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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 25 Sep 2018 07:31:23 -0600 Received: from b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.232]) by b03cxnp08028.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w8PDVKKw24051878 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 25 Sep 2018 06:31:20 -0700 Received: from b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CC1B6E056; Tue, 25 Sep 2018 07:31:20 -0600 (MDT) Received: from b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5EC686E04C; Tue, 25 Sep 2018 07:31:17 -0600 (MDT) Received: from oc8043147753.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.207.102]) by b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 25 Sep 2018 07:31:17 -0600 (MDT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 24/26] KVM: s390: device attrs to enable/disable AP interpretation To: David Hildenbrand , Tony Krowiak , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: freude@de.ibm.com, schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, kwankhede@nvidia.com, bjsdjshi@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, alex.williamson@redhat.com, pmorel@linux.vnet.ibm.com, alifm@linux.vnet.ibm.com, mjrosato@linux.vnet.ibm.com, jjherne@linux.vnet.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, pasic@linux.vnet.ibm.com, berrange@redhat.com, fiuczy@linux.vnet.ibm.com, buendgen@de.ibm.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com References: <1536781396-13601-1-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1536781396-13601-25-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <9263b698-1827-1b7f-28bf-75b44657dea2@redhat.com> <18a21cda-1da9-3bfb-7b34-80415b5457f9@linux.ibm.com> <172560fb-2c54-ea43-3401-f108cf2a0595@redhat.com> From: Tony Krowiak Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 09:31:16 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.2.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18092513-0012-0000-0000-000016BB6C66 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00009769; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000267; SDB=6.01093447; UDB=6.00565149; IPR=6.00873484; MB=3.00023497; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-09-25 13:31:26 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18092513-0013-0000-0000-000054874037 Message-Id: <7f77492a-6561-b116-9c27-b54f549d7d9a@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-09-25_08:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1809250136 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 09/24/2018 02:46 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 24/09/2018 18:25, Tony Krowiak wrote: >> On 09/24/2018 07:23 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote: >>> On 22/09/2018 01:40, Tony Krowiak wrote: >>>> On 09/17/2018 04:51 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote: >>>>> Am 12.09.18 um 21:43 schrieb Tony Krowiak: >>>>>> From: Tony Krowiak >>>>>> >>>>>> Introduces two new VM crypto device attributes (KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO) >>>>>> to enable or disable AP instruction interpretation from userspace >>>>>> via the KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR ioctl: >>>>>> >>>>>> * The KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE attribute enables hardware >>>>>> interpretation of AP instructions executed on the guest. >>>>>> >>>>>> * The KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE attribute disables hardware >>>>>> interpretation of AP instructions executed on the guest. In this >>>>>> case the instructions will be intercepted and pass through to >>>>>> the guest. >>>>>> >>>>>> Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak >>>>>> --- >>>>>> arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + >>>>>> arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 2 ++ >>>>>> arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- >>>>>> 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >>>>>> >>>>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h >>>>>> index b32bd1b..36d3531 100644 >>>>>> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h >>>>>> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h >>>>>> @@ -719,6 +719,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_crypto { >>>>>> __u32 crycbd; >>>>>> __u8 aes_kw; >>>>>> __u8 dea_kw; >>>>>> + __u8 apie; >>>>>> }; >>>>>> >>>>>> #define APCB0_MASK_SIZE 1 >>>>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h >>>>>> index 8c23afc..a8dbd90 100644 >>>>>> --- a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h >>>>>> +++ b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h >>>>>> @@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_subfunc { >>>>>> #define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_DEA_KW 1 >>>>>> #define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_AES_KW 2 >>>>>> #define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_DEA_KW 3 >>>>>> +#define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE 4 >>>>>> +#define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE 5 >>>>>> >>>>>> /* kvm attributes for migration mode */ >>>>>> #define KVM_S390_VM_MIGRATION_STOP 0 >>>>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c >>>>>> index 2cdd980..286c2e0 100644 >>>>>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c >>>>>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c >>>>>> @@ -856,12 +856,11 @@ void kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_reset_all(struct kvm *kvm) >>>>>> >>>>>> static int kvm_s390_vm_set_crypto(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *attr) >>>>>> { >>>>>> - if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76)) >>>>>> - return -EINVAL; >>>>>> - >>>>>> mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); >>>>>> switch (attr->attr) { >>>>>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_AES_KW: >>>>>> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76)) >>>>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>>>> get_random_bytes( >>>>>> kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->aes_wrapping_key_mask, >>>>>> sizeof(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->aes_wrapping_key_mask)); >>>>>> @@ -869,6 +868,8 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_set_crypto(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *attr) >>>>>> VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "ENABLE: AES keywrapping support"); >>>>>> break; >>>>>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_DEA_KW: >>>>>> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76)) >>>>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>>>> get_random_bytes( >>>>>> kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask, >>>>>> sizeof(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask)); >>>>>> @@ -876,17 +877,31 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_set_crypto(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *attr) >>>>>> VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "ENABLE: DEA keywrapping support"); >>>>>> break; >>>>>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_AES_KW: >>>>>> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76)) >>>>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>>>> kvm->arch.crypto.aes_kw = 0; >>>>>> memset(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->aes_wrapping_key_mask, 0, >>>>>> sizeof(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->aes_wrapping_key_mask)); >>>>>> VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "DISABLE: AES keywrapping support"); >>>>>> break; >>>>>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_DEA_KW: >>>>>> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76)) >>>>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>>>> kvm->arch.crypto.dea_kw = 0; >>>>>> memset(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask, 0, >>>>>> sizeof(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask)); >>>>>> VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "DISABLE: DEA keywrapping support"); >>>>>> break; >>>>>> + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE: >>>>>> + if (!ap_instructions_available()) { >>>>>> + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); >>>>>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP; >>>>>> + } >>>>>> + kvm->arch.crypto.apie = 1; >>>>>> + break; >>>>>> + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE: >>>>>> + kvm->arch.crypto.apie = 0; >>>>>> + break; >>>>>> default: >>>>>> mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); >>>>>> return -ENXIO; >>>>>> @@ -1493,6 +1508,8 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_has_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *attr) >>>>>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_DEA_KW: >>>>>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_AES_KW: >>>>>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_DEA_KW: >>>>>> + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE: >>>>>> + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE: >>>>> >>>>> As also replied to the QEMU series, could we indicate >>>>> KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE (and maybe >>>>> KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE) only with ap_instructions_available(), >>>>> so we can avoid the additional KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP? >>>>> >>>>> KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP is right now completely unused in KVM otherwise >>>>> (never checked, we only care about apie). >>>> >>>> After much discussion with Halil and a few exchanges with you, we >>>> decided to go ahead and accept your suggestion to get rid of >>>> KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT and keep the VM device attributes to enable/disable >>>> apie. >>>> >>>> To that end, I responded to patches 03/26, 11/26 and 25/26 with fixup! >>>> patches that show the KVM/kernel changes that will be necessary to get >>>> rid of KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT and use apie to control ECA.28. I did that >>>> to generate discussion in v10 rather than waiting until v11 for >>>> comments. I make no guarantees that those fixup! patches will >>>> successfully apply should you have a v10 branch generated from this >>>> patch series you want to update. >>>> >>> >>> Will you also fixup this patch to expose KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE >>> only if supported by HW? (ap_instructions_available) >> >> Given that this patch DOES expose KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE only if >> supported by HW, I assume you are talking about >> KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE. I didn't check >> ap_instructions_available() for disabling APIE because I didn't >> think it necessary given that ECA.28 will be set to 0 (intercept) by >> default, whether AP instructions are installed or not; so why not allow >> disabling apie. I suppose from the perspective of consistency, since the >> kvm_s390_vm_has_attr() function checks ap_instructions_available() for >> both attributes, then it probably makes sense to add that check to >> KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE here. Then again, we could make a change >> in ap_instructions_available() to allow KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE >> regardless of whether AP instructions are available. It boils down to >> whether APIE needs to be dynamically disabled at some point when it has >> been enabled. The only case I can think of where that may be necessary >> is if a guest is migrated to a system without AP instructions. I don't >> think that can happen and may even be protected against precisely >> because the VM attributes won't be available on the target system due to >> no AP instructions. What say you? >> >>> >> > > Just so we're on the same page, I am talking about exposing, I talk > about indicating the attribute: > > diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c > index 03c23045527f..40924fe05bdf 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c > +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c > @@ -1491,6 +1491,11 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_has_attr(struct kvm *kvm, > struct kvm_device_attr *attr) > case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_DEA_KW: > ret = 0; > break; > + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE: > + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE: > + ret = -ENXIO; > + if (ap_instructions_available()) > + ret = 0; > default: > ret = -ENXIO; > break; > > KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE can either be handled like > KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE (return -EOPNOTSUPP) when setting or > always be allowed. I'll leave that up to you. But as it is completely > useless without ap_instructions_available() / > KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE , we might as well also just not expose > it then. We are on the same page. >