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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 10 Aug 2018 12:13:22 -0400 Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.111]) by b01cxnp22034.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w7AGDJVJ15794296 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 10 Aug 2018 16:13:20 GMT Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2C72AC064; Fri, 10 Aug 2018 12:13:46 -0400 (EDT) Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 21D23AC060; Fri, 10 Aug 2018 12:13:45 -0400 (EDT) Received: from oc8043147753.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.230.146]) by b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 10 Aug 2018 12:13:44 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 07/22] KVM: s390: refactor crypto initialization To: Janosch Frank , Tony Krowiak , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: freude@de.ibm.com, schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, kwankhede@nvidia.com, bjsdjshi@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, alex.williamson@redhat.com, pmorel@linux.vnet.ibm.com, alifm@linux.vnet.ibm.com, mjrosato@linux.vnet.ibm.com, jjherne@linux.vnet.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, pasic@linux.vnet.ibm.com, berrange@redhat.com, fiuczy@linux.vnet.ibm.com, buendgen@de.ibm.com References: <1533739472-7172-1-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1533739472-7172-8-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <169d2a44-34ae-3785-bdac-77018dc2ad13@linux.ibm.com> From: Tony Krowiak Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2018 12:13:17 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.2.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <169d2a44-34ae-3785-bdac-77018dc2ad13@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Language: en-US X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18081016-0052-0000-0000-0000031CD315 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00009518; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000266; SDB=6.01071700; UDB=6.00551951; IPR=6.00851491; MB=3.00022637; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-08-10 16:13:24 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18081016-0053-0000-0000-00005DAE7428 Message-Id: X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-08-10_09:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1808100175 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 08/09/2018 01:58 AM, Janosch Frank wrote: > On 08.08.2018 16:44, Tony Krowiak wrote: >> From: Tony Krowiak >> >> This patch refactors the code that initializes and sets up the >> crypto configuration for a guest. The following changes are >> implemented via this patch: >> >> 1. Prior to the introduction of AP device virtualization, it >> was not necessary to provide guest access to the CRYCB >> unless the MSA extension 3 (MSAX3) facility was installed >> on the host system. With the introduction of AP device >> virtualization, the CRYCB must be made accessible to the >> guest if the AP instructions are installed on the host >> and are to be provided to the guest. >> >> 2. Introduces a flag indicating AP instructions executed on >> the guest shall be interpreted by the firmware. It is >> initialized to indicate AP instructions are to be >> to be interpreted and is used to set the SIE bit for >> each vcpu during vcpu setup. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak >> Reviewed-by: Halil Pasic >> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger >> Tested-by: Michael Mueller >> Tested-by: Farhan Ali >> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger > Acked-by: Janosch Frank > >> --- >> arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 + >> arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + >> arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ >> 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> index af39561..0c13f61 100644 >> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> @@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_sie_block { >> #define ECA_AIV 0x00200000 >> #define ECA_VX 0x00020000 >> #define ECA_PROTEXCI 0x00002000 >> +#define ECA_APIE 0x00000008 >> #define ECA_SII 0x00000001 >> __u32 eca; /* 0x004c */ >> #define ICPT_INST 0x04 >> @@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_sie_block { >> __u8 reservede4[4]; /* 0x00e4 */ >> __u64 tecmc; /* 0x00e8 */ >> __u8 reservedf0[12]; /* 0x00f0 */ >> +#define CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK 0x00000003 >> #define CRYCB_FORMAT1 0x00000001 >> #define CRYCB_FORMAT2 0x00000003 >> __u32 crycbd; /* 0x00fc */ >> @@ -714,6 +716,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_crypto { >> __u32 crycbd; >> __u8 aes_kw; >> __u8 dea_kw; >> + __u8 apie; > In the last review I wanted a comment here to know what they do. I'm not sure what the 'they' are that you reference here. I couldn't find your review comment but I assume you are looking for a comment explaining what the 'apie' field is used for. I am removing the 'apie' field based on a review comment by David, so there is no longer a need for a comment here, assuming that is what you are referring to. > >> static void kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >> { >> - if (!test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76)) >> + /* >> + * If neither the AP instructions nor the MSAX3 facility are installed >> + * on the host, then there is no need for a CRYCB in SIE because the >> + * they will not be installed on the guest either. > the they I'll fix this grammatical error. > >> + */ >> + if (ap_instructions_available() && !test_facility(76)) >> return; > I know you're not responsible for that one :) but 0 being the wanted > value here is a bit counter-intuitive. Based on another review comment by David, I've changed this to: if (!test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP) && !test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76)) > >> >> - vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 &= ~(ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA); >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd = vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycbd; >> + >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca &= ~ECA_APIE; > The scb is zero allocated, are the ECA and the ECB3s set somewhere > in-between, or is that your way of making sure the controls are > definitely gone for good? It is a bit of defensive programming. There is a KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR ioctl to set crypto attributes (KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO) that ultimately calls the kvm_s390_vm_set_crypto() function. You'll notice that at the end of that function, there is a call to kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_reset_all() that calls the kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_setup() for each vcpu, so it would seem that there is the possiblility that there could be a need to set ECB3 to a different value. At any rate, I see no good reason to remove this. > >> + if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.apie && >> + test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP)) >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca |= ECA_APIE; >> >> - if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.aes_kw) >> - vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_AES; >> - if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.dea_kw) >> - vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_DEA; >> + /* If MSAX3 is installed on the guest, set up protected key support */ >> + if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76)) { >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 &= ~(ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA); >> >> - vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd = vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycbd; >> + if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.aes_kw) >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_AES; >> + if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.dea_kw) >> + vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_DEA; >> + } >> } >> >> void kvm_s390_vcpu_unsetup_cmma(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >> >