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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id m10-v6si13139163pfe.133.2018.08.26.10.18.18; Sun, 26 Aug 2018 10:18:33 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=LMTj6AI+; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726918AbeHZVAZ (ORCPT + 99 others); Sun, 26 Aug 2018 17:00:25 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:35950 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726694AbeHZVAY (ORCPT ); Sun, 26 Aug 2018 17:00:24 -0400 Received: from sol.localdomain (c-67-185-97-198.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [67.185.97.198]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 14B96208D8; Sun, 26 Aug 2018 17:17:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1535303836; bh=5fl/7KS5bMbu4x03I9H56U0A8XPQKFj6z4Cz6C1l8IU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=LMTj6AI+4ZKDUVold+9dmPsu0SV25qhImRBipi+OWg1qrFfKa9fDBHVapggiBzTjV QG/rM3Wn2ZCcUChT4+du1W0+y2aS8s26uDtrz0XIsg2clEhqHqKgzLekxaSsAhjN5a +NRw5x94OYiC/MbLV9OGY3uKX2yKFqYTRTczIDuM= Date: Sun, 26 Aug 2018 10:17:14 -0700 From: Eric Biggers To: Chuck Lever Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , Michael Halcrow , Victor Hsieh Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 01/10] fs-verity: add setup code, UAPI, and Kconfig Message-ID: <20180826171713.GB728@sol.localdomain> References: <20180824161642.1144-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20180824161642.1144-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> <815EEE5D-D90F-4E97-A33E-D33D868B962B@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <815EEE5D-D90F-4E97-A33E-D33D868B962B@gmail.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Chuck, On Sun, Aug 26, 2018 at 12:22:08PM -0400, Chuck Lever wrote: > Hi Eric- > > Context: I'm working on IMA support for NFSv4, and would like to > use fs-verity (or some Merkle tree-like mechanism) eventually to > help address the performance impacts of using IMA with large NFS > files. > > > > On Aug 24, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > From: Eric Biggers > > > > fs-verity is a filesystem feature that provides efficient, transparent > > integrity verification and authentication of read-only files. It uses a > > dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree hidden past > > the end of the file is used to verify any block in the file in > > log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in > > fs/verity/ that will be shared by multiple filesystems. > > This description suggests that the only way fs-verity can work is > by placing the Merkle tree data after EOF. Further, this organi- > zation is exposed to user space, making it a fixed part of the > fs-verity kernel/user space API. > > Remote filesystems -- esp. NFS -- would prefer to manage the Merkle > tree data in other ways. The NFSv4 protocol, for example, supports > named streams (as some other filesystems do), and could store the > Merkle trees in those. Or, a new pNFS layout type could be con- > structed where Merkle trees are stored separately from a file's > content -- perhaps even on a separate file server. > > File servers can store this data as the servers' local filesystems > require. > > Sharing how the Merkle tree is created and used is sensible, but > IMHO the filesystem implementations should be allowed to store this > tree however they find convenient. The Merkle trees should be > exposed via a clean API, not as part of the file's content. > There has also been discussion with this on the thread for patch 02/10. "A Merkle tree hidden past the end of the file" describes how ext4 and f2fs are proposed to implement it, and it describes the file format expected by FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. But, at FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY time, a filesystem could copy the verity metadata to somewhere else if it wanted, e.g. into a file stream, and then truncate the file to its original size. Afterwards, fs-verity doesn't really care where the metadata is stored. Currently it does actually assume it's beyond EOF since it calls read_mapping_page() directly, but that could be replaced at any time with indirection via a method fsverity_operations.read_metadata_page(). We actually had such a method originally, but it turned out to be unnecessary for ext4 and f2fs, so I had dropped it for now. I will make this clearer in the next revision of the patchset, and maybe even consider reintroducing ->read_metadata_page() to make it clear that filesystems don't necessarily have to store the metadata beyond EOF. Thanks, - Eric