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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
        "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>,
        "Matt Helsley (VMware)" <matt.helsley@gmail.com>,
        Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com>,
        Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 096/107] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG
Date:   Mon, 23 Jul 2018 14:42:30 +0200
Message-Id: <20180723122418.320458689@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 47c61b3955cf712cadfc25635bf9bc174af030ea upstream

Add the necessary logic for supporting the emulated VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to
x86_virt_spec_ctrl().  If either X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD or
X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is set then use the new guest_virt_spec_ctrl
argument to check whether the state must be modified on the host. The
update reuses speculative_store_bypass_update() so the ZEN-specific sibling
coordination can be reused.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---

 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(
 	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
 }
 
+static inline unsigned long ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+	return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) << (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+}
+
 static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
 {
 	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -160,6 +160,36 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
 			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
 		}
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
+	 * MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
+	 */
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
+	    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
+	 * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
+	 * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
+	 */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
+		hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+	else
+		hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+	/* Sanitize the guest value */
+	guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+
+	if (hostval != guestval) {
+		unsigned long tif;
+
+		tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
+				 ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
+
+		speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
+	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);