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Date:   Fri, 3 Aug 2018 08:11:29 -0500
From:   Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To:     Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:     linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Justin Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] ima: add support for KEXEC_ORIG_KERNEL_CHECK
Message-ID: <20180803131129.GS3001@ubuntu-xps13>
References: <20180725233200.761-1-erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
 <20180725233200.761-4-erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 06:31:59PM -0500, Eric Richter wrote:
> IMA can verify the signature of kernel images loaded with kexec_file_load,
> but can not verify images loaded with the regular kexec_load syscall.
> Therefore, the appraisal will automatically fail during kexec_load when an
> appraise policy rule is set for func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK. This can be used
> to effectively disable the kexec_load syscall, while still allowing the
> kexec_file_load to operate so long as the target kernel image is signed.
> 
> However, this conflicts with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. If that option is
> enabled and there is an appraise rule set, then the target kernel would
> have to be verifiable by both IMA and the architecture specific kernel
> verification procedure.
> 
> This patch adds a new func= for IMA appraisal specifically for the original
> kexec_load syscall. Therefore, the kexec_load syscall can be effectively
> disabled via IMA policy, leaving the kexec_file_load syscall able to do its
> own signature verification, and not require it to be signed via IMA. To
> retain compatibility, the existing func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK flag is
> unchanged, and thus enables appraisal for both kexec syscalls.

This seems like a roundabout way to disallow the kexec_load syscall.
Wouldn't it make more sense to simply disallow kexec_load any time
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, since it effectively renders that
option impotent? Or has that idea already been rejected?

Thanks,
Seth