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Date:   Fri, 19 Oct 2018 16:54:10 +0100
From:   Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc:     Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>,
        Jacob Bramley <jacob.bramley@arm.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
        Adam Wallis <awallis@codeaurora.org>,
        "Suzuki K . Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
        Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
        kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
        Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
        Amit Kachhap <Amit.Kachhap@arm.com>,
        Dave P Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 07/17] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support
Message-ID: <20181019155410.wsbmhluq4xqcyty2@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>
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On Fri, Oct 19, 2018 at 08:36:45AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 19, 2018 at 4:24 AM, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> > Assuming we want this (Kees -- I was under the impression that everything in
> > Android would end up with the same key otherwise?), then the question is
> > do we want:
> >
> >   - prctl() get/set operations for the key, or
> >   - prctl() set_random_key operation, or
> >   - both of the above?
> >
> > Part of the answer to that may lie in the requirements of CRIU, where I
> > strongly suspect they need explicit get/set operations, although these
> > could be gated on CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y.
> 
> Oh CRIU. Yikes. I'd like the get/set to be gated by the CONFIG, yes.
> No reason to allow explicit access to the key (and selected algo) if
> we don't have to.

As a minor aside, the PAC algorithm (which can be IMPLEMENTATION
DEFINED) is fixed in HW, and cannot be selected dynamically.

Thus if a process is using pointer authentication, it would not be
possible for CRIU to migrate that process to a CPU with a different PAC
algorithm.

Thanks,
Mark.