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Date:   Tue, 4 Sep 2018 09:51:31 +0800
From:   Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
To:     lijiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
        hpa@zytor.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, joro@8bytes.org,
        thomas.lendacky@amd.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
        iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, bhe@redhat.com,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5 V6] x86/ioremap: strengthen the logic in
 early_memremap_pgprot_adjust() to adjust encryption mask
Message-ID: <20180904015131.GA10877@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>
References: <20180831081930.31561-1-lijiang@redhat.com>
 <20180831081930.31561-3-lijiang@redhat.com>
 <20180903024512.GA2568@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>
 <d2229538-51d5-ead7-c7e5-f4afe5b53693@redhat.com>
 <20180904004417.GA9842@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>
 <20180904012902.GB9842@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>
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On 09/04/18 at 09:29am, Dave Young wrote:
> On 09/04/18 at 08:44am, Dave Young wrote:
> > On 09/03/18 at 10:06pm, lijiang wrote:
> > > 在 2018年09月03日 10:45, Dave Young 写道:
> > > > On 08/31/18 at 04:19pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
> > > >> For kdump kernel, when SME is enabled, the acpi table and dmi table will need
> > > >> to be remapped without the memory encryption mask. So we have to strengthen
> > > >> the logic in early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(), which makes us have an opportunity
> > > >> to adjust the memory encryption mask.
> > > >>
> > > >> Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
> > > >> ---
> > > >>  arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 9 ++++++++-
> > > >>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > >>
> > > >> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> > > >> index e01e6c695add..f9d9a39955f3 100644
> > > >> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> > > >> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> > > >> @@ -689,8 +689,15 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> > > >>  	encrypted_prot = true;
> > > >>  
> > > >>  	if (sme_active()) {
> > > >> +                /*
> > > >> +                 * In kdump kernel, the acpi table and dmi table will need
> > > >> +                 * to be remapped without the memory encryption mask. Here
> > > >> +                 * we have to strengthen the logic to adjust the memory
> > > >> +                 * encryption mask.
> > > > 
> > > > Assume the acpi/dmi tables are identical for both 1st kernel and kdump
> > > > kernel, I'm not sure what is the difference, why need special handling
> > > > for kdump. Can you add more explanations?
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Ok, i will use a dmi example to explain this issue.
> > > 
> > > There are significant differences about E820 between the 1st kernel and kdump kernel. I pasted them at bottom.
> > > 
> > > Firstly, we need to know how they are called.
> > > __acpi_map_table()\                                                        / early_memremap_is_setup_data()
> > >                    |-> early_memremap()-> early_memremap_pgprot_adjust()-> | memremap_is_efi_data()
> > >  dmi_early_remap()/                                                        \ memremap_should_map_decrypted()-> e820__get_entry_type()
> > > 
> > > Secondly, we also need to understand the memremap_should_map_decrypted(), which is illustrated by the fake code.
> > > static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> > >                                           unsigned long size)
> > > {
> > > 
> > >     /* code ... */
> > > 
> > >     switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
> > >         case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
> > >         case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
> > >         case E820_TYPE_NVS:
> > >         case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
> > >                 /* For SEV, these areas are encrypted */
> > >                 if (sev_active())
> > >                         break;
> > >                 /* Fallthrough */
> > > 
> > >         case E820_TYPE_PRAM:
> > >                 /* For SME, these areas are decrypted */
> > >                 return true;
> > >         default:
> > >                 /* these areas are encrypted by default*/
> > >                 break;
> > >     }
> > > 
> > >     return false;
> > > }
> > > 
> > > For the dmi case, the dmi base address is 0x6286b000 in my test machine.
> > > 
> > > In the 1st kernel, the e820__get_entry_type() can get a valid entry and type by the dmi address, and we can also find the dmi base address from e820.
> > > (see the 1st kernel log)
> > > 0x6286b000 ∈ [mem 0x000000006286b000-0x000000006286efff]
> > > So, these areas are decrypted according to the memremap_should_map_decrypted().
> > > 
> > > In kdump kernel, the dmi base address is still 0x6286b000, but we can not find the dmi base address from e820 any more. The e820__get_entry_type() can
> > > not get a valid entry and type by the dmi base address, it will go into the default branch. That is to say, these areas become encrypted. In fact, these
> > > areas are also decrypted, so we have to strengthen the logic of adjusting the memory encryption mask.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > The 1st kernel log:
> > > 
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000008bfff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000008c000-0x000000000009ffff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000e0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x0000000029920fff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000029921000-0x0000000029921fff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000029922000-0x0000000062256fff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000062257000-0x0000000062356fff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000062357000-0x000000006235cfff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000006235d000-0x00000000623dbfff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000623dc000-0x000000006261bfff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000006261c000-0x000000006263dfff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000006263e000-0x000000006269dfff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000006269e000-0x00000000627d6fff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000627d7000-0x00000000627e3fff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000627e4000-0x00000000627e4fff] ACPI NVS
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000627e5000-0x00000000627e8fff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000627e9000-0x00000000627eafff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000627eb000-0x00000000627ebfff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000627ec000-0x000000006286afff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000006286b000-0x000000006286efff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000006286f000-0x00000000682f8fff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000682f9000-0x0000000068b05fff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000068b06000-0x0000000068b09fff] ACPI NVS
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000068b0a000-0x0000000068b1afff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000068b1b000-0x0000000068b1dfff] ACPI NVS
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000068b1e000-0x0000000071d1dfff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000071d1e000-0x0000000071d2dfff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000071d2e000-0x0000000071d3dfff] ACPI NVS
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000071d3e000-0x0000000071d4dfff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000071d4e000-0x0000000077ffffff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000078000000-0x000000008fffffff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed80000-0x00000000fed80fff] reserved
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000087effffff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000087f000000-0x000000087fffffff] reserved
> > > 
> > > The kdump kernel log:
> > > 
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000001000-0x000000000008bfff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000052000000-0x0000000061ffffff] usable
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000622ee000-0x0000000062300fff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000062301000-0x0000000062301fff] ACPI NVS
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000062703000-0x0000000062703fff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000062735000-0x0000000062737fff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000006273a000-0x000000006273afff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000068b06000-0x0000000068b09fff] ACPI NVS
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000068b1b000-0x0000000068b1dfff] ACPI NVS
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000071d2e000-0x0000000071d3dfff] ACPI NVS
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000071d3e000-0x0000000071d4dfff] ACPI data
> > > [    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000007fe000000-0x000000087df70fff] usable
> > > 
> > 
> > Can you provide the efi memmap dmesg?  boot with efi=debug?
> 
> The right way should be checking the efi mem types instead of only
> checking is_kdump_kernel.
> 
> Something like below, probably also check the region size with something
> like efi_mem_range_type(addr, size), return -EINVAL in case cross
> different type efi memory desc, added efi people in cc:
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index c63a545ec199..4a24e138c0d0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -527,6 +527,13 @@ static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>  		break;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (is_kdump_kernel() {
> +		switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
> +		/* refer to arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -> setup_e820()*/
> +		case ...
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	return false;
>  }
>  

Hold on, I suppose kexec reboot also need this, but if it works without
a fix then there might be thing to be made clear.

kexec-tools will read /proc/iomem and recreate the e820 ranges for 2nd
kernel so in theory we should be fine without a fix.

Can you debug the kexec-tools load process about the e820 creating code
path?

> 
> > 
> > > >> +                 */
> > > >>  		if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
> > > >> -		    memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
> > > >> +		    memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size) ||
> > > >> +		    is_kdump_kernel())
> > > >>  			encrypted_prot = false;
> > > >>  	}
> > > >>  
> > > >> -- 
> > > >> 2.17.1
> > > >>
> > > > 
> > > > Thanks
> > > > Dave
> > > > 

Thanks
Dave