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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a67-v6si21709831pla.135.2018.08.15.14.41.32; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 14:41:49 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=fail header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.s=20151216 header.b=YLcmDxts; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=hansenpartnership.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727697AbeHPAea (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 20:34:30 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:35964 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727327AbeHPAea (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 20:34:30 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C3ED8EE171; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 14:40:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Ldwuwm48pETt; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 14:40:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [153.66.254.194] (unknown [50.35.68.20]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A84658EE0C9; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 14:40:31 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1534369232; bh=2pJElYdZnhOtQ8eb2rMsyzB3a9b/WUAshfhTT0FwVU8=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=YLcmDxtsiyaYvUDwJFB8/xF8/d5HIBjAKpEdWq6K/CNse+53z0hFYBRR9AWxBIUN4 edJn3/Ik1kDd8fD3fLL+E3rPU9GNhhp16glY2D2m/oMfD1qCL5uVvH+AtEqiK+ewRl 7gaHmKzV39HrsMWMQQu5nPql/ue77fSoFP9xGU64= Message-ID: <1534369231.4049.23.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with custom platform keys to boot From: James Bottomley To: Yannik Sembritzki , Linus Torvalds , Vivek Goyal Cc: David Howells , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Peter Anvin , the arch/x86 maintainers , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Dave Young , Baoquan He , Justin Forbes , Peter Jones , Matthew Garrett Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 14:40:31 -0700 In-Reply-To: <2872b945-60e7-b5d1-1f20-1ae6ecfd3967@sembritzki.me> References: <20180815100053.13609-1-yannik@sembritzki.me> <654fbafb-69da-cd9a-b176-7b03401e71c5@sembritzki.me> <20180815174247.GB29541@redhat.com> <20180815185812.GC29541@redhat.com> <20180815194932.GD29541@redhat.com> <1ca6772b-46e0-9d93-0e15-7cf73a0b7b3f@sembritzki.me> <1534367597.4049.21.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <2872b945-60e7-b5d1-1f20-1ae6ecfd3967@sembritzki.me> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.22.6 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, 2018-08-15 at 23:31 +0200, Yannik Sembritzki wrote: > On 15.08.2018 23:13, James Bottomley wrote: > > Consider a UEFI system for which a user has taken ownership, but > > which > > has some signed ROMs which are UEFI secure boot verified.  Simply > > to > > get their system to boot the user will be forced to add the ODM key > > to > > the UEFI db ... and I'm sure in that situation the user wouldn't > > want > > to trust the ODM key further than booting. > > I definitely agree with this point. > > Is there any solution, except from building your own kernel, to the > scenario I described? > I think there should be. (I've personally run into this with > VirtualBox, which I IIRC couldn't load, even though I provisioned my > own PK, and signed both kernel and VirtualBox module with my own key. > I could've compiled my own kernel with my //own key, but that is > pretty impractical for most users.) What about the key linking patches: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/5/2/989 ? They allow you to insert your own binary key into bzimage and then resign the resulting blob for secure boot. It's a fairly painless process. The patches have been languishing for an unstated reason but it's suspected to have something to do with Red Hat not wanting to support Enterprise users signing their own kernels. James