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Date:   Wed, 26 Sep 2018 05:31:59 -0700
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To:     linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB
 filling mitigation to sysfs
Git-Commit-ID: bb4b3b7762735cdaba5a40fd94c9303d9ffa147a
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Commit-ID:  bb4b3b7762735cdaba5a40fd94c9303d9ffa147a
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/bb4b3b7762735cdaba5a40fd94c9303d9ffa147a
Author:     Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
AuthorDate: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 14:39:28 +0200
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 14:26:52 +0200

x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs

If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch
in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks.

If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 53eb14a65610..fe32103fcdc7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -874,10 +874,11 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 
 	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
-		ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+		ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
 			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
 			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
 			       (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
+			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
 			       spectre_v2_module_string());
 		return ret;