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From:   "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc:     Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Markus T Metzger <markus.t.metzger@intel.com>,
        Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
        "Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [v3 02/12] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE
Date:   Tue, 23 Oct 2018 11:42:24 -0700
Message-Id: <20181023184234.14025-3-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <20181023184234.14025-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

This is temporary.  It will allow the next few patches to be tested
incrementally.

Setting unsafe_fsgsbase is a root hole.  Don't do it.

[ chang: Minor fix. Add the TAINT_INSECURE flag. ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index ea8095521085..dfc2023b796b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2729,6 +2729,9 @@
 	no5lvl		[X86-64] Disable 5-level paging mode. Forces
 			kernel to use 4-level paging instead.
 
+	unsafe_fsgsbase	[X86] Allow FSGSBASE instructions.  This will be
+			replaced with a  nofsgsbase flag.
+
 	no_console_suspend
 			[HW] Never suspend the console
 			Disable suspending of consoles during suspend and
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 660d0b22e962..6c54e6d2fdfb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -365,6 +365,25 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Temporary hack: FSGSBASE is unsafe until a few kernel code paths are
+ * updated. This allows us to get the kernel ready incrementally. Setting
+ * unsafe_fsgsbase and TAINT_INSECURE flags will allow the series to be
+ * bisected if necessary.
+ *
+ * Once all the pieces are in place, these will go away and be replaced with
+ * a nofsgsbase chicken flag.
+ */
+static bool unsafe_fsgsbase;
+
+static __init int setup_unsafe_fsgsbase(char *arg)
+{
+	unsafe_fsgsbase = true;
+	add_taint(TAINT_INSECURE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("unsafe_fsgsbase", setup_unsafe_fsgsbase);
+
 /*
  * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
  */
@@ -1352,6 +1371,14 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	setup_smap(c);
 	setup_umip(c);
 
+	/* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
+		if (unsafe_fsgsbase)
+			cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
+		else
+			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
 	 * Now we do "generic changes."
-- 
2.19.1