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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id q15-v6si23136733pgm.595.2018.10.10.20.08.16; Wed, 10 Oct 2018 20:08:31 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=PWh5fQ1W; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726886AbeJKKay (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 11 Oct 2018 06:30:54 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:53696 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726220AbeJKKax (ORCPT ); Thu, 11 Oct 2018 06:30:53 -0400 Received: from localhost (unknown [104.132.1.80]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EF18620865; Thu, 11 Oct 2018 03:05:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1539227145; bh=qbirBwRooKzmq133a8tBSXB0YYnZEdLC3aHSd1U+GnQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=PWh5fQ1WdmCidn67l1qM/7mYlZ740hA+IeYoAwUszo5DF9tlv45HOAI4Oj6iLCtnz MumgRXdA5BLLhy44wBObo1k1cp8nxOYD8jShxa2CO1FVSPXRvVle4z30o87JM7Cd3a R8YdnJtEPOYS20FrDwNtv3sqks9JprXiMkf3wNy4= Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 20:05:44 -0700 From: Jaegeuk Kim To: Sahitya Tummala Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH] f2fs: fix data corruption issue with hardware encryption Message-ID: <20181011030544.GA82403@jaegeuk-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com> References: <1539149182-12729-1-git-send-email-stummala@codeaurora.org> <20181010213402.GA52406@jaegeuk-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com> <20181011002935.GA24669@codeaurora.org> <20181011021506.GA78526@jaegeuk-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181011021506.GA78526@jaegeuk-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.8.2 (2017-04-18) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 10/10, Jaegeuk Kim wrote: > On 10/11, Sahitya Tummala wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 02:34:02PM -0700, Jaegeuk Kim wrote: > > > On 10/10, Sahitya Tummala wrote: > > > > Direct IO can be used in case of hardware encryption. The following > > > > scenario results into data corruption issue in this path - > > > > > > > > Thread A - Thread B- > > > > -> write file#1 in direct IO > > > > -> GC gets kicked in > > > > -> GC submitted bio on meta mapping > > > > for file#1, but pending completion > > > > -> write file#1 again with new data > > > > in direct IO > > > > -> GC bio gets completed now > > > > -> GC writes old data to the new > > > > location and thus file#1 is > > > > corrupted. > > > > > > > > Fix this by submitting and waiting for pending io on meta mapping > > > > for direct IO case in f2fs_map_blocks(). > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala > > > > --- > > > > fs/f2fs/data.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c > > > > index 9ef6f1f..7b2fef0 100644 > > > > --- a/fs/f2fs/data.c > > > > +++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c > > > > @@ -1028,6 +1028,12 @@ int f2fs_map_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_map_blocks *map, > > > > map->m_pblk = ei.blk + pgofs - ei.fofs; > > > > map->m_len = min((pgoff_t)maxblocks, ei.fofs + ei.len - pgofs); > > > > map->m_flags = F2FS_MAP_MAPPED; > > > > + /* for HW encryption, but to avoid potential issue in future */ > > > > + if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_DIO) { > > > > + blkaddr = map->m_pblk; > > > > + for (; blkaddr < map->m_pblk + map->m_len; blkaddr++) > > > > + f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback(sbi, blkaddr); > > > > > > Do we need this? IIRC, DIO would give create=1. > > > > Yes, we need it. When we are overwriting an existing file, DIO calls > > f2fs_map_blocks() with create=0. From the DIO code, I see that this happens > > because blockdev_direct_IO() passes this dio flag DIO_SKIP_HOLES. And then > > in get_more_blocks(), below code updates create=0, when we are overwriting > > an existing file. > > > > create = dio->op == REQ_OP_WRITE; > > if (dio->flags & DIO_SKIP_HOLES) { > > if (fs_startblk <= ((i_size_read(dio->inode) - 1) >> > > i_blkbits)) > > create = 0; > > } > > > > ret = (*sdio->get_block)(dio->inode, fs_startblk, > > map_bh, create); > > > > Got it. > How about this? > Sorry, this is v2. From b78dd7b2e0317be18716b9496269e9792829f63e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sahitya Tummala Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 10:56:22 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix data corruption issue with hardware encryption Direct IO can be used in case of hardware encryption. The following scenario results into data corruption issue in this path - Thread A - Thread B- -> write file#1 in direct IO -> GC gets kicked in -> GC submitted bio on meta mapping for file#1, but pending completion -> write file#1 again with new data in direct IO -> GC bio gets completed now -> GC writes old data to the new location and thus file#1 is corrupted. Fix this by submitting and waiting for pending io on meta mapping for direct IO case in f2fs_map_blocks(). Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim --- fs/f2fs/data.c | 11 +++++++++++ fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 ++ fs/f2fs/segment.c | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c index be19257d9e36..8952f2d610a6 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/data.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c @@ -1030,6 +1030,11 @@ int f2fs_map_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_map_blocks *map, map->m_flags = F2FS_MAP_MAPPED; if (map->m_next_extent) *map->m_next_extent = pgofs + map->m_len; + + /* for hardware encryption, but to avoid potential issue in future */ + if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_DIO) + f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback_range(inode, + map->m_pblk, map->m_len); goto out; } @@ -1188,6 +1193,12 @@ int f2fs_map_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_map_blocks *map, goto next_dnode; sync_out: + + /* for hardware encryption, but to avoid potential issue in future */ + if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_DIO && map->m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED) + f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback_range(inode, + map->m_pblk, map->m_len); + if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_PRECACHE) { if (map->m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED) { unsigned int ofs = start_pgofs - map->m_lblk; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index 7693b1a2072e..4a608a71c360 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -2986,6 +2986,8 @@ void f2fs_allocate_data_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct page *page, void f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(struct page *page, enum page_type type, bool ordered); void f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback(struct inode *inode, block_t blkaddr); +void f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback_range(struct inode *inode, block_t blkaddr, + block_t len); void f2fs_write_data_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t start_blk); void f2fs_write_node_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t start_blk); int f2fs_lookup_journal_in_cursum(struct f2fs_journal *journal, int type, diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c index 805c8310d7b0..f306d8946d99 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c @@ -3301,6 +3301,15 @@ void f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback(struct inode *inode, block_t blkaddr) } } +void f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback_range(struct inode *inode, block_t blkaddr, + block_t len) +{ + block_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback(inode, blkaddr + i); +} + static int read_compacted_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) { struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi); -- 2.19.0.605.g01d371f741-goog