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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id k14-v6si7405105pls.393.2018.08.24.15.43.28; Fri, 24 Aug 2018 15:43:57 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727959AbeHYCSJ (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 24 Aug 2018 22:18:09 -0400 Received: from mga01.intel.com ([192.55.52.88]:55282 "EHLO mga01.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726770AbeHYCSI (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Aug 2018 22:18:08 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga001.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.23]) by fmsmga101.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Aug 2018 15:41:32 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.53,284,1531810800"; d="scan'208";a="84307219" Received: from cschaufl-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com ([10.254.2.129]) by fmsmga001.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Aug 2018 15:41:19 -0700 From: Casey Schaufler To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com, arjan@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH v4 4/5] Smack: Support determination of side-channel Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2018 15:41:16 -0700 Message-Id: <20180824224117.3356-5-casey.schaufler@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180824224117.3356-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> References: <20180824224117.3356-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Smack considers its private task data safe if the current task has read access to the passed task. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 91750205a5de..85dc053e610c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2299,6 +2299,23 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) isp->smk_inode = skp; } +/** + * smack_task_safe_sidechannel - Are the task and current sidechannel safe? + * @p: task to check on + * + * A crude value for sidechannel safety is that the current task is + * already allowed to read from the other. + * + * Returns 0 if the tasks are sidechannel safe, -EACCES otherwise. + */ +static int smack_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); + struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_task_struct(current); + + return smk_access(ckp, skp, MAY_READ, NULL); +} + /* * Socket hooks. */ @@ -4718,6 +4735,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, smack_task_safe_sidechannel), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid), -- 2.17.1