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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 9 Aug 2018 15:54:29 -0400 Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.111]) by b01cxnp22036.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w79JsRxY57999496 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Thu, 9 Aug 2018 19:54:27 GMT Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 964B2AC062; Thu, 9 Aug 2018 15:54:55 -0400 (EDT) Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E958AC059; Thu, 9 Aug 2018 15:54:54 -0400 (EDT) Received: from oc8043147753.ibm.com (unknown [9.60.75.213]) by b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 9 Aug 2018 15:54:54 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 07/22] KVM: s390: refactor crypto initialization To: David Hildenbrand , Tony Krowiak , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: freude@de.ibm.com, schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, kwankhede@nvidia.com, bjsdjshi@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, alex.williamson@redhat.com, pmorel@linux.vnet.ibm.com, alifm@linux.vnet.ibm.com, mjrosato@linux.vnet.ibm.com, jjherne@linux.vnet.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, pasic@linux.vnet.ibm.com, berrange@redhat.com, fiuczy@linux.vnet.ibm.com, buendgen@de.ibm.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com References: <1533739472-7172-1-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1533739472-7172-8-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <63a28213-5926-55e5-6d6c-de71a221521b@redhat.com> From: Tony Krowiak Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2018 15:54:25 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.2.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <63a28213-5926-55e5-6d6c-de71a221521b@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Language: en-US X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18080919-2213-0000-0000-000002D84EF1 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00009515; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000266; SDB=6.01071397; UDB=6.00551712; IPR=6.00851092; MB=3.00022619; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-08-09 19:54:32 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18080919-2214-0000-0000-00005B25194F Message-Id: <6ee73b88-a6ad-1dc2-3f46-eb3278e9d921@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-08-09_08:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1808090199 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 08/09/2018 04:25 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 08.08.2018 16:44, Tony Krowiak wrote: >> From: Tony Krowiak >> >> This patch refactors the code that initializes and sets up the >> crypto configuration for a guest. The following changes are >> implemented via this patch: >> >> 1. Prior to the introduction of AP device virtualization, it >> was not necessary to provide guest access to the CRYCB >> unless the MSA extension 3 (MSAX3) facility was installed >> on the host system. With the introduction of AP device >> virtualization, the CRYCB must be made accessible to the >> guest if the AP instructions are installed on the host >> and are to be provided to the guest. >> >> 2. Introduces a flag indicating AP instructions executed on >> the guest shall be interpreted by the firmware. It is >> initialized to indicate AP instructions are to be >> to be interpreted and is used to set the SIE bit for >> each vcpu during vcpu setup. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak >> Reviewed-by: Halil Pasic >> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger >> Tested-by: Michael Mueller >> Tested-by: Farhan Ali >> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger >> --- >> arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 + >> arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + >> arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ >> 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> index af39561..0c13f61 100644 >> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> @@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_sie_block { >> #define ECA_AIV 0x00200000 >> #define ECA_VX 0x00020000 >> #define ECA_PROTEXCI 0x00002000 >> +#define ECA_APIE 0x00000008 >> #define ECA_SII 0x00000001 >> __u32 eca; /* 0x004c */ >> #define ICPT_INST 0x04 >> @@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_sie_block { >> __u8 reservede4[4]; /* 0x00e4 */ >> __u64 tecmc; /* 0x00e8 */ >> __u8 reservedf0[12]; /* 0x00f0 */ >> +#define CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK 0x00000003 >> #define CRYCB_FORMAT1 0x00000001 >> #define CRYCB_FORMAT2 0x00000003 >> __u32 crycbd; /* 0x00fc */ >> @@ -714,6 +716,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_crypto { >> __u32 crycbd; >> __u8 aes_kw; >> __u8 dea_kw; >> + __u8 apie; > > This flag is essentially always 1 as far as I can see, so please drop it > for now. (can be introduced when really needed) That would appear to be true, so it probably makes sense to drop it. > >> }; >> >> #define APCB0_MASK_SIZE 1 >> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h >> index 4cdaa55..a580dec 100644 >> --- a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h >> +++ b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h >> @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_machine { >> #define KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_PFMFI 11 >> #define KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_SIGPIF 12 >> #define KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_KSS 13 >> +#define KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP 14 >> struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_feat { >> __u64 feat[16]; >> }; >> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c >> index 19f4f44..f96a443 100644 >> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c >> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c >> @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ >> #include >> #include >> #include >> +#include >> #include "kvm-s390.h" >> #include "gaccess.h" >> >> @@ -1881,49 +1882,37 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, >> return r; >> } >> >> -static int kvm_s390_query_ap_config(u8 *config) >> -{ >> - u32 fcn_code = 0x04000000UL; >> - u32 cc = 0; >> - >> - memset(config, 0, 128); >> - asm volatile( >> - "lgr 0,%1\n" >> - "lgr 2,%2\n" >> - ".long 0xb2af0000\n" /* PQAP(QCI) */ >> - "0: ipm %0\n" >> - "srl %0,28\n" >> - "1:\n" >> - EX_TABLE(0b, 1b) >> - : "+r" (cc) >> - : "r" (fcn_code), "r" (config) >> - : "cc", "0", "2", "memory" >> - ); >> - >> - return cc; >> -} >> - >> static int kvm_s390_apxa_installed(void) >> { >> - u8 config[128]; >> - int cc; >> + struct ap_config_info info; >> >> - if (test_facility(12)) { >> - cc = kvm_s390_query_ap_config(config); >> - >> - if (cc) >> - pr_err("PQAP(QCI) failed with cc=%d", cc); >> - else >> - return config[0] & 0x40; >> + if (ap_instructions_available() == 0) { >> + if (ap_qci(&info) == 0) >> + return info.apxa; >> } >> >> return 0; >> } >> >> +/* >> + * The format of the crypto control block (CRYCB) is specified in the 3 low >> + * order bits of the CRYCB designation (CRYCBD) field as follows: >> + * Format 0: Neither the message security assist extension 3 (MSAX3) nor the >> + * AP extended addressing (APXA) facility are installed. >> + * Format 1: The APXA facility is not installed but the MSAX3 facility is. >> + * Format 2: Both the APXA and MSAX3 facilities are installed >> + */ >> static void kvm_s390_set_crycb_format(struct kvm *kvm) >> { >> kvm->arch.crypto.crycbd = (__u32)(unsigned long) kvm->arch.crypto.crycb; >> >> + /* Clear the CRYCB format bits - i.e., set format 0 by default */ >> + kvm->arch.crypto.crycbd &= ~(CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK); >> + >> + /* Check whether MSAX3 is installed */ >> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76)) >> + return; >> + >> if (kvm_s390_apxa_installed()) >> kvm->arch.crypto.crycbd |= CRYCB_FORMAT2; >> else >> @@ -1941,11 +1930,13 @@ static u64 kvm_s390_get_initial_cpuid(void) >> >> static void kvm_s390_crypto_init(struct kvm *kvm) >> { >> - if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76)) >> - return; >> - >> kvm->arch.crypto.crycb = &kvm->arch.sie_page2->crycb; >> kvm_s390_set_crycb_format(kvm); >> + /* Default setting indicating SIE shall interpret AP instructions */ >> + kvm->arch.crypto.apie = 1; >> + >> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76)) >> + return; >> >> /* Enable AES/DEA protected key functions by default */ >> kvm->arch.crypto.aes_kw = 1; >> @@ -2474,17 +2465,30 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >> >> static void kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >> { >> - if (!test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76)) >> + /* >> + * If neither the AP instructions nor the MSAX3 facility are installed >> + * on the host, then there is no need for a CRYCB in SIE because the >> + * they will not be installed on the guest either. >> + */ >> + if (ap_instructions_available() && !test_facility(76)) > Why not turn this into > > if (!test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP) && > !test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76)) > > These properties should no longer change at this point. And we simulate > exactly what the guest will see. No crycb needed. And even no comment > needed. That sounds reasonable, I will make the change. > > >> return; >> >> - vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 &= ~(ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA); >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd = vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycbd; >> + >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca &= ~ECA_APIE; >> + if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.apie && >> + test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP)) >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca |= ECA_APIE; >> >> - if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.aes_kw) >> - vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_AES; >> - if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.dea_kw) >> - vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_DEA; >> + /* If MSAX3 is installed on the guest, set up protected key support */ >> + if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76)) { >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 &= ~(ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA); > Why not keep the original unconditional clearing? No good reason that I can think of ... I'll restore that. > >> >> - vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd = vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycbd; >> + if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.aes_kw) >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_AES; >> + if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.dea_kw) >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_DEA; >> + } >> } >> >> void kvm_s390_vcpu_unsetup_cmma(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >> >