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From:   Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
Date:   Mon, 25 Jun 2018 17:26:58 -0400
Message-ID: <CAOASepOrKApnxXZhiz4usPAeJux8i2zP0tEs1B6FyoYvtiPn4A@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [intel-sgx-kernel-dev] [PATCH v11 13/13] intel_sgx: in-kernel
 launch enclave
To:     jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com
Cc:     luto@kernel.org, Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>, x86@kernel.org,
        platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        mingo@redhat.com, intel-sgx-kernel-dev@lists.01.org, hpa@zytor.com,
        dvhart@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, andy@infradead.org,
        Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 5:28 AM Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 2018-06-20 at 12:28 -0400, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
> > As I understand it, the current policy models under discussion look like this:
> >
> > 1. SGX w/o FLC (not being merged) looks like this:
> >   Intel CPU => (Intel signed) launch enclave => enclaves
> >
> > 2. SGX w/ FLC, looks like this:
> >   Intel CPU => kernel => launch enclave => enclaves
> >
> > 3. Andy is proposing this:
> >   Intel CPU => kernel => enclaves
>
> What if MSRs are not writable after hand over to the OS? It is a legit
> configuration at least according to the SDM.

It seems to me that "set the MSRs in the BIOS" and "set the MSRs in a
UEFI module" are functionally equivalent.