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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id i61-v6si2093403plb.209.2018.08.02.13.55.04; Thu, 02 Aug 2018 13:55:19 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732117AbeHBWqE (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 2 Aug 2018 18:46:04 -0400 Received: from mx3-rdu2.redhat.com ([66.187.233.73]:48736 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729774AbeHBWqE (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Aug 2018 18:46:04 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx06.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B8C664074442; Thu, 2 Aug 2018 20:53:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from redhat.com (ovpn-117-57.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.117.57]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 4E4D2215670D; Thu, 2 Aug 2018 20:53:09 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2018 23:53:08 +0300 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" To: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Christoph Hellwig , Will Deacon , Anshuman Khandual , virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, aik@ozlabs.ru, robh@kernel.org, joe@perches.com, elfring@users.sourceforge.net, david@gibson.dropbear.id.au, jasowang@redhat.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, linuxram@us.ibm.com, haren@linux.vnet.ibm.com, paulus@samba.org, srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, robin.murphy@arm.com, jean-philippe.brucker@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com Subject: Re: [RFC 0/4] Virtio uses DMA API for all devices Message-ID: <20180802235233-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> References: <20180720035941.6844-1-khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20180727095804.GA25592@arm.com> <20180730093414.GD26245@infradead.org> <20180730125100-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20180730111802.GA9830@infradead.org> <20180730155633-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20180731173052.GA17153@infradead.org> <3d6e81511571260de1c8047aaffa8ac4df093d2e.camel@kernel.crashing.org> <20180802003823-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <7779442d7889ee943b3e4ff6c63ec90b4a58b79d.camel@kernel.crashing.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <7779442d7889ee943b3e4ff6c63ec90b4a58b79d.camel@kernel.crashing.org> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.6 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.7]); Thu, 02 Aug 2018 20:53:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: inspected by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.7]); Thu, 02 Aug 2018 20:53:13 +0000 (UTC) for IP:'10.11.54.6' DOMAIN:'int-mx06.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com' HELO:'smtp.corp.redhat.com' FROM:'mst@redhat.com' RCPT:'' Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 10:33:05AM -0500, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote: > On Thu, 2018-08-02 at 00:56 +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > but it's not, VMs are > > > created in "legacy" mode all the times and we don't know at VM creation > > > time whether it will become a secure VM or not. The way our secure VMs > > > work is that they start as a normal VM, load a secure "payload" and > > > call the Ultravisor to "become" secure. > > > > > > So we're in a bit of a bind here. We need that one-liner optional arch > > > hook to make virtio use swiotlb in that "IOMMU bypass" case. > > > > > > Ben. > > > > And just to make sure I understand, on your platform DMA APIs do include > > some of the cache flushing tricks and this is why you don't want to > > declare iommu support in the hypervisor? > > I'm not sure I parse what you mean. > > We don't need cache flushing tricks. You don't but do real devices on same platform need them? > The problem we have with our > "secure" VMs is that: > > - At VM creation time we have no idea it's going to become a secure > VM, qemu doesn't know anything about it, and thus qemu (or other > management tools, libvirt etc...) are going to create "legacy" (ie > iommu bypass) virtio devices. > > - Once the VM goes secure (early during boot but too late for qemu), > it will need to make virtio do bounce-buffering via swiotlb because > qemu cannot physically access most VM pages (blocked by HW security > features), we need to bounce buffer using some unsecure pages that are > accessible to qemu. > > That said, I wouldn't object for us to more generally switch long run > to changing qemu so that virtio on powerpc starts using the IOMMU as a > default provided we fix our guest firmware to understand it (it > currently doesn't), and provided we verify that the performance impact > on things like vhost is negligible. > > Cheers, > Ben. >