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[2001:14bb:52:7be:f0bf:dd2d:f008:5213]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j12-v6sm517117lja.8.2018.10.29.11.01.43 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 29 Oct 2018 11:01:44 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: [PATCH V5 0/5] KVM: X86: Introducing ROE Protection Kernel Hardening To: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood , Paolo Bonzini , rkrcmar@redhat.com, Jonathan Corbet , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ovich00@gmail.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, nigel.edwards@hpe.com, Boris Lukashev , Hossam Hassan <7ossam9063@gmail.com>, Ahmed Lotfy References: <20181026151223.16810-1-ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com> From: Igor Stoppa Message-ID: <1b3eb10e-c492-dc77-cbe6-3a3e692326d7@gmail.com> Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2018 20:01:42 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.2.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20181026151223.16810-1-ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi, On 26/10/2018 16:12, Ahmed Abd El Mawgood wrote: > This is the 5th version which is 4th version with minor fixes. ROE is a > hypercall that enables host operating system to restrict guest's access to its > own memory. This will provide a hardening mechanism that can be used to stop > rootkits from manipulating kernel static data structures and code. Once a memory > region is protected the guest kernel can't even request undoing the protection. This is very interesting, because it seems a very good match to the work I'm doing, for supporting the creation of more targets for protection: https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/10/23/3 In my case the protection would extend also to write-rate type of data. There is an open problem of identifying legitimate write-rare operations, however it should be possible to provide at least a certain degree of confidence. -- igor