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Biederman" , Amir Goldstein , Randy Dunlap , Stephen Smalley , linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred Message-ID: <20181106201118.GB21939@redhat.com> References: <20181105212117.135347-1-salyzyn@android.com> <20181105212117.135347-2-salyzyn@android.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181105212117.135347-2-salyzyn@android.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.1 (2017-09-22) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.11 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.31]); Tue, 06 Nov 2018 20:11:19 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 01:21:14PM -0800, Mark Salyzyn wrote: > By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the > recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are > checked against the caller's credentials. > > If the principles of least privilege are applied, the mounter's > credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when > accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower > DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally > higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector. > > We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all > subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the > caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option > override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", > existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds. Can you also write few lines about where this new model is useful? Are you using it already and does it reasonably work well? Thanks Vivek > > Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn > Cc: Miklos Szeredi > Cc: Jonathan Corbet > Cc: Vivek Goyal > Cc: Eric W. Biederman > Cc: Amir Goldstein > Cc: Randy Dunlap > Cc: Stephen Smalley > Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Cc: kernel-team@android.com > --- > v7: > - change name of internal parameter to ovl_override_creds_def > - report override_creds only if different than default > > v6: > - Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS. > - Do better with the documentation. > - pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences. > > v5: > - beefed up the caveats in the Documentation > - Is dependent on > "overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh" > "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout" > - Added prwarn when override_creds=off > > v4: > - spelling and grammar errors in text > > v3: > - Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the > boolean override_creds. > - Changed from creator to mounter credentials. > - Updated and fortified the documentation. > - Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS > > v2: > - Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error. > - altered commit message. > > Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt | 17 +++++++++++++++++ > fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +- > fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 9 +++++---- > fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 16 ++++++++-------- > fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 6 +++--- > fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + > fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + > fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 4 ++-- > fs/overlayfs/super.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++- > fs/overlayfs/util.c | 12 ++++++++++-- > 10 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt > index eef7d9d259e8..5cc299df4436 100644 > --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt > +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt > @@ -102,6 +102,23 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged. Other content > such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper > directory only. These attributes of the lower directory are hidden. > > +credentials > +----------- > + > +By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the > +recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are > +checked against the caller's credentials. > + > +override_creds mount flag turned off is reserved for when mounter and > +caller MAC or DAC credentials do not overlap. Several unintended side > +effects will occur. The caller with a lower privilege will not be > +able to delete files or directories, create nodes, or search some > +directories. The caller with higher privilege can perform unexpected > +or unsecured operations. The uneven security model where upperdir > +and workdir are opened at privilege, but accessed without, should only > +be used with strict understanding of the side effects and of the > +security policies. > + > whiteouts and opaque directories > -------------------------------- > > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c > index 9e62dcf06fc4..dfab62ce7504 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c > @@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags) > dput(parent); > dput(next); > } > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > > return err; > } > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c > index c6289147c787..b7052e23c467 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c > @@ -566,7 +566,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, > override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid; > if (!attr->hardlink) { > err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry, > - attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred, > + attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, > + old_cred ? old_cred : current_cred(), > override_cred); > if (err) { > put_cred(override_cred); > @@ -582,7 +583,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, > err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr); > } > out_revert_creds: > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > return err; > } > > @@ -842,7 +843,7 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir) > err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list); > else > err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > if (!err) { > if (is_dir) > clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode); > @@ -1212,7 +1213,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old, > out_unlock: > unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir); > out_revert_creds: > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > if (update_nlink) > ovl_nlink_end(new); > out_drop_write: > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c > index 6bcc9dedc342..192f5508ed45 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c > @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) > inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode); > old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > if (!err) > ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode); > inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode); > @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, > stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink; > > out: > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > > return err; > } > @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > > old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); > err = inode_permission(realinode, mask); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > > return err; > } > @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, > > old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > return p; > } > > @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, > WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE); > err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name); > } > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > > /* copy c/mtime */ > ovl_copyattr(d_inode(realdentry), inode); > @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, > > old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > return res; > } > > @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) > > old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > if (res <= 0 || size == 0) > return res; > > @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type) > > old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); > acl = get_acl(realinode, type); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > > return acl; > } > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > index 3ac9dc8f6cc0..c32fa8ed72e6 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > @@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, > goto out_free_oe; > } > > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > if (origin_path) { > dput(origin_path->dentry); > kfree(origin_path); > @@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, > kfree(upperredirect); > out: > kfree(d.redirect); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > return ERR_PTR(err); > } > > @@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) > dput(this); > } > } > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > > return positive; > } > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h > index 5e45cb3630a0..6f8b6f9ff357 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h > @@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry); > void ovl_drop_write(struct dentry *dentry); > struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry); > const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb); > +void ovl_revert_creds(const struct cred *oldcred); > struct super_block *ovl_same_sb(struct super_block *sb); > int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb); > struct dentry *ovl_indexdir(struct super_block *sb); > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h > index ec237035333a..e38eea8104be 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ struct ovl_config { > bool nfs_export; > int xino; > bool metacopy; > + bool override_creds; > }; > > struct ovl_sb { > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c > index cc8303a806b4..ec591b49e902 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c > @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd) > } > inode_unlock(dir->d_inode); > } > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > > return err; > } > @@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list) > > old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > if (err) > return err; > > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c > index 0116735cc321..8a018e5e7c2e 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c > @@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644); > MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_xino_auto_def, > "Auto enable xino feature"); > > +static bool __read_mostly ovl_override_creds_def = true; > +module_param_named(override_creds, ovl_override_creds_def, bool, 0644); > +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_override_creds_def, > + "Use mounter's credentials for accesses"); > + > static void ovl_entry_stack_free(struct ovl_entry *oe) > { > unsigned int i; > @@ -362,6 +367,9 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry) > if (ofs->config.metacopy != ovl_metacopy_def) > seq_printf(m, ",metacopy=%s", > ofs->config.metacopy ? "on" : "off"); > + if (ofs->config.override_creds != ovl_override_creds_def) > + seq_show_option(m, "override_creds", > + ofs->config.override_creds ? "on" : "off"); > return 0; > } > > @@ -401,6 +409,8 @@ enum { > OPT_XINO_AUTO, > OPT_METACOPY_ON, > OPT_METACOPY_OFF, > + OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON, > + OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF, > OPT_ERR, > }; > > @@ -419,6 +429,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = { > {OPT_XINO_AUTO, "xino=auto"}, > {OPT_METACOPY_ON, "metacopy=on"}, > {OPT_METACOPY_OFF, "metacopy=off"}, > + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON, "override_creds=on"}, > + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF, "override_creds=off"}, > {OPT_ERR, NULL} > }; > > @@ -477,6 +489,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) > config->redirect_mode = kstrdup(ovl_redirect_mode_def(), GFP_KERNEL); > if (!config->redirect_mode) > return -ENOMEM; > + config->override_creds = ovl_override_creds_def; > > while ((p = ovl_next_opt(&opt)) != NULL) { > int token; > @@ -557,6 +570,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) > config->metacopy = false; > break; > > + case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON: > + config->override_creds = true; > + break; > + > + case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF: > + config->override_creds = false; > + break; > + > default: > pr_err("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n", p); > return -EINVAL; > @@ -1549,7 +1570,8 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) > ovl_dentry_lower(root_dentry), NULL); > > sb->s_root = root_dentry; > - > + if (!ofs->config.override_creds) > + pr_warn("overlayfs: override_creds=off, caller credentials may not be enough to delete file or directories, create nodes, or search directories.\n"); > return 0; > > out_free_oe: > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c > index 7c01327b1852..484d7f76ac9c 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c > @@ -40,9 +40,17 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) > { > struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info; > > + if (!ofs->config.override_creds) > + return NULL; > return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); > } > > +void ovl_revert_creds(const struct cred *old_cred) > +{ > + if (old_cred) > + revert_creds(old_cred); > +} > + > struct super_block *ovl_same_sb(struct super_block *sb) > { > struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info; > @@ -782,7 +790,7 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry) > * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr. > */ > err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > > out: > if (err) > @@ -800,7 +808,7 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry) > > old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); > } > > ovl_inode_unlock(inode); > -- > 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog >