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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id f62-v6si28301571pfb.218.2018.08.15.21.14.59; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 21:15:27 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728138AbeHPDrD (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 23:47:03 -0400 Received: from mx3-rdu2.redhat.com ([66.187.233.73]:42042 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726062AbeHPDrD (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 23:47:03 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4855A401EF05; Thu, 16 Aug 2018 00:52:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com (ovpn-12-78.pek2.redhat.com [10.72.12.78]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 025867C28; Thu, 16 Aug 2018 00:52:11 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2018 08:52:06 +0800 From: Dave Young To: Vivek Goyal Cc: Yannik Sembritzki , Linus Torvalds , David Howells , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Peter Anvin , the arch/x86 maintainers , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Baoquan He , "Justin M. Forbes" Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with custom platform keys to boot Message-ID: <20180816005206.GA5915@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> References: <20180815100053.13609-1-yannik@sembritzki.me> <654fbafb-69da-cd9a-b176-7b03401e71c5@sembritzki.me> <20180815174247.GB29541@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20180815174247.GB29541@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.5 (2018-04-13) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.11.54.5 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.5]); Thu, 16 Aug 2018 00:52:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: inspected by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.5]); Thu, 16 Aug 2018 00:52:18 +0000 (UTC) for IP:'10.11.54.5' DOMAIN:'int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com' HELO:'smtp.corp.redhat.com' FROM:'dyoung@redhat.com' RCPT:'' Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 08/15/18 at 01:42pm, Vivek Goyal wrote: > On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 07:27:33PM +0200, Yannik Sembritzki wrote: > > Would this be okay? > > [ CC dave young, Baoquan, Justin Forbes] > > Hi Yannik, > > I am reading that bug and wondering that what broke it. It used to work, > so some change broke it. > > Justin said that we have been signing fedora kernels with fedora keys so > looks like no change there. > > Previously, I think all the keys used to go in system keyring and it > used to work. Is it somehow because of split in builtin keyring and > secondary system keyring. Could it be that fedora key used to show > up in system keyring previously and it worked but now it shows up > in secondary system keyring and by default we don't use keys from > that keyring for signature verification? There was a Fedora bug below: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1470995 I posted a fix here but bobody responsed, I think I obviously did not consider the "trust build system only" point from Linus: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2017-November/019632.html But either above patch or defining a macro for the "1UL" in cert header file works. Since nobody reviewed my patch so later I submitted a Fedora only patch which is similar with Yannik's and merged in Fedora tree: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1450772&action=edit > > Thanks > Vivek > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > > b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > > index 7326078e..2ba47e24 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > > @@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ > > ?#define MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR?? 0x100000 > > ?#define MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR?? 0x1000000 > > ? > > +// Allow both builtin trusted keys and secondary trusted keys > > +#define TRUST_FULL_KEYRING???? (void *)1UL > > + > > ?/* > > ? * This is a place holder for all boot loader specific data structure which > > ? * gets allocated in one call but gets freed much later during cleanup > > @@ -532,7 +535,7 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data) > > ?static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long > > kernel_len) > > ?{ > > ??????? return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, > > -????????????????????????????????????? NULL, > > +????????????????????????????????????? TRUST_FULL_KEYRING, > > ?????????????????????????????????????? VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); > > ?} > > ?#endif > > -- > > > > On 15.08.2018 18:54, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > > This needs more people involved, and at least a sign-off. > > > > > > It looks ok, but I think we need a #define for the magical (void *)1UL > > > thing. I see the use in verify_pkcs7_signature(), but still. > > > > > > Linus > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 3:11 AM Yannik Sembritzki wrote: > > >> --- > > >> arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 2 +- > > >> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > >> > > >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > > >> index 7326078e..eaaa125d 100644 > > >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > > >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > > >> @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data) > > >> static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) > > >> { > > >> return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, > > >> - NULL, > > >> + (void *)1UL, > > >> VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); > > >> } > > >> #endif > > >> -- > > >> 2.17.1 > > >> > > >> The exact scenario under which this issue occurs is described here: > > >> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1554113 > > >> > > Thanks Dave