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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id q8-v6si25431893pgh.675.2018.08.15.19.08.19; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 19:08:36 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731219AbeHPCs3 (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 22:48:29 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:61123 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728014AbeHPCs3 (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 22:48:29 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga003.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.27]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Aug 2018 16:53:57 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.53,245,1531810800"; d="scan'208";a="75694064" Received: from cschaufl-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com ([10.252.130.105]) by orsmga003.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 15 Aug 2018 16:53:57 -0700 From: Casey Schaufler To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, SMACK-discuss@lists.01.org, casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com, arjan@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH RFC 2/5] X86: Support LSM determination of side-channel vulnerability Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 16:53:52 -0700 Message-Id: <20180815235355.14908-3-casey.schaufler@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180815235355.14908-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> References: <20180815235355.14908-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Casey Schaufler When switching between tasks it may be necessary to set an indirect branch prediction barrier if the tasks are potentially vulnerable to side-channel attacks. This adds a call to security_task_safe_sidechannel so that security modules can weigh in on the decision. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 6eb1f34c3c85..8714d4af06aa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -270,11 +271,14 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, * threads. It will also not flush if we switch to idle * thread and back to the same process. It will flush if we * switch to a different non-dumpable process. + * If a security module thinks that the transition + * is unsafe do the flush. */ - if (tsk && tsk->mm && - tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id && - get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) - indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + if (tsk && tsk->mm && tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id) { + if (get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER || + security_task_safe_sidechannel(tsk) != 0) + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { /* -- 2.17.1