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From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date:   Sat, 25 Aug 2018 21:43:09 -0700
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+xUbq_mu=2jvH2Vu+mviteZJqdPNTrxpaijwsuDdN-sw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: TLB flushes on fixmap changes
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc:     Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@au1.ibm.com>,
        Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Adin Scannell <ascannell@google.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
        David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 9:21 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 7:23 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> wrote:
>> On Fri, 24 Aug 2018 21:23:26 -0700
>> Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>>> Couldn't text_poke() use kmap_atomic()?  Or, even better, just change CR3?
>>
>> No, since kmap_atomic() is only for x86_32 and highmem support kernel.
>> In x86-64, it seems that returns just a page address. That is not
>> good for text_poke, since it needs to make a writable alias for RO
>> code page. Hmm, maybe, can we mimic copy_oldmem_page(), it uses ioremap_cache?
>>
>
> I just re-read text_poke().  It's, um, horrible.  Not only is the
> implementation overcomplicated and probably buggy, but it's SLOOOOOW.
> It's totally the wrong API -- poking one instruction at a time
> basically can't be efficient on x86.  The API should either poke lots
> of instructions at once or should be text_poke_begin(); ...;
> text_poke_end();.
>
> Anyway, the attached patch seems to boot.  Linus, Kees, etc: is this
> too scary of an approach?  With the patch applied, text_poke() is a
> fantastic exploit target.  On the other hand, even without the patch
> applied, text_poke() is every bit as juicy.

I tried to convince Ingo to use this method for doing "write rarely"
and he soundly rejected it. :) I've always liked this because AFAICT,
it's local to the CPU. I had proposed it in
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=kspp/write-rarely&id=9ab0cb2618ebbc51f830ceaa06b7d2182fe1a52d

With that, text_poke() mostly becomes:

rare_write_begin()
memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
rare_write_end()

As for juiciness, if an attacker already has execution control, they
can do more interesting things than text_poke(). But regardless, yes,
it's always made me uncomfortable. :)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security