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Subject: Re: [PATCH] apparmor: add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering
To:     Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc:     David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
References: <20181005161206.727098-1-arnd@arndb.de>
From:   John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Organization: Canonical
Message-ID: <cddbef8c-f2e0-149c-2626-a3657851672b@canonical.com>
Date:   Fri, 5 Oct 2018 14:56:08 -0700
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In-Reply-To: <20181005161206.727098-1-arnd@arndb.de>
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Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
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On 10/05/2018 09:11 AM, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> The newly added code fails to build when either SECMARK or
> NETFILTER are disabled:
> 
> security/apparmor/lsm.c: In function 'apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb':
> security/apparmor/lsm.c:1138:12: error: 'struct sk_buff' has no member named 'secmark'; did you mean 'mark'?
> 
> security/apparmor/lsm.c:1671:21: error: 'struct nf_hook_state' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]
> 
> Add a set of #ifdef checks around it to only enable the code that
> we can compile and that makes sense in that configuration.
> 
> Fixes: ab9f2115081a ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy")
> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Thanks Arnd, I have pulled this into apparmor-next


> ---
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c | 10 ++++++++++
>  security/apparmor/net.c |  2 ++
>  2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 53201013c40e..b74b724d3e84 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1123,6 +1123,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
>  	return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
>  /**
>   * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
>   *
> @@ -1141,6 +1142,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
>  				      skb->secmark, sk);
>  }
> +#endif
>  
>  
>  static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
> @@ -1235,6 +1237,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
>  		ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
>  static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  				      struct request_sock *req)
>  {
> @@ -1246,6 +1249,7 @@ static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT,
>  				      skb->secmark, sk);
>  }
> +#endif
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
> @@ -1304,13 +1308,17 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
> +#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
> +#endif
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
>  		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
>  		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
> +#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
> +#endif
>  
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
> @@ -1666,6 +1674,7 @@ static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
>  
> +#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
>  static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
>  					  struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					  const struct nf_hook_state *state)
> @@ -1754,6 +1763,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  __initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init);
> +#endif
>  
>  static int __init apparmor_init(void)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
> index f9a678ce994f..c07fde444792 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/net.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
> @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
>  	return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
>  static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
>  {
>  	struct aa_label *label;
> @@ -254,3 +255,4 @@ int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
>  				    aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
>  						    &sa, sk));
>  }
> +#endif
>