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Date:   Wed, 12 Sep 2018 14:01:27 +0200 (CEST)
From:   Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To:     "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
cc:     Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
        "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to
 avoid cross-process data leak
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On Tue, 11 Sep 2018, Schaufler, Casey wrote:
> How about this? Take Jiri's patch as written. You get everything except checks
> on the security blobs and any "magic" that my safesidechannel module did. I
> will propose a follow on patch that fixes the SELinux code to eliminate the locking
> issue and enables the LSM hooks in the IBPB case. I can then do a revised "magic"
> safesidechannel security module that uses the ptrace hook instead of adding a
> new hook explicitly for IBPB. There is some danger that in the future ptrace and
> IBPB criteria will diverge sufficiently that a common hook becomes nonsensical.
> As no one else seems concerned about this possibility, I won't lose any sleep over
> it either.

Sounds like a plan.