Received: by 2002:ac0:a581:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id m1-v6csp5397924imm; Tue, 26 Jun 2018 10:32:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpeLRo9yMDsb5ESaacd6GTlHUeR4j4OLzV8vc7Jz4edJVxgZHFMIc0pfQfp9zpp9xlGjjDR9 X-Received: by 2002:a62:494f:: with SMTP id w76-v6mr2466494pfa.152.1530034321031; Tue, 26 Jun 2018 10:32:01 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1530034321; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=VI7gOuZyXDkDUqshMd2rgCxIO2yqbSkJ2f4QtEhbLUjBuUYp3zfAJQ3C3NECY8hmWA MHpOD6OKPlnHeV2BFbt/160uymdxqZd3VldW1mb+4v+qJhxYSkaqUP3xQIdJBNCA7E4b vWN94ULUrLS7TMv85zx9TDMd/fZ8yJVcnmnhJNYgWez3nDFXgej0xFFIGZODez54Puu0 juSbcopkZVSyUagVIZ2ihPCSOzi/pT79RiXmGWoAixvFFi131N5OtDtzGQxmgYW4A/Nn iRj3ftoqDAL+b2MDk9DGrMXfJtCeWcexZ9EQPSbf4wrew7+y9z8g/uPmlC0BaB/KmMCR PdCQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :references:in-reply-to:date:cc:to:from:subject:message-id :arc-authentication-results; bh=JCbsPbEZ0UMCW6kWDRApwgIXidDCdz7p9RlIhZzpXs0=; b=c7W9IboVT7L3YE5Rk0d1+TRSKyehdqhBWS5sX8vtq7rcW1Vz3WQs312DytE26ykR0r XvSyEF7g5HP/20i8Qs7rqADJKMM74p1FvW7asGfs4m+0rYimdsd65HzxM0fGm3wfHZPb L6IbIF/4jSw52W/GKOJmuLRAI+ltvFbaifLP4SgIasPT0VyapMC91Kqdcle8FpZMDDT4 pG4u18zcxxikWK3hM8oVD5+Irv7WB2dt5/VYUOG111ywlcGEBSeOLC9fVjAAYQ4kV9yN YO074Wr2H4g5qOZWvVWatI4povljF933Ho+AZ9PiKm4E4x1wK6sacz8qoJGpcbv6KKpK 7k+Q== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 143-v6si2131908pfa.178.2018.06.26.10.31.46; Tue, 26 Jun 2018 10:32:00 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751891AbeFZPAc (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 26 Jun 2018 11:00:32 -0400 Received: from mga01.intel.com ([192.55.52.88]:38081 "EHLO mga01.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751796AbeFZPA2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jun 2018 11:00:28 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga003.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.29]) by fmsmga101.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Jun 2018 08:00:28 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.51,274,1526367600"; d="scan'208";a="60298635" Received: from 2b52.sc.intel.com ([143.183.136.147]) by FMSMGA003.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 26 Jun 2018 08:00:28 -0700 Message-ID: <1530025017.27091.1.camel@intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) From: Yu-cheng Yu To: Andy Lutomirski , Linux API , Jann Horn , Florian Weimer Cc: LKML , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM , linux-arch , X86 ML , "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. J. Lu" , "Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Dave Hansen , Jonathan Corbet , Oleg Nesterov , Arnd Bergmann , mike.kravetz@oracle.com Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 07:56:57 -0700 In-Reply-To: References: <20180607143807.3611-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.18.5.2-0ubuntu3.2 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 2018-06-25 at 22:26 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:41 AM Yu-cheng Yu > wrote: > > > > > > This series introduces CET - Shadow stack > I think you should add some mitigation against sigreturn-oriented > programming.  How about creating some special token on the shadow > stack that indicates the presence of a signal frame at a particular > address when delivering a signal and verifying and popping that token > in sigreturn?  The token could be literally the address of the signal > frame, and you could make this unambiguous by failing sigreturn if > CET > is on and the signal frame is in executable memory. > > IOW, it would be a shame if sigreturn() itself became a convenient > CET-bypassing gadget. > > --Andy I will look into that. Thanks, Yu-cheng