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From:   David Abdurachmanov <david.abdurachmanov@gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 25 Oct 2018 20:31:30 +0200
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] RISC-V: Add support for SECCOMP
To:     Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc:     linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu,
        paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org,
        luto@amacapital.net, wad@chromium.org, wesley@sifive.com,
        dhowells@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, pombredanne@nexb.com,
        gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, kstewart@linuxfoundation.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com
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On Wed, Oct 24, 2018 at 10:40 PM Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> wrote:
>
> From: "Wesley W. Terpstra" <wesley@sifive.com>
>
> This is a fairly straight-forward implementation of seccomp for RISC-V
> systems.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wesley W. Terpstra <wesley@sifive.com>
> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
> ---
>  arch/riscv/Kconfig                   | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h     | 10 ++++++++++
>  arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h     |  6 ++++++
>  arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h |  1 +
>  include/uapi/linux/audit.h           |  1 +
>  5 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> index a344980287a5..28abe47602a1 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ config RISCV
>         select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER
>         select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
>         select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 if !64BIT || !RISCV_ISA_A
> +       select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
>         select HAVE_MEMBLOCK
>         select HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP
>         select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
> @@ -214,6 +215,22 @@ menu "Kernel type"
>
>  source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
>
> +config SECCOMP
> +       bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
> +
> +       help
> +         This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
> +         that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
> +         execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
> +         the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
> +         syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
> +         their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
> +         enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
> +         and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
> +         defined by each seccomp mode.
> +
> +         If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
> +
>  endmenu
>
>  menu "Bus support"
> @@ -243,3 +260,4 @@ menu "Power management options"
>  source kernel/power/Kconfig
>
>  endmenu
> +
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c1b4407f1038
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
> +/* Copyright 2018 SiFive, Inc. */
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_RISCV_SECCOMP_H
> +#define _ASM_RISCV_SECCOMP_H
> +
> +#include <asm/unistd.h>
> +
> +#include <asm-generic/seccomp.h>
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_SECCOMP_H */
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h
> index 8d25f8904c00..d24f774f39df 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h
> +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>  #define _ASM_RISCV_SYSCALL_H
>
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
>  #include <linux/err.h>
>
>  /* The array of function pointers for syscalls. */
> @@ -99,4 +100,9 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
>         memcpy(&regs->a1 + i * sizeof(regs->a1), args, n * sizeof(regs->a0));
>  }
>
> +static inline int syscall_get_arch(void)
> +{
> +       return AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV;
> +}
> +
>  #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_SYSCALL_H */
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> index f8fa1cd2dad9..374973dc05c6 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ struct thread_info {
>  #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK    4       /* restore signal mask in do_signal() */
>  #define TIF_MEMDIE             5       /* is terminating due to OOM killer */
>  #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT  6       /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
> +#define TIF_SECCOMP            7       /* seccomp syscall filtering active */
>
>  #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE     (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
>  #define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME     (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 818ae690ab79..c16fa1a76659 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ enum {
>  /* do not define AUDIT_ARCH_PPCLE since it is not supported by audit */
>  #define AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64       (EM_PPC64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT)
>  #define AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE     (EM_PPC64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
> +#define AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV       (EM_RISCV)
>  #define AUDIT_ARCH_S390                (EM_S390)
>  #define AUDIT_ARCH_S390X       (EM_S390|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT)
>  #define AUDIT_ARCH_SH          (EM_SH)

Palmer,

Half of the patch seems to touch audit parts. I started working on audit
support this morning, and I can boot Fedora with audit traces.

[root@fedora-riscv ~]# dmesg | grep audit
[    0.312000] audit: initializing netlink subsys (disabled)
[    0.316000] audit: type=2000 audit(0.316:1): state=initialized
audit_enabled=0 res=1
[    7.288000] audit: type=1130 audit(1529665913.772:2): pid=1 uid=0
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 msg='unit=systemd-remount-fs
comm="systemd" exe="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd" hostname=? addr=?
terminal=? res=success'
[    7.684000] audit: type=1130 audit(1529665914.176:3): pid=1 uid=0
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 msg='unit=systemd-sysctl comm="systemd"
exe="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd" hostname=? addr=? terminal=?
res=success'
[..]

I am still working on audit user-space support for better testing.

I suggest we first implement audit and then seccomp.

david