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From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed, 29 Aug 2018 08:46:04 -0700
Message-ID: <CALCETrXe9CUMo3c44UtmkxD4w68PvmoypdCyvCFvWiZVuxy=sQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] x86/alternatives: use temporary mm for text poking
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc:     Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 2:28 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 01:11:46AM -0700, Nadav Amit wrote:

>> +     pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep);
>> +
>> +     /*
>> +      * __flush_tlb_one_user() performs a redundant TLB flush when PTI is on,
>> +      * as it also flushes the corresponding "user" address spaces, which
>> +      * does not exist.
>> +      *
>> +      * Poking, however, is already very inefficient since it does not try to
>> +      * batch updates, so we ignore this problem for the time being.
>> +      *
>> +      * Since the PTEs do not exist in other kernel address-spaces, we do
>> +      * not use __flush_tlb_one_kernel(), which when PTI is on would cause
>> +      * more unwarranted TLB flushes.
>> +      */
>
> yuck :-), but yeah.

I'm sure we covered this ad nauseum when PTI was being developed, but
we were kind of in a rush, so:

Why do we do INVPCID at all?  The fallback path for non-INVPCID
systems uses invalidate_user_asid(), which should be faster than the
invpcid path.  And doesn't do a redundant flush in this case.

Can we just drop the INVPCID?  While we're at it, we could drop
X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE entirely, since that's the only user.

--Andy