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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 24 Jul 2018 14:35:03 +0100 Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.58]) by b06cxnps3074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w6ODZ27K42991762 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 24 Jul 2018 13:35:02 GMT Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B8134C05E; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 16:35:18 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9912C4C040; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 16:35:16 +0100 (BST) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.84.53]) by d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 16:35:16 +0100 (BST) Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM. From: Mimi Zohar To: Udit Agarwal , "dhowells@redhat.com" , "zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com" , "jmorris@namei.org" , "serge@hallyn.com" , "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" , "keyrings@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" Cc: Sahil Malhotra , Ruchika Gupta , Horia Geanta , Aymen Sghaier Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 09:34:50 -0400 In-Reply-To: References: <20180720054656.29143-1-udit.agarwal@nxp.com> <1532302451.6206.22.camel@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18072413-0020-0000-0000-000002AA7AED X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18072413-0021-0000-0000-000020F70D76 Message-Id: <1532439290.3277.52.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-07-24_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1806210000 definitions=main-1807240144 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, 2018-07-24 at 12:31 +0000, Udit Agarwal wrote: > Yes the secure keys and CAAM are correlated. Secure keys depends on > NXP CAAM crypto HW accelerator.  Secure key is a random data of > length X (passed using keyctl command) & derived using CAAM. Blob of > this data is also created using CAAM. Only blob is visible to user > space. The term "secure keys" is really generic.  What makes the "secure keys" secure?  We introduced "trusted keys", because TPM 1.2 didn't support symmetric keys.  We shouldn't just duplicate "trusted keys" for different HW, but improve upon it (eg. symmetric keys never leave the device). The new key type should define generic methods, which are implemented for NXP CAAM rypto HW accelerator as an example. Mimi