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Date:   Tue, 25 Sep 2018 23:16:45 -0400
From:   "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To:     TongZhang <ztong@vt.edu>
Cc:     Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, adobriyan@gmail.com,
        akpm@linux-foundation.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Wenbo Shen <shenwenbosmile@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Leaking path for set_task_comm
Message-ID: <20180926031645.GB3321@thunk.org>
Mail-Followup-To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
        TongZhang <ztong@vt.edu>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
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        viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Wenbo Shen <shenwenbosmile@gmail.com>
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On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 08:44:39PM -0400, TongZhang wrote:
> Yes, this is exactly what I am saying.
> A process can change its own name using prctl or /proc/self/comm.
> prctl is protected by security_task_prctl, whereas /proc/self/comm is not protected by this LSM hook.
> 
> A system admin may expect to use security_task_prctl to block all attempt to change process name, however, it can still change name using /proc/self/comm.

None of the in-tree LSM's try to affect PR_SET_NAME.  Looking at
security/commoncap.c, it's clear what is of interest is to checking
things relating to security sensitive things relating to capabilities, such as:

       PR_SET_SECUREBITS
       PR_CAPBSET_*
       PR_*_SECUREBITS
       PR_*_KEEPCAPS
       PR_CAP_AMBIENT

Trying to depend on task name for anything security sensitive is at
_really_ bad idea, so it seems unlikely that a LSM would want to
protect the process name.  (And if they did, the first thing I would
ask is "Why?  What are you trying to do?  Do you realize how many
*other* ways the process name can be spoofed or otherwise controlled
by a potentially malicious user?")

					- Ted