Received: by 2002:ac0:a5a7:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id m36-v6csp6876563imm; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 04:50:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpffPNxqzjnfRu8GyAfppmrznbbF0SBb3ftxPRZMTbXf98fMUsxVnlFm+fl11lOHcKscKq2p X-Received: by 2002:a63:8c51:: with SMTP id q17-v6mr16494114pgn.236.1532433016621; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 04:50:16 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1532433016; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=ciBCItdpfh1LXZLbiKI5SIlfAAo/LWrEPxOZkKYavU3czwHEwBn4NjzW2VI/gLyJZz NyPmR8PmTRI3ddpD6tNVNX0Pb6AlZh5Mp4VvDsJcma/YamMEH2GuKl6LWgwqmI9xQ8WC O6Inz98dSqgrNLlCALdrIBM1lq3wj+QhInY/mMTO5l2To4q+pGKRBlmv/tKyr7ngpXVs NNnj2xNrskTl1MvBkrdl30afsh5y4OS5ui0zklaH1e5Ek5u4c84Kzkg0A1XBiu8Remep +vsKEOFT4Pw+bZe+2Lypbekf1t7H56k6DwH8zitu1V+S9ZGTqpryB24Q8/3c56siobIG toEw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :references:in-reply-to:date:cc:to:from:subject:message-id :arc-authentication-results; bh=7W+qUQiUEdleCuPTwgQpDlXc1qxCbpUNw6WVXfOyXx4=; b=wWIwQPEV7dfnIzen1aD3HEtH1qOGd/efHzH/nvEyyokTyL4s140IKTYSfJ0fSM322E QreCgS/s/nsw56BL0hCSypmkr5eNj4kCtJ1RRaLpsCgSMPUduOjcjzEUR+nPKRjQrL0o VcceJtFkIW4EkRlWfLw1z9SorQD8mQDYlt2JZ6aalkLr4MM2aI8FJVTDHA4CVCdbBXWU pRx1M+oV+uaOX4Q+jemt770Gd56xHtC4XHhQWlcHj9QfsHM2TmJ/DjfTJu1D4X1Ayduh veYdaF+zYcZX3jtSZo7lHtMnuNO2yalkujzup9zcsG2jDKhhBecyUBhx2yY4QOSSedSF RttQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id k20-v6si10480369pgb.115.2018.07.24.04.50.02; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 04:50:16 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388372AbeGXMyn (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 24 Jul 2018 08:54:43 -0400 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:60246 "EHLO mx1.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2388275AbeGXMyn (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Jul 2018 08:54:43 -0400 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay1.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.254]) by mx1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AAB5AED3; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 11:48:36 +0000 (UTC) Message-ID: <1532432457.17797.8.camel@suse.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption From: Oliver Neukum To: Yu Chen Cc: Stephan Mueller , Denis Kenzior , Eric Biggers , Kookoo Gu , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Rui Zhang , Theodore Ts o , Joey Lee , Pavel Machek , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 13:40:57 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> References: <20180718202235.GA4132@amd> <20180718235851.GA22170@sandybridge-desktop> <20180719110149.GA4679@amd> <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> <20180720102532.GA20284@amd> <1532346156.3057.11.camel@suse.com> <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.26.6 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote: > Hi, > On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 01:42:36PM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote: > > On Fr, 2018-07-20 at 12:25 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > > > So your goal is to make hibernation compatible with kernel > > > lockdown? Do your patches provide sufficient security that hibernation > > > can be enabled with kernel lockdown? > > > > OK, maybe I am dense, but if the key comes from user space, will that > > be enough? > > > > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the > kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this > should also be safe for encryption in kernel. > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33145.html > Thus Chun-Yi's signature can use EFI key and both the key from > user space. It seems to me that your initial reasoning was correct and the key should be generated in kernel space. Regards Oliver