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From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date:   Fri, 12 Oct 2018 13:07:46 -0700
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 21/19] LSM: Cleanup and fixes from Tetsuo Handa
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc:     LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        LKLM <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
        =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= <mic@digikod.net>,
        Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
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On Mon, Oct 1, 2018 at 2:48 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 2:57 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() are called from only __init functions.
>>
>> lsm_cred_alloc()/lsm_file_alloc() are called from only security/security.c .
>>
>> lsm_early_inode() should be avoided because it is not appropriate to
>> call panic() when lsm_early_inode() is called after __init phase.
>>
>> Since all free hooks are called when one of init hooks failed, each
>> free hook needs to check whether init hook was called.
>>
>> The original changes are from Tetsuo Handa. I have made minor
>> changes in some places, but this is mostly his code.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         |  6 ++----
>>  security/security.c               | 27 ++++-----------------------
>>  security/selinux/hooks.c          |  5 ++++-
>>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h |  2 ++
>>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c        |  8 +++++++-
>>  5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
>
> I've split this across the various commits they touch:
>
> Infrastructure management of the cred security blob
> LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security
> LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
> LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security
> LSM: Blob sharing support for S.A.R.A and LandLock
>
> Based on these changes, I've uploaded the "v4.1", or "Casey is on
> vacation", tree here:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/log/?h=lsm/blob-sharing-v4.1
>
> I'm going to work on a merged series for the "arbitrary ordering" and
> "blob-sharing" trees next...

Here is my v6 (v5 plus small fix I noticed) with my refactoring of
Casey's blob-sharing series on top:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/log/?h=lsm/ordering-v6-blob-sharing

procfs: add smack subdir to attrs
Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob
SELinux: Abstract use of cred security blob
SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoning
SELinux: Remove unused selinux_is_enabled
AppArmor: Abstract use of cred security blob
TOMOYO: Abstract use of cred security blob
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob
SELinux: Abstract use of file security blob
Smack: Abstract use of file security blob
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security
SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blob
Smack: Abstract use of inode security blob
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security
SELinux: Abstract use of ipc security blobs
Smack: Abstract use of ipc security blobs
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob
TOMOYO: Update LSM flags to no longer be exclusive

Notably, the last patch from Casey's series is entirely removed.
Additionally all the per-LSM initialization changes were removed since
the blob size calculations now stay internal to security.c, done
during the "prepare" phase.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security