Received: by 2002:ac0:a5a6:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id m35-v6csp10941imm; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 15:00:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACcGV61oFnWZnEVKQPR9e7e8F0qHgRiwPmAXq0rEJuNPv2I0C9SKd4mxrjP4s44riY5SiRly9krU X-Received: by 2002:a62:8490:: with SMTP id k138-v6mr10252998pfd.177.1538085619781; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 15:00:19 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1538085619; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=kgHaZvDj7BX2GOaSdl5fFFwxZ8fIk+WfvcGuKqkENNGzcLtN+EINiKk4lWFbo0C7Bh M3j9hEeB1rA3xZU8zIMUjMw4g/YdJlSOasFNVjt7/lmS8G4IDJovuDBSZO6eD5a+nloY 6ImgdwkKDAyEI6HDKfGZeLqkqIlEq7iFb20rDxMl9vWOLKM1p04VOJ3+EQFTJIatqBHH lGx7lxSBa/jvIVtpCMUuxxZ/FDFLhjKSBYtuaoOVIfTfnxKY8sH3/18HJe23l7W742uo oMhLrWpW8N6VFmXDx8PNjF/S02YluN2qy+BX/2pWdHXV6MESyDi00IQBxmsPoZm83Ebm PWNw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :references:in-reply-to:mime-version:dkim-signature; bh=uKm4Kn+b+pUCf8ULPQsruKbGWiHJza1ikJkZfOlwobQ=; b=HT36tHgfv6WHueu4o3ofYlWbmX43Xm7uFmHg85WGlKl8zUSizh9oBsjgoeQF0U/Air /Gt00R4zzQRIov2OAgaTri8gniEiiRj4jJrjBw2vzwdpLPBp/y8vcELpKvrNftSJdbJP 7QXyCcAVEx4DAtf0JQiNMuAhDlfrXsWETT3jEi7JSv8cSG5bYforEyZz14g8w8uKHHyP 0eBwGb8r6TlBM6k/zfuNAZPIB0ZgtLFhGOIqca8B6MrRwsLcQlAZUkCnHXxwOmrbmfGb sxXZTRv/7G63nJz30yomZk8NixrR4zMevJ1+i5H3G8Gpg/+/G4OU7x44VrSBcC23zJ1j k8+Q== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@chromium.org header.s=google header.b=XF3HPeMV; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=chromium.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id e1-v6si2806341plt.223.2018.09.27.15.00.03; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 15:00:19 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@chromium.org header.s=google header.b=XF3HPeMV; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=chromium.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726150AbeI1EUV (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 28 Sep 2018 00:20:21 -0400 Received: from mail-yw1-f65.google.com ([209.85.161.65]:41168 "EHLO mail-yw1-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725974AbeI1EUV (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Sep 2018 00:20:21 -0400 Received: by mail-yw1-f65.google.com with SMTP id q129-v6so1761046ywg.8 for ; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 14:59:57 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=uKm4Kn+b+pUCf8ULPQsruKbGWiHJza1ikJkZfOlwobQ=; b=XF3HPeMVgP8PNaMXVJ8HixzH1ow8UT6HJfhdWKXHrtecCs2f8i+MtFBfekJZHmx59U v687oQvZb/YrcFQJWXz2yL7lpqRknPYjbkm6TpYdzp6cJ8Ijzyrbt8nAW7wu5/MohoHl amSgfzlOUt4C7kXCDr0+Dx0RkXY3mBbdYkPds= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=uKm4Kn+b+pUCf8ULPQsruKbGWiHJza1ikJkZfOlwobQ=; b=NRNj9TftAI7za9MyYujkFXbf7CubcGtbSjVvarBh4XbQZrFxQ5JEFUsF/Tr+QGtf6o qXMA/xrEgyH17wm5T0RlD5DE1nCxaxVePdW8CgtSPzYg5ZExLNd/Hww+JeNL0/3NKNOT K7aS6v2uZ+w6YIh9NeKqSvQoH0hXJ7YSykAJRq1PxEDdEmHHpUFrTqPV4lkjbx37FRSF nenidxGsHaraAkgaW8v/cBme+XhfusdgRH4QCqiAe35j6tKrnDn/EU2MX9I9yKbQJ2yb i6lHteiV4dmqagJkXckMdnMk4teTpv/L2ycavIVfcdASA9bUIBjokf9wNAcGE099pqI3 htVA== X-Gm-Message-State: ABuFfoiuLl1LrpP4tpwjerBJttEM28B6pOTvH2ZSR4jfBEd5kJmC7dOr nZ788ppogqnbyEK/M3L9uVNN0uf1Z2I= X-Received: by 2002:a81:8302:: with SMTP id t2-v6mr6725518ywf.428.1538085596194; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 14:59:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-yw1-f48.google.com (mail-yw1-f48.google.com. [209.85.161.48]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id u143-v6sm4091027ywc.28.2018.09.27.14.59.54 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 27 Sep 2018 14:59:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yw1-f48.google.com with SMTP id j131-v6so1745026ywc.13 for ; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 14:59:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a81:98d7:: with SMTP id p206-v6mr6850445ywg.353.1538085594006; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 14:59:54 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 2002:a25:d116:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 14:59:53 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20180927151119.9989-5-tycho@tycho.ws> References: <20180927151119.9989-1-tycho@tycho.ws> <20180927151119.9989-5-tycho@tycho.ws> From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 14:59:53 -0700 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] files: add a replace_fd_files() function To: Tycho Andersen Cc: LKML , Linux Containers , Linux API , Andy Lutomirski , Oleg Nesterov , "Eric W . Biederman" , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Christian Brauner , Tyler Hicks , Akihiro Suda , Jann Horn , "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" , Alexander Viro Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 8:11 AM, Tycho Andersen wrote: > Similar to fd_install/__fd_install, we want to be able to replace an fd of > an arbitrary struct files_struct, not just current's. We'll use this in the > next patch to implement the seccomp ioctl that allows inserting fds into a > stopped process' context. > > v7: new in v7 > > Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen > CC: Alexander Viro > CC: Kees Cook > CC: Andy Lutomirski > CC: Oleg Nesterov > CC: Eric W. Biederman > CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" > CC: Christian Brauner > CC: Tyler Hicks > CC: Akihiro Suda > --- > fs/file.c | 22 +++++++++++++++------- > include/linux/file.h | 8 ++++++++ > 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c > index 7ffd6e9d103d..3b3c5aadaadb 100644 > --- a/fs/file.c > +++ b/fs/file.c > @@ -850,24 +850,32 @@ __releases(&files->file_lock) > } > > int replace_fd(unsigned fd, struct file *file, unsigned flags) > +{ > + return replace_fd_task(current, fd, file, flags); > +} > + > +/* > + * Same warning as __alloc_fd()/__fd_install() here. > + */ > +int replace_fd_task(struct task_struct *task, unsigned fd, > + struct file *file, unsigned flags) > { > int err; > - struct files_struct *files = current->files; Same feedback as Jann: on a purely "smaller diff" note, this could just be s/current/task/ here and all the other s/files/task->files/ would go away... > > if (!file) > - return __close_fd(files, fd); > + return __close_fd(task->files, fd); > > - if (fd >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE)) > + if (fd >= task_rlimit(task, RLIMIT_NOFILE)) > return -EBADF; > > - spin_lock(&files->file_lock); > - err = expand_files(files, fd); > + spin_lock(&task->files->file_lock); > + err = expand_files(task->files, fd); > if (unlikely(err < 0)) > goto out_unlock; > - return do_dup2(files, file, fd, flags); > + return do_dup2(task->files, file, fd, flags); > > out_unlock: > - spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); > + spin_unlock(&task->files->file_lock); > return err; > } > > diff --git a/include/linux/file.h b/include/linux/file.h > index 6b2fb032416c..f94277fee038 100644 > --- a/include/linux/file.h > +++ b/include/linux/file.h > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include > > struct file; > +struct task_struct; > > extern void fput(struct file *); > > @@ -79,6 +80,13 @@ static inline void fdput_pos(struct fd f) > > extern int f_dupfd(unsigned int from, struct file *file, unsigned flags); > extern int replace_fd(unsigned fd, struct file *file, unsigned flags); > +/* > + * Warning! This is only safe if you know the owner of the files_struct is > + * stopped outside syscall context. It's a very bad idea to use this unless you > + * have similar guarantees in your code. > + */ > +extern int replace_fd_task(struct task_struct *task, unsigned fd, > + struct file *file, unsigned flags); Perhaps call this __replace_fd() to indicate the "please don't use this unless you're very sure"ness of it? > extern void set_close_on_exec(unsigned int fd, int flag); > extern bool get_close_on_exec(unsigned int fd); > extern int get_unused_fd_flags(unsigned flags); > -- > 2.17.1 > If I can get an Ack from Al, that would be very nice. :) -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security