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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id v12-v6si13837125pgn.547.2018.10.16.04.13.53; Tue, 16 Oct 2018 04:14:10 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727105AbeJPTDW (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 16 Oct 2018 15:03:22 -0400 Received: from gateway34.websitewelcome.com ([192.185.148.109]:42701 "EHLO gateway34.websitewelcome.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726595AbeJPTDW (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Oct 2018 15:03:22 -0400 Received: from cm13.websitewelcome.com (cm13.websitewelcome.com [100.42.49.6]) by gateway34.websitewelcome.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC6C2278D9 for ; Tue, 16 Oct 2018 06:13:15 -0500 (CDT) Received: from gator4166.hostgator.com ([108.167.133.22]) by cmsmtp with SMTP id CNHngDp8aFxNhCNHngXPbq; Tue, 16 Oct 2018 06:13:15 -0500 X-Authority-Reason: nr=8 Received: from lfbn-1-466-13.w86-245.abo.wanadoo.fr ([86.245.173.13]:36404 helo=embeddedor) by gator4166.hostgator.com with esmtpa (Exim 4.91) (envelope-from ) id 1gCNHn-000y2q-0v; Tue, 16 Oct 2018 06:13:15 -0500 Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 13:13:13 +0200 From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" To: Dmitry Torokhov Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Subject: [PATCH] Input: uinput - fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Message-ID: <20181016111313.GA28307@embeddedor.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - gator4166.hostgator.com X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - vger.kernel.org X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - embeddedor.com X-BWhitelist: no X-Source-IP: 86.245.173.13 X-Source-L: No X-Exim-ID: 1gCNHn-000y2q-0v X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: X-Source-Sender: lfbn-1-466-13.w86-245.abo.wanadoo.fr (embeddedor) [86.245.173.13]:36404 X-Source-Auth: gustavo@embeddedor.com X-Email-Count: 10 X-Source-Cap: Z3V6aWRpbmU7Z3V6aWRpbmU7Z2F0b3I0MTY2Lmhvc3RnYXRvci5jb20= X-Local-Domain: yes Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org setup.code can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:512 uinput_abs_setup() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->absinfo' [w] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing setup.code before using it to index dev->absinfo. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva --- drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c index 8ec483e..97b0809 100644 --- a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c +++ b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c @@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ #include #include "../input-compat.h" +#include + #define UINPUT_NAME "uinput" #define UINPUT_BUFFER_SIZE 16 #define UINPUT_NUM_REQUESTS 16 @@ -497,6 +499,7 @@ static int uinput_abs_setup(struct uinput_device *udev, if (setup.code > ABS_MAX) return -ERANGE; + setup.code = array_index_nospec(setup.code, ABS_MAX + 1); dev = udev->dev; -- 2.7.4