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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>,
        Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.18 122/150] ethtool: fix a privilege escalation bug
Date:   Fri,  2 Nov 2018 19:34:44 +0100
Message-Id: <20181102182911.454589845@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20181102182902.250560510@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20181102182902.250560510@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>

[ Upstream commit 58f5bbe331c566f49c9559568f982202a278aa78 ]

In dev_ethtool(), the eth command 'ethcmd' is firstly copied from the
use-space buffer 'useraddr' and checked to see whether it is
ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE. If yes, the sub-command 'sub_cmd' is further copied from
the user space. Otherwise, 'sub_cmd' is the same as 'ethcmd'. Next,
according to 'sub_cmd', a permission check is enforced through the function
ns_capable(). For example, the permission check is required if 'sub_cmd' is
ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE, but it is not necessary if 'sub_cmd' is
ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE, as suggested in the comment "Allow some commands to be
done by anyone". The following execution invokes different handlers
according to 'ethcmd'. Specifically, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE,
ethtool_set_per_queue() is called. In ethtool_set_per_queue(), the kernel
object 'per_queue_opt' is copied again from the user-space buffer
'useraddr' and 'per_queue_opt.sub_command' is used to determine which
operation should be performed. Given that the buffer 'useraddr' is in the
user space, a malicious user can race to change the sub-command between the
two copies. In particular, the attacker can supply ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE and
ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE to bypass the permission check in dev_ethtool(). Then
before ethtool_set_per_queue() is called, the attacker changes
ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE to ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE. In this way, the attacker can
bypass the permission check and execute ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE.

This patch enforces a check in ethtool_set_per_queue() after the second
copy from 'useraddr'. If the sub-command is different from the one obtained
in the first copy in dev_ethtool(), an error code EINVAL will be returned.

Fixes: f38d138a7da6 ("net/ethtool: support set coalesce per queue")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/ethtool.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -2461,13 +2461,17 @@ roll_back:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int ethtool_set_per_queue(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
+static int ethtool_set_per_queue(struct net_device *dev,
+				 void __user *useraddr, u32 sub_cmd)
 {
 	struct ethtool_per_queue_op per_queue_opt;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&per_queue_opt, useraddr, sizeof(per_queue_opt)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	if (per_queue_opt.sub_command != sub_cmd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	switch (per_queue_opt.sub_command) {
 	case ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE:
 		return ethtool_get_per_queue_coalesce(dev, useraddr, &per_queue_opt);
@@ -2838,7 +2842,7 @@ int dev_ethtool(struct net *net, struct
 		rc = ethtool_get_phy_stats(dev, useraddr);
 		break;
 	case ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE:
-		rc = ethtool_set_per_queue(dev, useraddr);
+		rc = ethtool_set_per_queue(dev, useraddr, sub_cmd);
 		break;
 	case ETHTOOL_GLINKSETTINGS:
 		rc = ethtool_get_link_ksettings(dev, useraddr);