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From:   Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Date:   Tue, 10 Jul 2018 08:56:35 +0200
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu8qjzh_Tta=n9C+cfXO29e_5RcLqfQSpvR5r7QmqzHbEg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware
 (pre-allocated buffer)
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Kexec Mailing List <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
        Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@suse.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>,
        Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
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On 10 July 2018 at 08:51, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> On 9 July 2018 at 21:41, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 17:30 +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>> On 2 July 2018 at 16:38, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>>> > Some systems are memory constrained but they need to load very large
>>> > firmwares.  The firmware subsystem allows drivers to request this
>>> > firmware be loaded from the filesystem, but this requires that the
>>> > entire firmware be loaded into kernel memory first before it's provided
>>> > to the driver.  This can lead to a situation where we map the firmware
>>> > twice, once to load the firmware into kernel memory and once to copy the
>>> > firmware into the final resting place.
>>> >
>>> > To resolve this problem, commit a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading
>>> > into a pre-allocated buffer") introduced request_firmware_into_buf() API
>>> > that allows drivers to request firmware be loaded directly into a
>>> > pre-allocated buffer. (Based on the mailing list discussions, calling
>>> > dma_alloc_coherent() is unnecessary and confusing.)
>>> >
>>> > (Very broken/buggy) devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of
>>> > the firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion of
>>> > IMA's signature verification.  For the time being, this patch emits a
>>> > warning, but does not prevent the loading of the firmware.
>>> >
>>>
>>> As I attempted to explain in the exchange with Luis, this has nothing
>>> to do with broken or buggy devices, but is simply the reality we have
>>> to deal with on platforms that lack IOMMUs.
>>
>>> Even if you load into one buffer, carry out the signature verification
>>> and *only then* copy it to another buffer, a bus master could
>>> potentially read it from the first buffer as well. Mapping for DMA
>>> does *not* mean 'making the memory readable by the device' unless
>>> IOMMUs are being used. Otherwise, a bus master can read it from the
>>> first buffer, or even patch the code that performs the security check
>>> in the first place. For such platforms, copying the data around to
>>> prevent the device from reading it is simply pointless, as well as any
>>> other mitigation in software to protect yourself from misbehaving bus
>>> masters.
>>
>> Thank you for taking the time to explain this again.
>>
>>> So issuing a warning in this particular case is rather arbitrary. On
>>> these platforms, all bus masters can read (and modify) all of your
>>> memory all of the time, and as long as the firmware loader code takes
>>> care not to provide the DMA address to the device until after the
>>> verification is complete, it really has done all it reasonably can in
>>> the environment that it is expected to operate in.
>>
>> So for the non-IOMMU system case, differentiating between pre-
>> allocated buffers vs. using two buffers doesn't make sense.
>>
>>>
>>> (The use of dma_alloc_coherent() is a bit of a red herring here, as it
>>> incorporates the DMA map operation. However, DMA map is a no-op on
>>> systems with cache coherent 1:1 DMA [iow, all PCs and most arm64
>>> platforms unless they have IOMMUs], and so there is not much
>>> difference between memory allocated with kmalloc() or with
>>> dma_alloc_coherent() in terms of whether the device can access it
>>> freely)
>>
>> What about systems with an IOMMU?
>>
>
> On systems with an IOMMU, performing the DMA map will create an entry
> in the IOMMU page tables for the physical region associated with the
> buffer, making the region accessible to the device. For platforms in
> this category, using dma_alloc_coherent() for allocating a buffer to
> pass firmware to the device does open a window where the device could
> theoretically access this data while the validation is still in
> progress.
>
> Note that the device still needs to be informed about the address of
> the buffer: just calling dma_alloc_coherent() will not allow the
> device to find the firmware image in its memory space, and arbitrary
> DMA accesses performed by the device will trigger faults that are
> reported to the OS. So the window between DMA map (or
> dma_alloc_coherent()) and the device specific command to pass the DMA
> buffer address to the device is not inherently unsafe IMO, but I do
> understand the need to cover this scenario.
>
> As I pointed out before, using coherent DMA buffers to perform
> streaming DMA is generally a bad idea, since they may be allocated
> from a finite pool, and may use uncached mappings, making the access
> slower than necessary (while streaming DMA can use any kmalloc'ed
> buffer and will just flush the contents of the caches to main memory
> when the DMA map is performed).
>
> So to summarize again: in my opinion, using a single buffer is not a
> problem as long as the validation completes before the DMA map is
> performed. This will provide the expected guarantees on systems with
> IOMMUs, and will not complicate matters on systems where there is no
> point in obsessing about this anyway given that devices can access all
> of memory whenever they want to.
>
> As for the Qualcomm case: dma_alloc_coherent() is not needed here but
> simply ends up being used because it was already wired up in the
> qualcomm specific secure world API, which amounts to doing syscalls
> into a higher privilege level than the one the kernel itself runs at.
> So again, reasoning about whether the secure world will look at your
> data before you checked the sig is rather pointless, and adding
> special cases to the IMA api to cater for this use case seems like a
> waste of engineering and review effort to me. If we have to do
> something to tie up this loose end, let's try switching it to the
> streaming DMA api instead.
>

Forgot to mention: the Qualcomm case is about passing data to the CPU
running at another privilege level, so IOMMU vs !IOMMU is not a factor
here.