Received: by 2002:ac0:98c7:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id g7-v6csp6200235imd; Wed, 31 Oct 2018 08:14:39 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AJdET5e3XDYRILPkuLv6sJMEZfUNeosfDqZ2rnBkTEpZHp/XTmnVNN/eMfdHzfYVLl91Ozdsm/AX X-Received: by 2002:a62:475c:: with SMTP id u89-v6mr3788375pfa.225.1540998879389; Wed, 31 Oct 2018 08:14:39 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1540998879; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=KkmdUTfNhZvxbriNYTXUU2fvR52ufwZZMs6LkDjmWHpLsLQJT6p6b4LdGBBkxVDR2+ DFWSAFKWVFnBL6Azxd4fA5v1mFgp7fUkn2UY6JaDgbKrqhVI5/NCYODXoVFaYINNHLxw rJRMMvOmVBPbS1IZD7aCRB/9kyGKWdeIsCOr5B3I0JVWIU7RptKt8yaOj7W9nP1IqFmI hmbwt5NLshuaJqAOer4Dw7vT0qPCDh2Jy8e4/Jnjxx26feTiIEbyGqKyoTKlnJWHA6pg p4IEr7hYsJMC496e8WoEisLzE2GNNBK6PYjwNZ2tXvfRng2669sw0GEJUoQ4A422v43N HYvQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:in-reply-to :content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id:subject:cc :to:from:date; bh=HpK7Snk4sStvcvL3SVGbEYka/W3tvTNgTRxhThuVCE4=; b=WyQNSb3kTvStcmr1D+GY/mdQcrDoWlUGkNHyTcsm50mRf0oat6Hv8wFAYAq51HsBhl qYTLPmZT0c4KzT4ilUHCaddSlf526DWk7PiXFToUs0N3vJBWU9AR4tXJ18bkN6jGOjfM staUC8FLKFpx/JRrLMHUI3yijC+ks7mhkCkx1rslo5HxYEl6hws+/B/GZcwWJ5t8Rmjt gvhKXDvhwfaAo1+q40bLvFywGk8GY/3VJIh1Itwuf00HzrKlhDaYPk7jrs9FW/2bzaYX SFYUfJtQN93/10cdLZXBbN/+8r+gbzv1YCOfydWqgs54Q+uSRECJ3Do0ohMcgljmFS5o hoxw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n17-v6si3536759pgk.501.2018.10.31.08.14.08; Wed, 31 Oct 2018 08:14:39 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729599AbeKAAIg (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 31 Oct 2018 20:08:36 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:47336 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728649AbeKAAIf (ORCPT ); Wed, 31 Oct 2018 20:08:35 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 29BBA330788; Wed, 31 Oct 2018 15:10:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from dhcp-27-174.brq.redhat.com (unknown [10.43.17.31]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 7AB5365918; Wed, 31 Oct 2018 15:10:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: by dhcp-27-174.brq.redhat.com (nbSMTP-1.00) for uid 1000 oleg@redhat.com; Wed, 31 Oct 2018 16:10:10 +0100 (CET) Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 16:10:07 +0100 From: Oleg Nesterov To: Daniel Colascione Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" , linux-kernel , Tim Murray , Joel Fernandes , Suren Baghdasaryan , Kees Cook , Christian Brauner Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] Implement /proc/pid/kill Message-ID: <20181031151007.GA21207@redhat.com> References: <20181029221037.87724-1-dancol@google.com> <87bm7a3et9.fsf@xmission.com> <20181031124435.GA9007@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.26]); Wed, 31 Oct 2018 15:10:11 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 10/31, Daniel Colascione wrote: > > > perhaps it would be simpler to do > > > > my_cred = override_creds(file->f_cred); > > kill_pid(...); > > revert_creds(my_cred); > > Thanks for the suggestion. That looks neat, but it's not quite enough. > The problem is that check_kill_permission looks for > same_thread_group(current, t) _before_ checking kill_of_by_cred, Yes, you are right. Looks like kill_pid_info_as_cred() can find another user, but probably it needs some changes with or without /proc/pid/kill ... > There's another problem though: say we open /proc/pid/5/kill *, with > proc 5 being an ordinary unprivileged process, e.g., the shell. At > open(2) time, the access check passes. Now suppose PID 5 execve(2)s > into a setuid process. The kill FD is still open, so the kill FD's > holder can send a signal Confused... why? kill_ok_by_cred() should fail? Oleg.