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Date:   Wed, 26 Sep 2018 23:39:03 +0100
From:   Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To:     "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc:     TongZhang <ztong@vt.edu>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
        adobriyan@gmail.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
        viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: Leaking path for set_task_comm
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> Trying to depend on task name for anything security sensitive is at
> _really_ bad idea, so it seems unlikely that a LSM would want to
> protect the process name.  (And if they did, the first thing I would
> ask is "Why?  What are you trying to do?  Do you realize how many
> *other* ways the process name can be spoofed or otherwise controlled
> by a potentially malicious user?")

Two processes that should not be able to otherwise communicate can keep
changing their name to a chunk of data, waiting for an ack flag name
change back.

Alan