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Date:   Thu, 9 Aug 2018 16:12:05 +0800
From:   joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
To:     Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc:     Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Ryan Chen <yu.chen.surf@gmail.com>,
        oneukum@suse.com, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
        ebiggers@google.com, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
        smueller@chronox.de, denkenz@gmail.com,
        Linux PM list <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        kookoo.gu@intel.com, Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation
 encryption
Message-ID: <20180809081205.GJ13767@linux-l9pv.suse>
References: <20180726081404.GG4244@linux-l9pv.suse>
 <20180730170415.GQ4244@linux-l9pv.suse>
 <20180803033702.GB416@sandybridge-desktop>
 <20180803053445.GC4244@linux-l9pv.suse>
 <CADjb_WSURQz86+E8kakNf7UBDM+aho+uaz3QdDkuGsEgan=szw@mail.gmail.com>
 <20180805100200.GB22948@amd>
 <20180806084534.GB12124@chenyu-desktop>
 <20180806103958.GI27062@linux-l9pv.suse>
 <20180808175845.GB16217@amd>
 <20180809034320.GB21364@chenyu-desktop>
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On Thu, Aug 09, 2018 at 11:43:20AM +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> Hi,
> On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 07:58:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > On Mon 2018-08-06 18:39:58, joeyli wrote:
> > > On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 04:45:34PM +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > > > Hi Pavel,
> > > > On Sun, Aug 05, 2018 at 12:02:00PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > > > Hi!
> > > > > 
> > > > > > > User space doesn't need to involve. The EFI root key is generated by
> > > > > > > EFI boot stub and be transfer to kernel. It's stored in EFI boot service
> > > > > > > variable that it can only be accessed by trusted EFI binary when
> > > > > > > secure boot is enabled.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > Okay, this apply to the 'suspend' phase, right?
> > > > > > I'm still a little confused about the 'resume' phase.
> > > > > > Taking encryption as example(not signature),
> > > > > > the purpose of doing hibernation encryption is to prevent other users
> > > > > > from stealing ram content. Say, user A uses a  passphrase to generate the
> > > > > 
> > > > > No, I don't think that's purpose here.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Purpose here is to prevent user from reading/modifying kernel memory
> > > > > content on machine he owns.
> > > > >
> > > > Say, A puts his laptop into hibernation and walks away,
> > > > and B walks by, and opens A's laptop and wakes up the system and he
> > > > can do what he wants. Although EFI key/TPM trusted key is enabled,
> > > > currently there's no certification during resume, which sounds
> > > > unsafe to me. Afterall, the original requirement is to probe
> > > > user for password during resume, which sounds more natural.
> > > 
> > > OK, I saw your case. This is a physical accessing.
> > > 
> > > I have a question: The suspend to memory also has the same behavior
> > > and more people are using suspend. Should we think a common solution
> > > to cover S3 and S4? 
> > 
> > Well, we have similar problem during runtime, too ;-).
> > 
> > Anyway, I don't think we should encrypt memory during S3 in kernel.
> > 
> It seems that Joey was talking about certification(something like login)
> rather than encryption?
>

Actually I do not have good idea.

Joey Lee