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From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date:   Wed, 5 Sep 2018 17:43:50 -0700
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+z8eQKu_3sm93pdo+bBZDFqkHNM3Y0tKTDbnHfUNzywg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] crypto: skcipher: Remove VLA usage for SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc:     Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
        Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>,
        Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>,
        Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>,
        Arnaud Ebalard <arno@natisbad.org>,
        Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>,
        Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@bootlin.com>,
        Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>,
        Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>,
        Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>,
        Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>,
        "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
        <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
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On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:49 PM, Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> On 5 September 2018 at 23:05, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:18 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
>> <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>>> On 4 September 2018 at 20:16, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>> In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
>>>> caps the skcipher request size similar to other limits and adds a sanity
>>>> check at registration. Looking at instrumented tcrypt output, the largest
>>>> is for lrw:
>>>>
>>>>         crypt: testing lrw(aes)
>>>>         crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize: 8
>>>>         crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize: 88
>>>>         crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize: 472
>>>>
>>>
>>> Are you sure this is a representative sampling? I haven't double
>>> checked myself, but we have plenty of drivers for peripherals in
>>> drivers/crypto that implement block ciphers, and they would not turn
>>> up in tcrypt unless you are running on a platform that provides the
>>> hardware in question.
>>
>> Hrm, excellent point. Looking at this again:
>>
>> The core part of the VLA is using this in the ON_STACK macro:
>>
>> static inline unsigned int crypto_skcipher_reqsize(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
>> {
>>         return tfm->reqsize;
>> }
>>
>> I don't find any struct crypto_skcipher .reqsize static initializers,
>> and the initial reqsize is here:
>>
>> static int crypto_init_skcipher_ops_ablkcipher(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>> {
>> ...
>>         skcipher->reqsize = crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(ablkcipher) +
>>                             sizeof(struct ablkcipher_request);
>>
>> with updates via crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize().
>>
>> So I have to examine ablkcipher reqsize too:
>>
>> static inline unsigned int crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(
>>         struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm)
>> {
>>         return crypto_ablkcipher_crt(tfm)->reqsize;
>> }
>>
>> And of the crt_ablkcipher.reqsize assignments/initializers, I found:
>>
>> ablkcipher reqsize:
>> 1       struct dcp_aes_req_ctx
>> 8       struct atmel_tdes_reqctx
>> 8       struct cryptd_blkcipher_request_ctx
>> 8       struct mtk_aes_reqctx
>> 8       struct omap_des_reqctx
>> 8       struct s5p_aes_reqctx
>> 8       struct sahara_aes_reqctx
>> 8       struct stm32_cryp_reqctx
>> 8       struct stm32_cryp_reqctx
>> 16      struct ablk_ctx
>> 24      struct atmel_aes_reqctx
>> 48      struct omap_aes_reqctx
>> 48      struct omap_aes_reqctx
>> 48      struct qat_crypto_request
>> 56      struct artpec6_crypto_request_context
>> 64      struct chcr_blkcipher_req_ctx
>> 80      struct spacc_req
>> 80      struct virtio_crypto_sym_request
>> 136     struct qce_cipher_reqctx
>> 168     struct n2_request_context
>> 328     struct ccp_des3_req_ctx
>> 400     struct ccp_aes_req_ctx
>> 536     struct hifn_request_context
>> 992     struct cvm_req_ctx
>> 2456    struct iproc_reqctx_s
>>
>> The base ablkcipher wrapper is:
>> 80      struct ablkcipher_request
>>
>> And in my earlier skcipher wrapper analysis, lrw was the largest
>> skcipher wrapper:
>> 384     struct rctx
>>
>> iproc_reqctx_s is an extreme outlier, with cvm_req_ctx at a bit less than half.
>>
>> Making this a 2920 byte fixed array doesn't seem sensible at all
>> (though that's what's already possible to use with existing
>> SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK users).
>>
>> What's the right path forward here?
>>
>
> The skcipher implementations based on crypto IP blocks are typically
> asynchronous, and I wouldn't be surprised if a fair number of
> SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() users are limited to synchronous
> skciphers.

Looks similar to ahash vs shash. :) Yes, so nearly all
crypto_alloc_skcipher() users explicitly mask away ASYNC. What's left
appears to be:

crypto/drbg.c:  sk_tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(ctr_name, 0, 0);
crypto/tcrypt.c:        tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(algo, 0, async ? 0
: CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
drivers/crypto/omap-aes.c:      ctx->ctr =
crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c:          cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] =
crypto_alloc_skcipher(ciphermode, 0, 0);
drivers/md/dm-integrity.c:              ic->journal_crypt =
crypto_alloc_skcipher(ic->journal_crypt_alg.alg_string, 0, 0);
fs/crypto/keyinfo.c:    struct crypto_skcipher *tfm =
crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
fs/crypto/keyinfo.c:    ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0);
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:   crypt_stat->tfm =
crypto_alloc_skcipher(full_alg_name, 0, 0);

I'll cross-reference this with SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK...

> So we could formalize this and limit SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() to
> synchronous skciphers, which implies that the reqsize limit only has
> to apply synchronous skciphers as well. But before we can do this, we
> have to identify the remaining occurrences that allow asynchronous
> skciphers to be used, and replace them with heap allocations.

Sounds good; thanks!

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security