Received: by 2002:ac0:a582:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id m2-v6csp3075829imm; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 04:50:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACcGV60K07wsv1lupgsPrJepwgJlh0dgYlm+N0+EG2ZhEdwHGG81yEaFkHCe5wPd7V7/LpfGsnL5 X-Received: by 2002:a62:d504:: with SMTP id d4-v6mr1705331pfg.60.1539949837712; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 04:50:37 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1539949837; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=Lm9RQybu2Eqt/rJhbKo9ERMbMmRvKbV+ikyuKjN80kGp0CtSlDd+j9CNnvltaKJul3 1Om3MG12cnGjPnREGC03MAfkg9mD7T0PCByU104Cf1yknPpgaCW3WvHobo/qSCnfOMBp HRJ4nCNvGvHVuqYiCVPI8KAGrkY8QUrZUV3gmlXdL8Uv33OSlNm5XAEAgiHBPc3hoTEF 6q3WJW7ZnWdF86CgPBnqfZ+KKyiusZye11GoetQCZ9HoW70W9AE8FSjcD8RX+VQ0RSC2 YPrRqTIymcTbUZr4Rsq2PvkDX0B1hl3YYV2R9QwjVPyKYWihbXWgMcHwyQDep07a/Vvz h9jA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:in-reply-to :content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id:subject:cc :to:from:date; bh=VBupGk5pHCUGEqmlOxu1TpeMfvSVJC6AmVMbbYXwjvE=; b=CbfamwXcjZiMceTkiFfbLBCUQVPt1cjU9r28wQlQBSNQ9VTbFrdX6mxBnDSwu7uoae H1JbJnEPh0z5upFhJ/AQXU3RSkD42kAVE/SNkWcfq5z7ct4A+g+LbPAIMRI1AcHgtnod 1Jeyq0eMI0hoI4XSI1wioZg4UPiivomFETB0GV4V5J+GzQ706rdN+KTCCvGA2ZfRJl0P bn7s27r7bcPOwpunfoXkuOsTvuwHfcXRqM3uWCixJHPwW11MSX5A+xl3CmhaoYSLIT+Z m2fH+nn+sxQ2lDd6uO/kZZywDWngbrsHaV7+T4qnKFZZx8QWpAi2s/7RoJSajjbIqhq2 yPCA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id b41-v6si23374738pla.306.2018.10.19.04.50.22; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 04:50:37 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727410AbeJSTza (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 19 Oct 2018 15:55:30 -0400 Received: from vmicros1.altlinux.org ([194.107.17.57]:37754 "EHLO vmicros1.altlinux.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727039AbeJSTza (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Oct 2018 15:55:30 -0400 Received: from imap.altlinux.org (imap.altlinux.org [194.107.17.38]) by vmicros1.altlinux.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78CA072CC59; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 14:49:44 +0300 (MSK) Received: from sole.flsd.net (sole.flsd.net [185.75.180.6]) by imap.altlinux.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 643744A4A16; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 14:49:44 +0300 (MSK) Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 14:49:44 +0300 From: Vitaly Chikunov To: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Alasdair Kergon , Mike Snitzer , dm-devel@redhat.com, Jonathan Corbet , Shaohua Li , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH] dm: add secdel target Message-ID: <20181019114944.syemvziebwfuruof@sole.flsd.net> References: <20181014112439.8119-1-vt@altlinux.org> <20181019061945.GA7403@infradead.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=koi8-r Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181019061945.GA7403@infradead.org> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20171215-106-ac61c7 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Oct 18, 2018 at 11:19:45PM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > Just as a note: the name is a complete misowner, a couple overwrite > are not in any way secure deletion. So naming it this way and exposing > this as erase is a problem that is going to get back to bite us. In what way it's not secure deletion? It's secure deletion by overwriting discarded data instead of leaving it as is. Thus it's secure deletion in some way. Level of security and applicability (disks choice) is to be determined by the end user. Because nobody could guarantee absolute security. Some three letter agencies require just one pass of overwrite, some say that more than one pass does not increase security. Some hardware disks advertising secure deletion may do not much more than this target. Thus 'secure erase' is applicable in that way too. > If you really want this anyway at least give it a different way, and > do a one-time warning when th first erase comes in that it is not in > any meaninful way secure. dm-erase or dm-wipe? dm-discerase? But still provide REQ_OP_SECURE_ERASE support?