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Subject: Re: [intel-sgx-kernel-dev] [PATCH v11 13/13] intel_sgx: in-kernel
 launch enclave
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To:     Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
        sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
Cc:     jethro@fortanix.com, luto@kernel.org,
        Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>, x86@kernel.org,
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        Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Date:   Mon, 25 Jun 2018 12:41:08 +0300
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On Thu, 2018-06-21 at 08:32 -0400, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
> This implies that it should be possible to create MSR activation (and
> an embedded launch enclave?) entirely as a UEFI module. The kernel
> would still get to manage who has access to /dev/sgx and other
> important non-cryptographic policy details. Users would still be able
> to control the cryptographic policy details (via BIOS Secure Boot
> configuration that exists today). Distributions could still control
> cryptographic policy details via signing of the UEFI module with their
> own Secure Boot key (or using something like shim). The UEFI module
> (and possibly the external launch enclave) could be distributed via
> linux-firmware.
> 
> Andy/Neil, does this work for you?

Nothing against having UEFI module for MSR activation step.

And we would move the existing in-kernel LE to firmware so that it is
avaible for locked-in-to-non-Intel-values case? 

/Jarkko