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R. Silva" , Felipe Balbi Subject: [PATCH 4.9 164/171] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 13:52:14 -0800 Message-Id: <20181108215138.854437480@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181108215127.257643509@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20181108215127.257643509@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit 9ae24af3669111d418242caec8dd4ebd9ba26860 upstream. num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn: potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index fsg_opts->common->luns Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Acked-by: Felipe Balbi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c @@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ #include #include +#include + #include "configfs.h" @@ -3260,6 +3262,7 @@ static struct config_group *fsg_lun_make fsg_opts = to_fsg_opts(&group->cg_item); if (num >= FSG_MAX_LUNS) return ERR_PTR(-ERANGE); + num = array_index_nospec(num, FSG_MAX_LUNS); mutex_lock(&fsg_opts->lock); if (fsg_opts->refcnt || fsg_opts->common->luns[num]) {