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[128.68.186.150]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id p91sm856297lfg.4.2018.11.09.15.09.09 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 09 Nov 2018 15:09:10 -0800 (PST) Reply-To: alex.popov@linux.com Subject: Re: afaef01c00 ("x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack .."): double fault: 0000 [#1] To: Andy Lutomirski , Jann Horn , Joerg Roedel Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Kees Cook , Ingo Molnar , Thomas Gleixner , lkp@01.org, lkp@intel.com, Kernel Hardening , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel list , Dave Hansen References: <5be58a6e.w0IbLdKsiRknTygq%lkp@intel.com> <2B681F10-752C-4327-9960-3987CE17A619@amacapital.net> From: Alexander Popov Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=alex.popov@linux.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsFNBFX15q4BEADZartsIW3sQ9R+9TOuCFRIW+RDCoBWNHhqDLu+Tzf2mZevVSF0D5AMJW4f UB1QigxOuGIeSngfmgLspdYe2Kl8+P8qyfrnBcS4hLFyLGjaP7UVGtpUl7CUxz2Hct3yhsPz ID/rnCSd0Q+3thrJTq44b2kIKqM1swt/F2Er5Bl0B4o5WKx4J9k6Dz7bAMjKD8pHZJnScoP4 dzKPhrytN/iWM01eRZRc1TcIdVsRZC3hcVE6OtFoamaYmePDwWTRhmDtWYngbRDVGe3Tl8bT 7BYN7gv7Ikt7Nq2T2TOfXEQqr9CtidxBNsqFEaajbFvpLDpUPw692+4lUbQ7FL0B1WYLvWkG cVysClEyX3VBSMzIG5eTF0Dng9RqItUxpbD317ihKqYL95jk6eK6XyI8wVOCEa1V3MhtvzUo WGZVkwm9eMVZ05GbhzmT7KHBEBbCkihS+TpVxOgzvuV+heCEaaxIDWY/k8u4tgbrVVk+tIVG 99v1//kNLqd5KuwY1Y2/h2MhRrfxqGz+l/f/qghKh+1iptm6McN//1nNaIbzXQ2Ej34jeWDa xAN1C1OANOyV7mYuYPNDl5c9QrbcNGg3D6gOeGeGiMn11NjbjHae3ipH8MkX7/k8pH5q4Lhh Ra0vtJspeg77CS4b7+WC5jlK3UAKoUja3kGgkCrnfNkvKjrkEwARAQABzSZBbGV4YW5kZXIg UG9wb3YgPGFsZXgucG9wb3ZAbGludXguY29tPsLBgAQTAQoAKgIbIwIeAQIXgAULCQgHAwUV CgkICwUWAgMBAAUJB8+UXAUCWgsUegIZAQAKCRCODp3rvH6PqqpOEACX+tXHOgMJ6fGxaNJZ HkKRFR/9AGP1bxp5QS528Sd6w17bMMQ87V5NSFUsTMPMcbIoO73DganKQ3nN6tW0ZvDTKpRt pBUCUP8KPqNvoSs3kkskaQgNQ3FXv46YqPZ7DoYj9HevY9NUyGLwCTEWD2ER5zKuNbI2ek82 j4rwdqXn9kqqBf1ExAoEsszeNHzTKRl2d+bXuGDcOdpnOi7avoQfwi/O0oapR+goxz49Oeov YFf1EVaogHjDBREaqiqJ0MSKexfVBt8RD9ev9SGSIMcwfhgUHhMTX2JY/+6BXnUbzVcHD6HR EgqVGn/0RXfJIYmFsjH0Z6cHy34Vn+aqcGa8faztPnmkA/vNfhw8k5fEE7VlBqdEY8YeOiza hHdpaUi4GofNy/GoHIqpz16UulMjGB5SBzgsYKgCO+faNBrCcBrscWTl1aJfSNJvImuS1JhB EQnl/MIegxyBBRsH68x5BCffERo4FjaG0NDCmZLjXPOgMvl3vRywHLdDZThjAea3pwdGUq+W C77i7tnnUqgK7P9i+nEKwNWZfLpfjYgH5JE/jOgMf4tpHvO6fu4AnOffdz3kOxDyi+zFLVcz rTP5b46aVjI7D0dIDTIaCKUT+PfsLnJmP18x7dU/gR/XDcUaSEbWU3D9u61AvxP47g7tN5+a 5pFIJhJ44JLk6I5H/c7BTQRV9eauARAArcUVf6RdT14hkm0zT5TPc/3BJc6PyAghV/iCoPm8 kbzjKBIK80NvGodDeUV0MnQbX40jjFdSI0m96HNt86FtifQ3nwuW/BtS8dk8+lakRVwuTgMb hJWmXqKMFdVRCbjdyLbZWpdPip0WGND6p5i801xgPRmI8P6e5e4jBO4Cx1ToIFyJOzD/jvtb UhH9t5/naKUGa5BD9gSkguooXVOFvPdvKQKca19S7bb9hzjySh63H4qlbhUrG/7JGhX+Lr3g DwuAGrrFIV0FaVyIPGZ8U2fjLKpcBC7/lZJv0jRFpZ9CjHefILxt7NGxPB9hk2iDt2tE6jSl GNeloDYJUVItFmG+/giza2KrXmDEFKl+/mwfjRI/+PHR8PscWiB7S1zhsVus3DxhbM2mAK4x mmH4k0wNfgClh0Srw9zCU2CKJ6YcuRLi/RAAiyoxBb9wnSuQS5KkxoT32LRNwfyMdwlEtQGp WtC/vBI13XJVabx0Oalx7NtvRCcX1FX9rnKVjSFHX5YJ48heAd0dwRVmzOGL/EGywb1b9Q3O IWe9EFF8tmWV/JHs2thMz492qTHA5pm5JUsHQuZGBhBU+GqdOkdkFvujcNu4w7WyuEITBFAh 5qDiGkvY9FU1OH0fWQqVU/5LHNizzIYN2KjU6529b0VTVGb4e/M0HglwtlWpkpfQzHMAEQEA AcLBZQQYAQIADwUCVfXmrgIbDAUJCWYBgAAKCRCODp3rvH6PqrZtEACKsd/UUtpKmy4mrZwl 053nWp7+WCE+S9ke7CFytmXoMWf1CIrcQTk5cmdBmB4E0l3sr/DgKlJ8UrHTdRLcZZnbVqur +fnmVeQy9lqGkaIZvx/iXVYUqhT3+DNj9Zkjrynbe5pLsrGyxYWfsPRVL6J4mQatChadjuLw 7/WC6PBmWkRA2SxUVpxFEZlirpbboYWLSXk9I3JmS5/iJ+P5kHYiB0YqYkd1twFXXxixv1GB Zi/idvWTK7x6/bUh0AAGTKc5zFhyR4DJRGROGlFTAYM3WDoa9XbrHXsggJDLNoPZJTj9DMww u28SzHLvR3t2pY1dT61jzKNDLoE3pjvzgLKF/Olif0t7+m0IPKY+8umZvUEhJ9CAUcoFPCfG tEbL6t1xrcsT7dsUhZpkIX0Qc77op8GHlfNd/N6wZUt19Vn9G8B6xrH+dinc0ylUc4+4yxt6 6BsiEzma6Ah5jexChYIwaB5Oi21yjc6bBb4l6z01WWJQ052OGaOBzi+tS5iGmc5DWH4/pFqX OIkgJVVgjPv2y41qV66QJJEi2wT4WUKLY1zA9s6KXbt8dVSzJsNFvsrAoFdtzc8v6uqCo0/W f0Id8MBKoqN5FniTHWNxYX6b2dFwq8i5Rh6Oxc6q75Kg8279+co3/tLCkU6pGga28K7tUP2z h9AUWENlnWJX/YhP8MLBZQQYAQoADwIbDAUCWgsSOgUJB9eShwAKCRCODp3rvH6PqtoND/41 ozCKAS4WWBBCU6AYLm2SoJ0EGhg1kIf9VMiqy5PKlSrAnW5yl4WJQcv5wER/7EzvZ49Gj8aG uRWfz3lyQU8dH2KG6KLilDFCZF0mViEo2C7O4QUx5xmbpMUq41fWjY947Xvd3QDisc1T1/7G uNBAALEZdqzwnKsT9G27e9Cd3AW3KsLAD4MhsALFARg6OuuwDCbLl6k5fu++26PEqORGtpJQ rRBWan9ZWb/Y57P126IVIylWiH6vt6iEPlaEHBU8H9+Z0WF6wJ5rNz9gR6GhZhmo1qsyNedD 1HzOsXQhvCinsErpZs99VdZSF3d54dac8ypH4hvbjSmXZjY3Sblhyc6RLYlru5UXJFh7Hy+E TMuCg3hIVbdyFSDkvxVlvhHgUSf8+Uk3Ya4MO4a5l9ElUqxpSqYH7CvuwkG+mH5mN8tK3CCd +aKPCxUFfil62DfTa7YgLovr7sHQB+VMQkNDPXleC+amNqJb423L8M2sfCi9gw/lA1ha6q80 ydgbcFEkNjqz4OtbrSwEHMy/ADsUWksYuzVbw7/pQTc6OAskESBr5igP7B/rIACUgiIjdOVB ktD1IQcezrDcuzVCIpuq8zC6LwLm7V1Tr6zfU9FWwnqzoQeQZH4QlP7MBuOeswCpxIl07mz9 jXz/74kjFsyRgZA+d6a1pGtOwITEBxtxxg== Message-ID: Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2018 02:09:09 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.2.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <2B681F10-752C-4327-9960-3987CE17A619@amacapital.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 09.11.2018 23:46, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Nov 9, 2018, at 12:06 PM, Jann Horn wrote: >> >> +Andy, Thomas, Ingo >> >>> On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 2:24 PM kernel test robot wrote: >>> 0day kernel testing robot got the below dmesg and the first bad commit is >>> >>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master >>> >>> commit afaef01c001537fa97a25092d7f54d764dc7d8c1 >>> Author: Alexander Popov >>> AuthorDate: Fri Aug 17 01:16:58 2018 +0300 >>> Commit: Kees Cook >>> CommitDate: Tue Sep 4 10:35:47 2018 -0700 >>> >>> x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls >> [...] >>> [ 127.808225] double fault: 0000 [#1] >>> [ 127.808695] CPU: 0 PID: 414 Comm: trinity-main Tainted: G T 4.19.0-rc2-00001-gafaef01 #1 >>> [ 127.809799] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 >>> [ 127.810760] RIP: 0010:ftrace_ops_test+0x27/0xa0 >>> [ 127.811289] Code: eb 9a 90 41 54 55 49 89 f4 53 48 89 d3 48 89 fd 48 81 ec b0 00 00 00 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 84 24 a8 00 00 00 31 c0 54 df ff ff 48 85 db 74 57 e8 4a df ff ff 48 8b 85 d0 00 00 00 >>> [ 127.813385] RSP: 0018:fffffe0000001fb8 EFLAGS: 00010046 >> [...] >>> [ 127.819762] CR2: fffffe0000001fa8 CR3: 000000001579a000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 >> [...] >>> [ 127.822234] Call Trace: >>> [ 127.822530] >>> [ 127.822914] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0x2f0/0x2f0 >>> [ 127.823395] ftrace_ops_list_func+0xa5/0x1b0 >>> [ 127.823922] ftrace_call+0x5/0x34 >>> [ 127.824318] ? stackleak_erase+0x5/0xf0 >>> [ 127.824789] ? stackleak_erase+0x43/0xf0 >>> [ 127.825260] stackleak_erase+0x5/0xf0 >>> [ 127.825699] syscall_return_via_sysret+0x61/0x81 >>> [ 127.826238] WARNING: stack recursion on stack type 4 >>> [ 127.826243] WARNING: can't dereference registers at (____ptrval____) for ip syscall_return_via_sysret+0x61/0x81 >>> [ 127.826246] >>> [ 127.828342] ---[ end trace e9f96d3f45575499 ]--- >>> [ 127.828911] RIP: 0010:ftrace_ops_test+0x27/0xa0 >> >> CR2: fffffe0000001fa8, RSP: 0018:fffffe0000001fb8; this is a pagefault >> on the stack. fffffe0000000000 is CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT; >> fffffe0000001000 is CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PER_CPU; so fffffe0000002000 is the >> page with the entry stack for cpu 0, and you overflowed from that into >> the readonly gdt at fffffe0000001000, which doubles as a guard page >> for the entry stack: >> >> struct cpu_entry_area { >> char gdt[PAGE_SIZE]; >> >> /* >> * The GDT is just below entry_stack and thus serves (on x86_64) as >> * a a read-only guard page. >> */ >> struct entry_stack_page entry_stack_page; >> [...] >> }; >> >> In other words: You're calling C code on the entry trampoline stack; >> this C code can call into ftrace; and the entry trampoline stack isn't >> big enough for ftrace shenanigans. I think you probably shouldn't be >> calling C code on the entry stack, but maybe one of the X86 folks has >> a different opinion? > > My opinion was that, on x86_32, the entry stack ought to be fairly large so > that NMIs could execute on the entry stack. I don’t remember what the code > actually does, though. > > But stackleak_erase should probably not run on the entry stack. That seems > like it’s just asking for trouble. Hello Jann and Andy, The stackleak_erase() function is called on the trampoline stack at the end of syscall, it erases the used part of the kernel thread stack after the syscall is handled. I've reproduced such a double fault with function tracing for stackleak_erase(): # mount -t tracefs nodev /sys/kernel/tracing # echo 'p:myprobe stackleak_erase' > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/myprobe/enable I think we should simply not allow function tracing for stackleak_*() functions: diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index 7343b3a..0906f6d 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MULTIUSER) += groups.o ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER # Do not trace internal ftrace files CFLAGS_REMOVE_irq_work.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_stackleak.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) endif With this patch setting kprobe event for stackleak_erase() is not allowed. This is the corresponding dmesg output: [ 75.660478] trace_kprobe: Could not probe notrace function stackleak_erase If you agree, I'll prepare the patch for LKML. Best regards, Alexander