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Mon, 01 Oct 2018 22:53:38 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state To: Kees Cook Cc: James Morris , Casey Schaufler , Tetsuo Handa , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , "Schaufler, Casey" , LSM , Jonathan Corbet , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , linux-arch , LKML References: <20180925001832.18322-1-keescook@chromium.org> <20180925001832.18322-15-keescook@chromium.org> <822e8ef3-5035-736e-1bea-dcb4af5c36ac@canonical.com> From: John Johansen Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=john.johansen@canonical.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsFNBE5mrPoBEADAk19PsgVgBKkImmR2isPQ6o7KJhTTKjJdwVbkWSnNn+o6Up5knKP1f49E BQlceWg1yp/NwbR8ad+eSEO/uma/K+PqWvBptKC9SWD97FG4uB4/caomLEU97sLQMtnvGWdx rxVRGM4anzWYMgzz5TZmIiVTZ43Ou5VpaS1Vz1ZSxP3h/xKNZr/TcW5WQai8u3PWVnbkjhSZ PHv1BghN69qxEPomrJBm1gmtx3ZiVmFXluwTmTgJOkpFol7nbJ0ilnYHrA7SX3CtR1upeUpM a/WIanVO96WdTjHHIa43fbhmQube4txS3FcQLOJVqQsx6lE9B7qAppm9hQ10qPWwdfPy/+0W 6AWtNu5ASiGVCInWzl2HBqYd/Zll93zUq+NIoCn8sDAM9iH+wtaGDcJywIGIn+edKNtK72AM gChTg/j1ZoWH6ZeWPjuUfubVzZto1FMoGJ/SF4MmdQG1iQNtf4sFZbEgXuy9cGi2bomF0zvy BJSANpxlKNBDYKzN6Kz09HUAkjlFMNgomL/cjqgABtAx59L+dVIZfaF281pIcUZzwvh5+JoG eOW5uBSMbE7L38nszooykIJ5XrAchkJxNfz7k+FnQeKEkNzEd2LWc3QF4BQZYRT6PHHga3Rg ykW5+1wTMqJILdmtaPbXrF3FvnV0LRPcv4xKx7B3fGm7ygdoowARAQABzR1Kb2huIEpvaGFu c2VuIDxqb2huQGpqbXgubmV0PsLBegQTAQoAJAIbAwULCQgHAwUVCgkICwUWAgMBAAIeAQIX gAUCTo0YVwIZAQAKCRAFLzZwGNXD2LxJD/9TJZCpwlncTgYeraEMeDfkWv8c1IsM1j0AmE4V tL+fE780ZVP9gkjgkdYSxt7ecETPTKMaZSisrl1RwqU0oogXdXQSpxrGH01icu/2n0jcYSqY KggPxy78BGs2LZq4XPfJTZmHZGnXGq/eDr/mSnj0aavBJmMZ6jbiPz6yHtBYPZ9fdo8btczw P41YeWoIu26/8II6f0Xm3VC5oAa8v7Rd+RWZa8TMwlhzHExxel3jtI7IzzOsnmE9/8Dm0ARD 5iTLCXwR1cwI/J9BF/S1Xv8PN1huT3ItCNdatgp8zqoJkgPVjmvyL64Q3fEkYbfHOWsaba9/ kAVtBNz9RTFh7IHDfECVaToujBd7BtPqr+qIjWFadJD3I5eLCVJvVrrolrCATlFtN3YkQs6J n1AiIVIU3bHR8Gjevgz5Ll6SCGHgRrkyRpnSYaU/uLgn37N6AYxi/QAL+by3CyEFLjzWAEvy Q8bq3Iucn7JEbhS/J//dUqLoeUf8tsGi00zmrITZYeFYARhQMtsfizIrVDtz1iPf/ZMp5gRB niyjpXn131cm3M3gv6HrQsAGnn8AJru8GDi5XJYIco/1+x/qEiN2nClaAOpbhzN2eUvPDY5W 0q3bA/Zp2mfG52vbRI+tQ0Br1Hd/vsntUHO903mMZep2NzN3BZ5qEvPvG4rW5Zq2DpybWc7B TQROZqz6ARAAoqw6kkBhWyM1fvgamAVjeZ6nKEfnRWbkC94L1EsJLup3Wb2X0ABNOHSkbSD4 pAuC2tKF/EGBt5CP7QdVKRGcQzAd6b2c1Idy9RLw6w4gi+nn/d1Pm1kkYhkSi5zWaIg0m5RQ Uk+El8zkf5tcE/1N0Z5OK2JhjwFu5bX0a0l4cFGWVQEciVMDKRtxMjEtk3SxFalm6ZdQ2pp2 822clnq4zZ9mWu1d2waxiz+b5Ia4weDYa7n41URcBEUbJAgnicJkJtCTwyIxIW2KnVyOrjvk QzIBvaP0FdP2vvZoPMdlCIzOlIkPLgxE0IWueTXeBJhNs01pb8bLqmTIMlu4LvBELA/veiaj j5s8y542H/aHsfBf4MQUhHxO/BZV7h06KSUfIaY7OgAgKuGNB3UiaIUS5+a9gnEOQLDxKRy/ a7Q1v9S+Nvx+7j8iH3jkQJhxT6ZBhZGRx0gkH3T+F0nNDm5NaJUsaswgJrqFZkUGd2Mrm1qn KwXiAt8SIcENdq33R0KKKRC80Xgwj8Jn30vXLSG+NO1GH0UMcAxMwy/pvk6LU5JGjZR73J5U LVhH4MLbDggD3mPaiG8+fotTrJUPqqhg9hyUEPpYG7sqt74Xn79+CEZcjLHzyl6vAFE2W0kx lLtQtUZUHO36afFv8qGpO3ZqPvjBUuatXF6tvUQCwf3H6XMAEQEAAcLBXwQYAQoACQUCTmas +gIbDAAKCRAFLzZwGNXD2D/XD/0ddM/4ai1b+Tl1jznKajX3kG+MeEYeI4f40vco3rOLrnRG FOcbyyfVF69MKepie4OwoI1jcTU0ADecnbWnDNHpr0SczxBMro3bnrLhsmvjunTYIvssBZtB 4aVJjuLILPUlnhFqa7fbVq0ZQjbiV/rt2jBENdm9pbJZ6GjnpYIcAbPCCa/ffL4/SQRSYHXo hGiiS4y5jBTmK5ltfewLOw02fkexH+IJFrrGBXDSg6n2Sgxnn++NF34fXcm9piaw3mKsICm+ 0hdNh4afGZ6IWV8PG2teooVDp4dYih++xX/XS8zBCc1O9w4nzlP2gKzlqSWbhiWpifRJBFa4 WtAeJTdXYd37j/BI4RWWhnyw7aAPNGj33ytGHNUf6Ro2/jtj4tF1y/QFXqjJG/wGjpdtRfbt UjqLHIsvfPNNJq/958p74ndACidlWSHzj+Op26KpbFnmwNO0psiUsnhvHFwPO/vAbl3RsR5+ 0Ro+hvs2cEmQuv9r/bDlCfpzp2t3cK+rhxUqisOx8DZfz1BnkaoCRFbvvvk+7L/fomPntGPk qJciYE8TGHkZw1hOku+4OoM2GB5nEDlj+2TF/jLQ+EipX9PkPJYvxfRlC6dK8PKKfX9KdfmA IcgHfnV1jSn+8yH2djBPtKiqW0J69aIsyx7iV/03paPCjJh7Xq9vAzydN5U/UA== Organization: Canonical Message-ID: Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 15:53:33 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-GB Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 10/01/2018 03:29 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Oct 1, 2018 at 3:20 PM, John Johansen > wrote: >> On 10/01/2018 02:56 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> On Mon, Oct 1, 2018 at 2:47 PM, James Morris wrote: >>>> On Mon, 24 Sep 2018, Kees Cook wrote: >>>> >>>>> In preparation for lifting the "is this LSM enabled?" logic out of the >>>>> individual LSMs, pass in any special enabled state tracking (as needed >>>>> for SELinux, AppArmor, and LoadPin). This should be an "int" to include >>>>> handling any future cases where "enabled" is exposed via sysctl which >>>>> has no "bool" type. >>>>> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook >>>>> --- >>>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + >>>>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++-- >>>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + >>>>> 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >>>>> >>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h >>>>> index 5056f7374b3d..2a41e8e6f6e5 100644 >>>>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h >>>>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h >>>>> @@ -2044,6 +2044,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, >>>>> struct lsm_info { >>>>> const char *name; /* Populated automatically. */ >>>>> unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */ >>>>> + int *enabled; /* Optional: NULL means enabled. */ >>>> >>>> This seems potentially confusing. >>>> >>>> Perhaps initialize 'enabled' to a default int pointer, like: >>>> >>>> static int lsm_default_enabled = 1; >>>> >>>> Then, >>>> >>>> DEFINE_LSM(foobar) >>>> flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, >>>> .enabled = &lsm_default_enabled, >>>> .init = foobar_init, >>>> END_LSM; >>> >>> The reason I didn't do this is because there are only two LSMs that >>> expose this "enabled" variable, so I didn't like making the other LSMs >>> have to declare this. Internally, though, this is exactly what the >>> infrastructure does: if it finds a NULL, it aims it at >>> &lsm_default_enabled (in a later patch). >>> >>> However, it seems more discussion is needed on the "enable" bit of >>> this, so I'll reply to John in a moment... >>> >> fwiw the apparmor.enabled config is really only a meant to be used to >> disable apparmor. I'd drop it entirely except its part of the userspace >> api now and needs to show up in >> >> /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled > > Showing the enabled-ness there can be wired up. What should happen if > someone sets apparmor.enabled=0/1 in new-series-world? (See other > thread...) > I am open to either just making apparmor=0/apparmor.enabled=0 a means of only disabling apparmor, thats how it is currently used. Or even potentially getting rid of it as an available kernel boot config parameter and running with just lsm.enabled/disabled. The important bit that applications are relying on is having /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled set to the the correct value.