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Date:   Sun, 5 Aug 2018 12:02:00 +0200
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To:     Ryan Chen <yu.chen.surf@gmail.com>
Cc:     jlee@suse.com, Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>, oneukum@suse.com,
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        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        kookoo.gu@intel.com, Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation
 encryption
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Hi!

> > User space doesn't need to involve. The EFI root key is generated by
> > EFI boot stub and be transfer to kernel. It's stored in EFI boot service
> > variable that it can only be accessed by trusted EFI binary when
> > secure boot is enabled.
> >
> Okay, this apply to the 'suspend' phase, right?
> I'm still a little confused about the 'resume' phase.
> Taking encryption as example(not signature),
> the purpose of doing hibernation encryption is to prevent other users
> from stealing ram content. Say, user A uses a  passphrase to generate the

No, I don't think that's purpose here.

Purpose here is to prevent user from reading/modifying kernel memory
content on machine he owns.

Strange as it may sound, that is what "secure" boot requires (and what
Disney wants).

I guess it may have some non-evil uses,
too... https://www.linux.com/news/matthew-garrett-explains-how-increase-sec=
urity-boot-time

								=09
									Pavel
--=20
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blo=
g.html

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