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Thu, 04 Oct 2018 05:56:27 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: Remove boot parameter To: Kees Cook , James Morris Cc: Jordan Glover , Stephen Smalley , Paul Moore , Casey Schaufler , Tetsuo Handa , "Schaufler, Casey" , linux-security-module , Jonathan Corbet , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , linux-arch , LKML References: <20181002005505.6112-1-keescook@chromium.org> <809f1cfd-077b-ee58-51ba-b22daf46d12b@tycho.nsa.gov> <5955f5ce-b803-4f58-8b07-54c291e33da5@canonical.com> From: John Johansen Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=john.johansen@canonical.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsFNBE5mrPoBEADAk19PsgVgBKkImmR2isPQ6o7KJhTTKjJdwVbkWSnNn+o6Up5knKP1f49E BQlceWg1yp/NwbR8ad+eSEO/uma/K+PqWvBptKC9SWD97FG4uB4/caomLEU97sLQMtnvGWdx rxVRGM4anzWYMgzz5TZmIiVTZ43Ou5VpaS1Vz1ZSxP3h/xKNZr/TcW5WQai8u3PWVnbkjhSZ PHv1BghN69qxEPomrJBm1gmtx3ZiVmFXluwTmTgJOkpFol7nbJ0ilnYHrA7SX3CtR1upeUpM a/WIanVO96WdTjHHIa43fbhmQube4txS3FcQLOJVqQsx6lE9B7qAppm9hQ10qPWwdfPy/+0W 6AWtNu5ASiGVCInWzl2HBqYd/Zll93zUq+NIoCn8sDAM9iH+wtaGDcJywIGIn+edKNtK72AM gChTg/j1ZoWH6ZeWPjuUfubVzZto1FMoGJ/SF4MmdQG1iQNtf4sFZbEgXuy9cGi2bomF0zvy BJSANpxlKNBDYKzN6Kz09HUAkjlFMNgomL/cjqgABtAx59L+dVIZfaF281pIcUZzwvh5+JoG eOW5uBSMbE7L38nszooykIJ5XrAchkJxNfz7k+FnQeKEkNzEd2LWc3QF4BQZYRT6PHHga3Rg ykW5+1wTMqJILdmtaPbXrF3FvnV0LRPcv4xKx7B3fGm7ygdoowARAQABzR1Kb2huIEpvaGFu c2VuIDxqb2huQGpqbXgubmV0PsLBegQTAQoAJAIbAwULCQgHAwUVCgkICwUWAgMBAAIeAQIX gAUCTo0YVwIZAQAKCRAFLzZwGNXD2LxJD/9TJZCpwlncTgYeraEMeDfkWv8c1IsM1j0AmE4V tL+fE780ZVP9gkjgkdYSxt7ecETPTKMaZSisrl1RwqU0oogXdXQSpxrGH01icu/2n0jcYSqY KggPxy78BGs2LZq4XPfJTZmHZGnXGq/eDr/mSnj0aavBJmMZ6jbiPz6yHtBYPZ9fdo8btczw P41YeWoIu26/8II6f0Xm3VC5oAa8v7Rd+RWZa8TMwlhzHExxel3jtI7IzzOsnmE9/8Dm0ARD 5iTLCXwR1cwI/J9BF/S1Xv8PN1huT3ItCNdatgp8zqoJkgPVjmvyL64Q3fEkYbfHOWsaba9/ kAVtBNz9RTFh7IHDfECVaToujBd7BtPqr+qIjWFadJD3I5eLCVJvVrrolrCATlFtN3YkQs6J n1AiIVIU3bHR8Gjevgz5Ll6SCGHgRrkyRpnSYaU/uLgn37N6AYxi/QAL+by3CyEFLjzWAEvy Q8bq3Iucn7JEbhS/J//dUqLoeUf8tsGi00zmrITZYeFYARhQMtsfizIrVDtz1iPf/ZMp5gRB niyjpXn131cm3M3gv6HrQsAGnn8AJru8GDi5XJYIco/1+x/qEiN2nClaAOpbhzN2eUvPDY5W 0q3bA/Zp2mfG52vbRI+tQ0Br1Hd/vsntUHO903mMZep2NzN3BZ5qEvPvG4rW5Zq2DpybWc7B TQROZqz6ARAAoqw6kkBhWyM1fvgamAVjeZ6nKEfnRWbkC94L1EsJLup3Wb2X0ABNOHSkbSD4 pAuC2tKF/EGBt5CP7QdVKRGcQzAd6b2c1Idy9RLw6w4gi+nn/d1Pm1kkYhkSi5zWaIg0m5RQ Uk+El8zkf5tcE/1N0Z5OK2JhjwFu5bX0a0l4cFGWVQEciVMDKRtxMjEtk3SxFalm6ZdQ2pp2 822clnq4zZ9mWu1d2waxiz+b5Ia4weDYa7n41URcBEUbJAgnicJkJtCTwyIxIW2KnVyOrjvk QzIBvaP0FdP2vvZoPMdlCIzOlIkPLgxE0IWueTXeBJhNs01pb8bLqmTIMlu4LvBELA/veiaj j5s8y542H/aHsfBf4MQUhHxO/BZV7h06KSUfIaY7OgAgKuGNB3UiaIUS5+a9gnEOQLDxKRy/ a7Q1v9S+Nvx+7j8iH3jkQJhxT6ZBhZGRx0gkH3T+F0nNDm5NaJUsaswgJrqFZkUGd2Mrm1qn KwXiAt8SIcENdq33R0KKKRC80Xgwj8Jn30vXLSG+NO1GH0UMcAxMwy/pvk6LU5JGjZR73J5U LVhH4MLbDggD3mPaiG8+fotTrJUPqqhg9hyUEPpYG7sqt74Xn79+CEZcjLHzyl6vAFE2W0kx lLtQtUZUHO36afFv8qGpO3ZqPvjBUuatXF6tvUQCwf3H6XMAEQEAAcLBXwQYAQoACQUCTmas +gIbDAAKCRAFLzZwGNXD2D/XD/0ddM/4ai1b+Tl1jznKajX3kG+MeEYeI4f40vco3rOLrnRG FOcbyyfVF69MKepie4OwoI1jcTU0ADecnbWnDNHpr0SczxBMro3bnrLhsmvjunTYIvssBZtB 4aVJjuLILPUlnhFqa7fbVq0ZQjbiV/rt2jBENdm9pbJZ6GjnpYIcAbPCCa/ffL4/SQRSYHXo hGiiS4y5jBTmK5ltfewLOw02fkexH+IJFrrGBXDSg6n2Sgxnn++NF34fXcm9piaw3mKsICm+ 0hdNh4afGZ6IWV8PG2teooVDp4dYih++xX/XS8zBCc1O9w4nzlP2gKzlqSWbhiWpifRJBFa4 WtAeJTdXYd37j/BI4RWWhnyw7aAPNGj33ytGHNUf6Ro2/jtj4tF1y/QFXqjJG/wGjpdtRfbt UjqLHIsvfPNNJq/958p74ndACidlWSHzj+Op26KpbFnmwNO0psiUsnhvHFwPO/vAbl3RsR5+ 0Ro+hvs2cEmQuv9r/bDlCfpzp2t3cK+rhxUqisOx8DZfz1BnkaoCRFbvvvk+7L/fomPntGPk qJciYE8TGHkZw1hOku+4OoM2GB5nEDlj+2TF/jLQ+EipX9PkPJYvxfRlC6dK8PKKfX9KdfmA IcgHfnV1jSn+8yH2djBPtKiqW0J69aIsyx7iV/03paPCjJh7Xq9vAzydN5U/UA== Organization: Canonical Message-ID: Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2018 22:56:21 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-GB Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 10/03/2018 01:36 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 1:10 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 11:28 AM, James Morris wrote: >>> On Wed, 3 Oct 2018, Kees Cook wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 11:17 AM, James Morris wrote: >>>>> On Tue, 2 Oct 2018, John Johansen wrote: >>>>>> To me a list like >>>>>> lsm.enable=X,Y,Z >>>>> >>>>> What about even simpler: >>>>> >>>>> lsm=selinux,!apparmor,yama >>>> >>>> We're going to have lsm.order=, so I'd like to keep it with a dot >>>> separator (this makes it more like module parameters, too). You want >>>> to mix enable/disable in the same string? That implies you'd want >>>> implicit enabling (i.e. it complements the builtin enabling), which is >>>> opposite from what John wanted. >>>> >>> >>> Why can't this be the order as well? >> >> That was covered extensively in the earlier threads. It boils down to >> making sure we do not create a pattern of leaving LSMs disabled by >> default when they are added to the kernel. The v1 series used >> security= like this: >> >> + security= [SECURITY] An ordered comma-separated list of >> + security modules to attempt to enable at boot. If >> + this boot parameter is not specified, only the >> + security modules asking for initialization will be >> + enabled (see CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY). Duplicate >> + or invalid security modules will be ignored. The >> + capability module is always loaded first, without >> + regard to this parameter. >> >> This meant booting "security=apparmor" would disable all the other >> LSMs, which wasn't friendly at all. So "security=" was left alone (to >> leave it to only select the "major" LSM: all major LSMs not matching >> "security=" would be disabled). So I proposed "lsm.order=" to specify >> the order things were going to be initialized in, but to avoid kernels >> booting with newly added LSMs forced-off due to not being listed in >> "lsm.order=", it had to have implicit fall-back for unlisted LSMs. >> (i.e. anything missing from lsm.order would then follow their order in >> CONFIG_LSM_ORDER, and anything missing there would fall back to >> link-time ordering.) However, then the objection was raised that this >> didn't provide a way to explicitly disable an LSM. So I proposed >> lsm.enable/disable, and John argued for CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE over >> CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE. > > I still think we should have all built LSMs enabled by default, with > CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE available to turn stuff off. CONFIG_LSM_ORDER and this as a distro ubuntu does not want. Ubuntu wants to make yes available by building them in, but does NOT want all the LSM enabled by default, not even necessarily all minor LSMs. As a distro we want a supported set as default, and users can opt-in to new LSMs. If a new LSM comes along we don't want it enabled by default, which happens Using the lsm disable approach. > declares their order, "lsm.order=" works as mentioned, and > "lsm.enable/disable=" make changes to what's enabled. > > (This would be most like the v3 series, swapping CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE for > CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE.) > > It gives us centralized ordering and centralized disabling. Distros > wanting specific LSMs are already building them, so _also_ adding them > to CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE seems redundant to me. Distros wanting all the except as a disto we want to build in all LSMs by default but NOT have new LSMs enabled by default. The disable approach either mean we don't offer new LSMs in the supported kernels, OR me distro patch so we have the enabled by default list. > LSMs just want to declare the order of initialization, and maybe add > some to CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE some day, so they use CONFIG_LSM_ORDER. > individual LSMs may want that. > I should also note that I don't want to leave CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY > in, since it's just a way to disable all the other majors. I don't > like this because it will force LSMs to be disabled that don't need to > be once blob-sharing lands. The whole point of this series is to get > us away from fixed ordering and thinking about "major" vs "minor" and > towards "exclusive" or not, where we can continue to slowly chip away > at exclusivity without breaking anything. > sure we definitely want to get away form "major" vs "minor" and in generally even exclusive, except where to LSMs just can't live with each other. But that doesn't mean dropping something like default security. The mistake with the current DEFAULT_SECURITY was that it only applied to major LSMs, not the minor ones.