Received: by 2002:ac0:a5a7:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id m36-v6csp1468432imm; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 19:01:21 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA+uWPyRG62r6gXBgsAOad3RU2fOlfV6JMcCmqUcSkBHuBmnzWkAjJ/+iu9KHcv48I+981tXb1mb X-Received: by 2002:a63:63c3:: with SMTP id x186-v6mr518314pgb.173.1534384880954; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 19:01:20 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1534384880; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=k2i+RkE/a7Y2AyJCeYAKBFoaxawuSXshbYtrHm9lTKApbumxc54d/jfBjj1pzSkZZ4 6x72h04++Tepvp8F3z5n+xunwFqQF5mkadsgCVVg6mZ2dXpVMsA4obo7HEEel46QS5in FzJPCh3gUFk1liydvduyLFVMo3doxGsvsWlCYmxumeLxtDsthpDKeOak+Wi5uG1WMaG8 npj8x0WAgNFDuPU4QH/4SAd/knIHmnfGIB0hL30XFhwUA3cYUCB0knn0Afc4TfuVJZvv ALFJJ31fKHo5VaBpHRorSFIBfMY2uQLO7SOhLpjraaI6fx3V26l6D4qfQWcut7QRM07Q aDmw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:message-id:date:subject:to:from :arc-authentication-results; bh=4s8H5NoCSshtXDWEqzHFr19GEHH93S/eGb9n74YW20Y=; b=JE41oub8nenyPvDAuQBBMk+guccoQkt2p/C1kfWwzbM6smRq5LR99lAVfGJIEiUF2s eBlRKgsqPKQZv2IhNMYJaic8QxxQOzpXCBEZH4vmwUwkZuUzOD538Sx1JRbx35uQaKRG FGb8O+0PvdWuuHNrdSwVOnL7MHhFFWYUS1ZE+Ls8K8KbUyZAjB609nHehaqPiftD/pKB 3hDXgYJUuNe8j+gAavIspqmHdt9PhksqU8OrPC9kTHsoanQ9f0tSxvhOyW2hvFpFti79 X5TELeFHyPw/LaDZcpgHM6oGcFs8bbtCo7ruj25M4valr/OFlAqIzLpjqGVbZwQu6ruG b4cA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d32-v6si20237506pla.93.2018.08.15.19.00.51; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 19:01:20 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731180AbeHPCs1 (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 22:48:27 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:61123 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728014AbeHPCs1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 22:48:27 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga003.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.27]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Aug 2018 16:53:56 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.53,245,1531810800"; d="scan'208";a="75694058" Received: from cschaufl-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com ([10.252.130.105]) by orsmga003.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 15 Aug 2018 16:53:56 -0700 From: Casey Schaufler To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, SMACK-discuss@lists.01.org, casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com, arjan@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH RFC 0/5] LSM: Add and use a hook for side-channel safety checks Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 16:53:50 -0700 Message-Id: <20180815235355.14908-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patchset provide a mechanism by which a security module can advise the system about potential side-channel vulnerabilities. If security_task_safe_sidechannel() returns 0 the security modules do not know of any data that would be subject to a side-channel attack. If the security module maintains data that it believes may be susceptible to a side-channel attack it will return -EACCES. Simple hooks are provided for SELinux and Smack. A new security module is provided to make determinations regarding traditional task attributes, including user IDs, capability sets and namespaces. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- MAINTAINERS | 6 ++ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 12 ++- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/Kconfig | 1 + security/Makefile | 2 + security/security.c | 6 ++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++ security/sidechannel/Kconfig | 60 ++++++++++++++ security/sidechannel/Makefile | 1 + security/sidechannel/sidechannel.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 18 +++++ 12 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)