KERNEL); if (!config->redirect_mode) return -ENOMEM; + config->override_creds = ovl_default_override_creds; while ((p = ovl_next_opt(&opt)) != NULL) { int token; @@ -555,6 +568,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->xino = OVL_XINO_AUTO; break; + case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON: + config->override_creds = true; + break; + + case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF: + config->override_creds = false; + break; + default: pr_err("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n", p); return -EINVAL; diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c index 6f1078028c66..0a59de9b4088 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c @@ -40,9 +40,17 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) { struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info; + if (!ofs->config.override_creds) + return NULL; return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); } +void ovl_revert_creds(const struct cred *old_cred) +{ + if (old_cred) + revert_creds(old_cred); +} + struct super_block *ovl_same_sb(struct super_block *sb) { struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info; @@ -630,7 +638,7 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry, bool *locked) * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr. */ err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); out: if (err) @@ -650,7 +658,7 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry, bool locked) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); } mutex_unlock(&OVL_I(d_inode(dentry))->lock); -- 2.18.0.rc2.346.g013aa6912e-goog