Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
Cc:     brijesh.singh@amd.com, stable@vger.kernel.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
        =?UTF-8?B?UmFkaW0gS3LEjW3DocWZ?= <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm: add .data..decrypted section to hold shared
 variables
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
References: <1535369080-20290-1-git-send-email-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
 <1535369080-20290-2-git-send-email-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
 <8c7250e6-c7f6-cfcd-08f8-fd35a829f032@amd.com>
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-ID: <9b6f974b-dcb3-3668-c83b-308abf33e85a@amd.com>
Date:   Tue, 28 Aug 2018 12:13:30 -0500
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101
 Thunderbird/52.9.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <8c7250e6-c7f6-cfcd-08f8-fd35a829f032@amd.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Received-SPF: None (protection.outlook.com: amd.com does not designate
 permitted sender hosts)
SpamDiagnosticOutput: 1:99
SpamDiagnosticMetadata: NSPM
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Aug 2018 17:13:33.3214 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: cd0debeb-855b-4da1-af4f-08d60d09962e
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: BN7PR12MB2675
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk
List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org>
X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org


On 08/27/2018 05:11 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 08/27/2018 06:24 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> kvmclock defines few static variables which are shared with hypervisor
>> during the kvmclock initialization.
>>
>> When SEV is active, memory is encrypted with a guest-specific key, and
>> if guest OS wants to share the memory region with hypervisor then it must
>> clear the C-bit before sharing it.
>>
>> The '__decrypted' can be used to define a shared variables; the variables
>> will be put in the .data.decryption section. This section is mapped with
>> C=0 early in the boot, we also ensure that the initialized values are
>> updated to match with C=0 (i.e peform an in-place decryption). The
>> .data..decrypted section is PMD aligned and sized so that we avoid the
>> need for spliting the pages when map with C=0.
> 
> This should probably be broken into a few smaller patches.  Maybe a
> patch that adds the section and the attribute, a patch that re-arranges
> the mapping setup and then the in-place decryption and clearing of the
> encryption bit for the area.
> 


OK, I will break the patch. Probably will create a separate patch which
just re-arranges the mapping setup without making any logical changes.


>>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> Fixes: 368a540e0232 ("x86/kvmclock: Remove memblock dependency")
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
>> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
>> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |   4 +
>>   arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |  12 ++
>>   arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S      |  18 +++
>>   arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 220 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>>   4 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
>> index c064383..3f7d9d3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
>> @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
>>   bool sme_active(void);
>>   bool sev_active(void);
>>   
>> +#define __decrypted __attribute__((__section__(".data..decrypted")))
>> +
>>   #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>>   
>>   #define sme_me_mask	0ULL
>> @@ -77,6 +79,8 @@ early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0;
>>   static inline int __init
>>   early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
>>   
>> +#define __decrypted
>> +
>>   #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>>   
>>   /*
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> index 8047379..6a18297 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> @@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];
>>   static unsigned int __initdata next_early_pgt;
>>   pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);
>>   
>> +/* To clear memory encryption mask from the decrypted section */
>> +extern char __start_data_decrypted[], __end_data_decrypted[];
>> +
> 
> Should find a header for these rather than defining them here.
> 

OK, will move then in mem_encrypt.h. Will that work ?


>>   #ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
>>   unsigned int __pgtable_l5_enabled __ro_after_init;
>>   unsigned int pgdir_shift __ro_after_init = 39;
>> @@ -112,6 +115,7 @@ static bool __head check_la57_support(unsigned long physaddr)
>>   unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
>>   				  struct boot_params *bp)
>>   {
>> +	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end;
>>   	unsigned long load_delta, *p;
>>   	unsigned long pgtable_flags;
>>   	pgdval_t *pgd;
>> @@ -234,6 +238,14 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
>>   	/* Encrypt the kernel and related (if SME is active) */
>>   	sme_encrypt_kernel(bp);
>>   
>> +	/* Clear the memory encryption mask from the decrypted section */
>> +	vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_data_decrypted;
>> +	vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_data_decrypted;
>> +	for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
>> +		i = pmd_index(vaddr);
>> +		pmd[i] -= sme_get_me_mask();
>> +	}
>> +
>>   	/*
>>   	 * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
>>   	 * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
>> index 8bde0a4..511b875 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
>> @@ -89,6 +89,22 @@ PHDRS {
>>   	note PT_NOTE FLAGS(0);          /* ___ */
>>   }
>>   
>> +/*
>> + * This section contains data which will be mapped as decrypted. Memory
>> + * encryption operates on a page basis. But we make this section a pmd
>> + * aligned to avoid spliting the pages while mapping the section early.
>> + *
>> + * Note: We use a separate section so that only this section gets
>> + * decrypted to avoid exposing more than we wish.
>> + */
>> +#define DATA_DECRYPTED_SECTION						\
>> +	. = ALIGN(PMD_SIZE);						\
>> +	__start_data_decrypted = .;					\
>> +	*(.data..decrypted);						\
>> +	__end_data_decrypted = .;					\
>> +	. = ALIGN(PMD_SIZE);						\
>> +
>> +
>>   SECTIONS
>>   {
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>> @@ -171,6 +187,8 @@ SECTIONS
>>   		/* rarely changed data like cpu maps */
>>   		READ_MOSTLY_DATA(INTERNODE_CACHE_BYTES)
>>   
>> +		DATA_DECRYPTED_SECTION
>> +
>>   		/* End of data section */
>>   		_edata = .;
>>   	} :data
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
>> index 7ae3686..ccf6e2b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
>> @@ -59,6 +59,8 @@
>>   				 (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
>>   
>>   #define PTE_FLAGS_ENC		(PTE_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC)
>> +#define PTE_FLAGS_ENC_WP	((PTE_FLAGS_ENC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
>> +				 (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
>>   
>>   struct sme_populate_pgd_data {
>>   	void    *pgtable_area;
>> @@ -72,10 +74,28 @@ struct sme_populate_pgd_data {
>>   	unsigned long vaddr_end;
>>   };
>>   
>> +struct sme_workarea_data {
>> +	unsigned long kernel_start;
>> +	unsigned long kernel_end;
>> +	unsigned long kernel_len;
>> +
>> +	unsigned long initrd_start;
>> +	unsigned long initrd_end;
>> +	unsigned long initrd_len;
>> +
>> +	unsigned long workarea_start;
>> +	unsigned long workarea_end;
>> +	unsigned long workarea_len;
>> +
>> +	unsigned long decrypted_base;
>> +};
>> +
>>   static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
>>   static char sme_cmdline_on[]  __initdata = "on";
>>   static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
>>   
>> +extern char __start_data_decrypted[], __end_data_decrypted[];
>> +
> 
> Same comment from above.
> 
>>   static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>>   {
>>   	unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
>> @@ -219,6 +239,11 @@ static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>>   	__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC);
>>   }
>>   
>> +static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> +{
>> +	__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC_WP);
>> +}
>> +
>>   static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>>   {
>>   	__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC);
>> @@ -266,19 +291,17 @@ static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
>>   	return entries + tables;
>>   }
>>   
>> -void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
>> +static void __init build_workarea_map(struct boot_params *bp,
>> +				      struct sme_workarea_data *wa,
>> +				      struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>>   {
>>   	unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
>>   	unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
>>   	unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_end, kernel_len;
>>   	unsigned long initrd_start, initrd_end, initrd_len;
>> -	struct sme_populate_pgd_data ppd;
>>   	unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
>>   	unsigned long decrypted_base;
>>   
>> -	if (!sme_active())
>> -		return;
>> -
>>   	/*
>>   	 * Prepare for encrypting the kernel and initrd by building new
>>   	 * pagetables with the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the
>> @@ -358,17 +381,17 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
>>   	 * pagetables and when the new encrypted and decrypted kernel
>>   	 * mappings are populated.
>>   	 */
>> -	ppd.pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end;
>> +	ppd->pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end;
>>   
>>   	/*
>>   	 * Make sure the current pagetable structure has entries for
>>   	 * addressing the workarea.
>>   	 */
>> -	ppd.pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa();
>> -	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
>> -	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start;
>> -	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end;
>> -	sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
>> +	ppd->pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa();
>> +	ppd->paddr = workarea_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr = workarea_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr_end = workarea_end;
>> +	sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>>   
>>   	/* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
>>   	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
>> @@ -379,9 +402,9 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
>>   	 * then be populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and
>>   	 * decrypted kernel mappings are created.
>>   	 */
>> -	ppd.pgd = ppd.pgtable_area;
>> -	memset(ppd.pgd, 0, sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD);
>> -	ppd.pgtable_area += sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
>> +	ppd->pgd = ppd->pgtable_area;
>> +	memset(ppd->pgd, 0, sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD);
>> +	ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
>>   
>>   	/*
>>   	 * A different PGD index/entry must be used to get different
>> @@ -399,75 +422,158 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
>>   	decrypted_base <<= PGDIR_SHIFT;
>>   
>>   	/* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */
>> -	ppd.paddr = kernel_start;
>> -	ppd.vaddr = kernel_start;
>> -	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end;
>> -	sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd);
>> +	ppd->paddr = kernel_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr = kernel_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr_end = kernel_end;
>> +	sme_map_range_encrypted(ppd);
>>   
>>   	/* Add decrypted, write-protected kernel (non-identity) mappings */
>> -	ppd.paddr = kernel_start;
>> -	ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base;
>> -	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
>> -	sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
>> +	ppd->paddr = kernel_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base;
>> +	ppd->vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
>> +	sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(ppd);
>>   
>>   	if (initrd_len) {
>>   		/* Add encrypted initrd (identity) mappings */
>> -		ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
>> -		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start;
>> -		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end;
>> -		sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd);
>> +		ppd->paddr = initrd_start;
>> +		ppd->vaddr = initrd_start;
>> +		ppd->vaddr_end = initrd_end;
>> +		sme_map_range_encrypted(ppd);
>>   		/*
>>   		 * Add decrypted, write-protected initrd (non-identity) mappings
>>   		 */
>> -		ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
>> -		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
>> -		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
>> -		sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
>> +		ppd->paddr = initrd_start;
>> +		ppd->vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
>> +		ppd->vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
>> +		sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(ppd);
>>   	}
>>   
>> -	/* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */
>> -	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
>> -	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start;
>> -	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end;
>> -	sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
>> +	/*
>> +	 * When SEV is active, kernel is already encrypted hence mapping
>> +	 * the initial workarea_start as encrypted. When SME is active,
>> +	 * the kernel is not encrypted hence add a decrypted workarea
>> +	 * mappings to both kernel mappings
>> +	 */
>> +	ppd->paddr = workarea_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr = workarea_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr_end = workarea_end;
>> +	if (sev_active())
>> +		sme_map_range_encrypted(ppd);
>> +	else
>> +		sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>> +
>> +	ppd->paddr = workarea_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
>> +	ppd->vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
>> +	sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
> 
> I think this needs to do the same sev_active() check as above.  It might
> be working only because of the inherent instruction fetch decryption,
> but it would probably be best in case anything changes in this routine
> in the future.
> 


In SEV instruction fetches are always decrypted hence I didn't do it.
But I will follow your advice and just to be consistence with SME I
will map this as encrypted.


>>   
>> -	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
>> -	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
>> -	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
>> -	sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
>> +	wa->kernel_start = kernel_start;
>> +	wa->kernel_end = kernel_end;
>> +	wa->kernel_len = kernel_len;
>>   
>> -	/* Perform the encryption */
>> -	sme_encrypt_execute(kernel_start, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
>> -			    kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
>> +	wa->initrd_start = initrd_start;
>> +	wa->initrd_end = initrd_end;
>> +	wa->initrd_len = initrd_len;
>>   
>> -	if (initrd_len)
>> -		sme_encrypt_execute(initrd_start, initrd_start + decrypted_base,
>> -				    initrd_len, workarea_start,
>> -				    (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
>> +	wa->workarea_start = workarea_start;
>> +	wa->workarea_end = workarea_end;
>> +	wa->workarea_len = workarea_len;
>>   
>> +	wa->decrypted_base = decrypted_base;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void __init remove_workarea_map(struct sme_workarea_data *wa,
>> +				       struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> +{
>>   	/*
>>   	 * At this point we are running encrypted.  Remove the mappings for
>>   	 * the decrypted areas - all that is needed for this is to remove
>>   	 * the PGD entry/entries.
>>   	 */
>> -	ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base;
>> -	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
>> -	sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
>> -
>> -	if (initrd_len) {
>> -		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
>> -		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
>> -		sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
>> +	ppd->vaddr = wa->kernel_start + wa->decrypted_base;
>> +	ppd->vaddr_end = wa->kernel_end + wa->decrypted_base;
>> +	sme_clear_pgd(ppd);
>> +
>> +	if (wa->initrd_len) {
>> +		ppd->vaddr = wa->initrd_start + wa->decrypted_base;
>> +		ppd->vaddr_end = wa->initrd_end + wa->decrypted_base;
>> +		sme_clear_pgd(ppd);
>>   	}
>>   
>> -	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
>> -	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
>> -	sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
>> +	ppd->vaddr = wa->workarea_start + wa->decrypted_base;
>> +	ppd->vaddr_end = wa->workarea_end + wa->decrypted_base;
>> +	sme_clear_pgd(ppd);
>>   
>>   	/* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
>>   	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
>>   }
>>   
>> +static void __init decrypt_data_decrypted_section(struct sme_workarea_data *wa,
>> +						  struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned long decrypted_start, decrypted_end, decrypted_len;
>> +
>> +	/* Physical addresses of decrypted data section */
>> +	decrypted_start = __pa_symbol(__start_data_decrypted);
>> +	decrypted_end = __pa_symbol(__end_data_decrypted);
>> +	decrypted_len = decrypted_end - decrypted_start;
>> +
>> +	if (!decrypted_len)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	/* Add decrypted mapping for the section (identity) */
>> +	ppd->paddr = decrypted_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr = decrypted_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr_end = decrypted_end;
>> +	sme_map_range_decrypted(ppd);
>> +
>> +	/* Add encrypted-wp mapping for the section (non-identity) */
>> +	ppd->paddr = decrypted_start;
>> +	ppd->vaddr = decrypted_start + wa->decrypted_base;
>> +	ppd->vaddr_end = decrypted_end + wa->decrypted_base;
>> +	sme_map_range_encrypted_wp(ppd);
>> +
>> +	/* Perform in-place decryption */
>> +	sme_encrypt_execute(decrypted_start + wa->decrypted_base,
>> +			    decrypted_start,
>> +			    decrypted_len, wa->workarea_start,
>> +			    (unsigned long)ppd->pgd);
> 
> This doesn't seem correct.  The first argument should be the dest,
> not the source.  I think this is working because the mappings aren't
> actually being updated (see sme_populate_pgd() where the page table
> entry isn't updated if it exists).
> 


Ah I see, I was under assumption that sme_populate_pgd will update
the flags (if they already exist). I will take a look.


> There probably isn't any reason to check if the entry exists, so
> you should be able to update sme_populate_pgd() to set the page
> table entry no matter what.
>