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From:   Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 5 Oct 2018 17:55:26 +0200
Message-ID: <CAG48ez3FG0axt92F=+vDe1Q=kj-YngmCgFqDET7E2xCE1mOgeg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] namei: implement AT_THIS_ROOT chroot-like path resolution
To:     cyphar@cyphar.com, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc:     jlayton@kernel.org, Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, shuah@kernel.org,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, christian@brauner.io,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, dev@opencontainers.org,
        containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
        Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
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On Fri, Oct 5, 2018 at 5:07 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> wrote:
> On 2018-10-04, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 4, 2018 at 6:26 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> wrote:
> > > On 2018-09-29, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
> > > > You attempt to open "C/../../etc/passwd" under the root "/A/B".
> > > > Something else concurrently moves /A/B/C to /A/C. This can result in
> > > > the following:
> > > >
> > > > 1. You start the path walk and reach /A/B/C.
> > > > 2. The other process moves /A/B/C to /A/C. Your path walk is now at /A/C.
> > > > 3. Your path walk follows the first ".." up into /A. This is outside
> > > > the process root, but you never actually encountered the process root,
> > > > so you don't notice.
> > > > 4. Your path walk follows the second ".." up to /. Again, this is
> > > > outside the process root, but you don't notice.
> > > > 5. Your path walk walks down to /etc/passwd, and the open completes
> > > > successfully. You now have an fd pointing outside your chroot.
> > >
> > > I've been playing with this and I have the following patch, which
> > > according to my testing protects against attacks where ".." skips over
> > > nd->root. It abuses __d_path to figure out if nd->path can be resolved
> > > from nd->root (obviously a proper version of this patch would refactor
> > > __d_path so it could be used like this -- and would not return
> > > -EMULTIHOP).
> > >
> > > I've also attached my reproducer. With it, I was seeing fairly constant
> > > breakouts before this patch and after it I didn't see a single breakout
> > > after running it overnight. Obviously this is not conclusive, but I'm
> > > hoping that it can show what my idea for protecting against ".." was.
> > >
> > > Does this patch make sense? Or is there something wrong with it that I'm
> > > not seeing?
> > >
> > > --8<-------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > There is a fairly easy-to-exploit race condition with chroot(2) (and
> > > thus by extension AT_THIS_ROOT and AT_BENEATH) where a rename(2) of a
> > > path can be used to "skip over" nd->root and thus escape to the
> > > filesystem above nd->root.
> > >
> > >   thread1 [attacker]:
> > >     for (;;)
> > >       renameat2(AT_FDCWD, "/a/b/c", AT_FDCWD, "/a/d", RENAME_EXCHANGE);
> > >   thread2 [victim]:
> > >     for (;;)
> > >       openat(dirb, "b/c/../../etc/shadow", O_THISROOT);
> > >
> > > With fairly significant regularity, thread2 will resolve to
> > > "/etc/shadow" rather than "/a/b/etc/shadow". With this patch, such cases
> > > will be detected during ".." resolution (which is the weak point of
> > > chroot(2) -- since walking *into* a subdirectory tautologically cannot
> > > result in you walking *outside* nd->root).
> > >
> > > The use of __d_path here might seem suspect, however we don't mind if a
> > > path is moved from within the chroot to outside the chroot and we
> > > incorrectly decide it is safe (because at that point we are still within
> > > the set of files which were accessible at the beginning of resolution).
> > > However, we can fail resolution on the next path component if it remains
> > > outside of the root. A path which has always been outside nd->root
> > > during resolution will never be resolveable from nd->root and thus will
> > > always be blocked.
> > >
> > > DO NOT MERGE: Currently this code returns -EMULTIHOP in this case,
> > >               purely as a debugging measure (so that you can see that
> > >               the protection actually does something). Obviously in the
> > >               proper patch this will return -EXDEV.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
> > > ---
> > >  fs/namei.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > >  1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> > > index 6f995e6de6b1..c8349693d47b 100644
> > > --- a/fs/namei.c
> > > +++ b/fs/namei.c
> > > @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
> > >   * The new code replaces the old recursive symlink resolution with
> > >   * an iterative one (in case of non-nested symlink chains).  It does
> > >   * this with calls to <fs>_follow_link().
> > > - * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now
> > > - * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all
> > > + * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now
> > > + * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all
> > >   * the special cases of the former code.
> > >   *
> > >   * With the new dcache, the pathname is stored at each inode, at least as
> > > @@ -1375,6 +1375,20 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
> > >                                 return -EXDEV;
> > >                         break;
> > >                 }
> > > +               if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT))) {
> > > +                       char *pathbuf, *pathptr;
> > > +
> > > +                       pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_ATOMIC);
> > > +                       if (!pathbuf)
> > > +                               return -ECHILD;
> > > +                       pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
> > > +                       kfree(pathbuf);
> > > +                       if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) {
> > > +                               if (!pathptr)
> > > +                                       pathptr = ERR_PTR(-EMULTIHOP);
> > > +                               return PTR_ERR(pathptr);
> > > +                       }
> > > +               }
> >
> > One somewhat problematic thing about this approach is that if someone
> > tries to lookup
> > "a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/[...]/../../../../../../../../../.." for some
> > reason, you'll have quadratic runtime: For each "..", you'll have to
> > walk up to the root.
>
> What if we took rename_lock (call it nd->r_seq) at the start of the
> resolution, and then only tried the __d_path-style check
>
>   if (read_seqretry(&rename_lock, nd->r_seq) ||
>       read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq))
>           /* do the __d_path lookup. */
>
> That way you would only hit the slow path if there were concurrent
> renames or mounts *and* you are doing a path resolution with
> AT_THIS_ROOT or AT_BENEATH. I've attached a modified patch that does
> this (and after some testing it also appears to work).

Yeah, I think that might do the job.

> I'm not sure if there's a way to always avoid the quadratic lookup
> without (significantly and probably unreasonably) changing how dcache
> invalidation works. And obviously using this slow path if there was
> _any_ rename on the _entire_ system is suboptimal, but I think it is a
> significant improvement.

Yeah, I think this is much better.

> Another possibility is to expand on Andy's suggestion to use
> /proc/$pid/root, and instead require AT_THIS_ROOT to use the root of a
> namespace as its dirfd (I'm not sure if there's a trivial way to detect
> this though). This wouldn't help with AT_BENEATH, but it should protect
> against ".." shenanigans without any ".." handling changes. (This is
> less ideal because it requires a container process, but it is another
> way of dealing with the issue.)

(For container usecases, but not for a web server that uses AT_BENEATH.)

> ---
>  fs/namei.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 6f995e6de6b1..12c9be175cb4 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ struct nameidata {
>         struct path     root;
>         struct inode    *inode; /* path.dentry.d_inode */
>         unsigned int    flags;
> -       unsigned        seq, m_seq;
> +       unsigned        seq, m_seq, r_seq;
>         int             last_type;
>         unsigned        depth;
>         int             total_link_count;
> @@ -1375,6 +1375,27 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
>                                 return -EXDEV;
>                         break;
>                 }
> +               if (unlikely((nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT)) &&
> +                            (read_seqretry(&rename_lock, nd->r_seq) ||
> +                             read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))) {
> +                       char *pathbuf, *pathptr;
> +
> +                       nd->r_seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
> +                       /* Cannot take m_seq here. */
> +
> +                       pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_ATOMIC);
> +                       if (!pathbuf)
> +                               return -ECHILD;
> +                       pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
> +                       kfree(pathbuf);

You're doing this check before actually looking up the parent, right?
So as long as I don't trigger the "path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root)"
check that you do for O_BENEATH, escaping up by one level is possible,
right? You should probably move this check so that it happens after
following "..".

(Also: I assume that you're going to get rid of that memory allocation
in a future version.)

> +                       if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) {
> +                               int error = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(pathptr);
> +
> +                               if (!error)
> +                                       error = nd_jump_root(nd);
> +                               return error;
> +                       }
> +               }
>                 if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
>                         struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
>                         struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
> @@ -1510,6 +1531,27 @@ static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
>                                 return -EXDEV;
>                         break;
>                 }
> +               if (unlikely((nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT)) &&
> +                            (read_seqretry(&rename_lock, nd->r_seq) ||
> +                             read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))) {
> +                       char *pathbuf, *pathptr;
> +
> +                       nd->r_seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
> +                       /* Cannot take m_seq here. */
> +
> +                       pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
> +                       if (!pathbuf)
> +                               return -ENOMEM;
> +                       pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
> +                       kfree(pathbuf);
> +                       if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) {
> +                               int error = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(pathptr);
> +
> +                               if (!error)
> +                                       error = nd_jump_root(nd);
> +                               return error;
> +                       }
> +               }

Same problem as in the RCU case above.

>                 if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
>                         int ret = path_parent_directory(&nd->path);
>                         if (ret)
> @@ -2269,6 +2311,9 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
>         nd->last_type = LAST_ROOT; /* if there are only slashes... */
>         nd->flags = flags | LOOKUP_JUMPED | LOOKUP_PARENT;
>         nd->depth = 0;
> +       nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
> +       nd->r_seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);

This means that now, attempting to perform a lookup while something is
holding the rename_lock will spin on the lock. I don't know whether
that's a problem in practice though. Does anyone on this thread know
whether this is problematic?